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Abstract
The exploitation, for useful work, of the energy released by the rise and fall 
of the tides is not a new phenomenon. History records the existence of tide 
mills, particularly in England and France, many centuries ago.
The conversion of the diurnal movement of the tides into electrical energy 
by the construction of barrages is, however, comparatively new, the first 
hard evidence of the technology appearing in the literature some seventy 
years ago. England, particularly the west coast of the country, has been 
identified as having very considerable tidal resources and this thesis 
reviews in detail the several tidal barrage schemes which have been 
proposed for a number of estuaries, including the Severn and the Mersey.
The successful construction in the 1960’s of the 240MW tidal generation 
scheme on the Ranee River in Northern France could perhaps have been 
expected to provide the impetus required for a tidal project to be agreed in 
this country. It remains a fact, however, that despite the information 
available from the successful implementation of the Ranee scheme, the 
succession of Symposia held on the subject, the conclusions drawn by 
expert Committees, the research and development undertaken by specialist 
Companies, together with calls for action, no electricity generating barrage 
has been constructed, or even authorised, in this country.
This thesis places on record the results of a detailed review of the 
extensive literature which now exists on the subject of tidal power. While 
so doing, it also attempts to provide insights into possible reasons why, 
despite environmental pressure for the control and reduction of emissions
from fossil-fired power stations and public aversion to nuclear generated 
electricity, this country’s significant tidal resource of renewable green 
energy has not so far been tapped for electricity generation purposes.
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Summary of Severn Barrage Proposals 
(See Fig 1).
1
Table 1
Date Comments
1920
1933
1945
m i
1985
1989
Nov
1991
First Tidal Barrage Proposal. No copy of original Report prepared by 
Civil Engineering Dept, of the Ministry of Transport now available. 
Certain details contained in ‘Studies in Tidal Power’ by N. Davey pl38- 
149.
‘English Stones’ the recommended site; Ebb generation with Pumped 
Storage reservoir at Trelleck Grange. Estimated annual output from DC 
machines 1.36TWh.
First major Report. Committee chaired by J.T.C. Moore-Brabazon. 
‘English Stones’ the recommended site, with Pumped Storage at 
Trelleck Grange as 1920 proposal. Estimated annual output from AC 
machines 2.25TWh.
Second major Report. Committee, chaired by A.C. Vaughan-Lee. 
‘English Stones’ again the recommended site for a barrage. Considered 
unnecessary to develop any Pumped Storage facility in view of newly 
constructed ‘Grid’ transmission system. Estimated annual output 
2.365TWh.
Third major Report. Committee, chaired by Sir Hermann Bondi, 
reviewed whole of Severn estuary and concluded that a barrage from 
Lavemock Pt. to Brean Down (Cardiff-Weston) was the most favoured. 
The ebb generation scheme anticipated to produce 12.9 TWh annually.
Fourth major Report. Produced on this occasion by STPG - concluded 
that Bondi barrage line should be adjusted to eliminate ‘dog-legs’. 
Output coincidentally increased to 14.4TWh by introduction of flood 
pumping.
Fifth major Report. Second report by STPG. Barrage line re-adjusted 
as a result of geological survey and hydrodynamic studies. Annual 
output increased to 17TWh* by optimising generating capacity of the 
ebb generation flood pumping scheme.
Representatives of STPG summoned to appear before the Select 
Committee on (Renewable) Energy.
* 17TWh of tidal generation reduces CO2 emissions by approximately 17M- 
18M tonnes if coal-fired generating plant is displaced.
2Table 2
Summary of Severn Barrage Details
GENERATION CAPITAL CONSTN. UNIT COAL
DATE DETAILS COST
m
TIME
YRS
COST
p/kWh
SAVED 
lannuallv 
M tonnes
1920 400 Kaplan turbines 
3m runner diam. 
1300kW DC 
machines. 520MW
28 ‘Several’
0.21
(6%
interest
ra te)
1
1933
72 Kaplan turbines. 
6m runner diam. 
12.7MW AC 
machines. 914MW 
lof which 850MW 
would be available 
at any one time)
38 15
0.075
(4%
interest
ra te)
1.8
1945
32 Kaplan turbines. 
6m runner diam. 
25MW alternators 
800MW
47 8
0.083
(3%
interest
ra te)
1
1981
160 Bulb turbines 
9m runner diam. 
45MW alternators 
7200MW
5660 12
3.1
(5%
discount
ra te)
6
1985
192 Bulb turbines 
8.2m runner diam. 
37.5MW 
alternators 
7200MW
5543 9
3.0
(5%
discount
ra te)
6
1989
216 Bulb turbines 
9m runner diam. 
40MW alternators 
8640MW
8280 9
34
(5%
discount
ra te)
8*
Equivalent to approximately 18M tonnes of CO2 emissions annually.
F,c i
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Summary of Mersey Barrage Proposals 
(See Fig 2)
D ate Comments
i m
1986
Undated MBC handout 
- probably 1988-9.
Stage II 
Studies 1990
Stage III 
studies 
1991.
Nov 1991
Pre-feasibility studies undertaken on behalf of 
Merseyside County Council. Three barrage lines 
(Lines 1,2 and 3) identified - Line 2 quickly rejected. 
Barrages at Lines 1 and 3 anticipated to produce 
1.2TWh and 0.965TWh respectively using Straflo 
machines. Construction period approximately 6 years.
Mersey Barrage Company formed.
Line 1 adjusted to provide better arrangement for 
shipping interests - designated Line lA . Outputs 
reconsidered with bulb turbines and flood pumping. 
Line 1 A -1.33 TWh with pumping (1.27TWh without); 
Line 3 - 106TWh with pumping (1.02TWh without).
Line 3 revised to new favoured site 600m upstream of 
original line. Line lA  abandoned.
Line 3 now expected to produce 1.5TWh* with flood 
pumping. Construction time 5 years, Revised Cost 
€880m. (Line designated 3B).
250 page Report submitted to D of E on environmental 
matters. More details requested.
Representatives of MBC summoned to appear before 
the Select Committee on (Renewable) Energy.
* 1.5TWh of tidal generation reduces CO2 emissions by approximately 1.7M 
tonnes if coal-fired generating plant is displaced.
5Table 4
Summary of Mersev Barrage Details
DATE GENERATION CAPITAL CONSTN UNIT COAL
DETAILS TIME
YEARS
COST
p/KWh
SAVED
(annuallv)
M Tonnes
I W
Straflo turbines driving 
Line 1 - 27 x 23MW 
Line 3 - 2 1  x 23MW 
alternators:- 621 MW (1) 
483MW(3)
Bulb Turbines - 7.6m 
runner diam. 25MW
522
395
~ 6 years 2.89
2.71
-
1986 alternators.
Line lA  (27) 675MW 
Line 3 (21) 525MW
Bulb Turbines - 8m
<r- as above
1989 runner diam.
Line 3A 26 x 25MW
Line 3B. 28 x 25MW
1990 bulb turbine alternators 
700MW
880 5 5.65 0.7*
* Equivalent to approximately 1.5M tonnes of CO2 emissions annually.
srif cA^ftu
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Introduction
The demand for energy and particularly for its electrical form continues to 
increase world-wide. Many would argue that a halt, or at least a reduction in 
the rate of increase of this commodity, is a major priority if global 
environmental catastrophe is to be averted.
In this country at least, the seven per cent annual increase in electricity 
demand, identified following nationalisation in the late 1940s has, over 
succeeding years, been drastically reduced, the average anticipated annual 
growth in electricity requirements for the 1990s now being predicted at around 
one per cent.
During the period of nationalisation, the generation interests of the electrical 
supply industry followed a generally identifiable course. The planning 
processes incorporated the advantages of economy of scale, with larger and 
larger output machines being connected to the busbars, with a loose strategy of 
fuel mix and including an element of nuclear generation. Indigenous coal 
resources, however, remained the dominant primary fuel throughout the period, 
with large scale burning of natural gas for electricity generation being 
effectively banned by Government legislation.
The generation planning scenario summarised above has been completely 
overturned by the privatisation of the electricity supply industry, the emission 
requirements of the EC large combustion plant directive (LCPD), the freeing of 
natural gas reserves as a power station fuel and a general relaxation of 
generation planning restraints allowing new generating interests to enter the 
field in the early 1990’s.
8The combined cycle gas turbine (CCGT) generating station, with its short 
construction phase and comparatively low capital cost per installed kW has 
become very popular. On the basis of present trends, it is anticipated that 
some 7000-10,000MW of such plant will have been commissioned by the 
middle 1990’s. The owners of this generation will, with the approval of 
government and the Regulator (OFFER) mainly be the present Distribution 
Electricity Companies (DECs) in association with private investors.
The seven year statement recently published by the National Grid Company 
(NGC) suggests that, including CCGT capacity, the uprating of the 
Scotland/England interconnector and the commissioning of Sizewell ’B', more 
than 22GW of new generation will become available to the electricity supply 
network before the end of the century. The NGC statement also indicates that, 
taking account of the programmed decommissioning of the older, mainly coal- 
fired, stations, (although some nuclear stations are likely also to be involved) 
generating capacity of 82GW will remain available, to be set against a 
predicted demand of somewhat less than 53GW.
Such over-capacity developments run counter to the commercial environment 
envisaged as a result of privatisation, a reduction in capacity margin being 
predicted at that time. There are already suggestions that the gas-bum 
proposed must be limited in view of the finite indigenous reserves available; 
also that the rate of decommissioning of the older fossil-fuelled plant will be 
required to accelerate to meet commercial and environmental pressures. But it 
is evident, in view of the long term (fifteen years plus) gas contracts which 
have been successfully negotiated together with their matching electricity 
supply agreements, that all presently identified base load requirements of the 
country will be satisfied, well into the 2000's, by the modem base load plant 
already connected in conjunction with CCGT.
Demands for greater energy conservation, for more stringent control of 
greenhouse gases, for the possible introduction by the EC of a carbon tax 
continue to grow, any of which may have some small influence on present UK 
attitudes to energy conversion processes. But it is apparent that, unless 
pressures other than technical or commercial are applied, the utilisation of 
environmentally friendly renewable energy on any significant scale or in any 
form is unlikely in this country for the foreseeable future. The non-fossil fuel 
obligation (NFFO) has been of some assistance to the small scale wind 
generation systems but, as presently conceived, cannot be brought to bear on 
the huge costs associated with large scale tidal power and electricity producing 
schemes such as the Severn and Mersey Barrages.
It is against this backdrop that the thesis reviews the early history of tidal 
power and identifies its progress in this country over the twentieth century.
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Chapter 1
The Earlv History of Tidal Power
According to Charlier (1), Bernard Forest de Bélidor (2) is the individual to be 
credited with drawing the attention of the technical experts, in 1737, to the 
latent power of the tides although Wickert (3) is of the opinion that the oldest 
treatise on tide utilisation, that due to Mariano, predates the Bélidor work by 
some three hundred years. Davey (4) lists some one hundred and fifty patents 
taken out in England alone over the period 1856-1920 dealing with the subject 
of tidal power development.
An examination of this literature confirms that the ideas associated with all 
such proposals fall into one of four categories in their attempts to produce 
mechanical/rotational output from the rise and fall of the tides. The first 
category, utilising one Of the most common principles and incorporated in a 
number of the early patents, could be called the 'float system'. The first of the 
many patents associated with the principle was taken out in France by 
Chauvet in 1837 (5). Basically simple in concept (any complication being 
introduced by the aspiring patentee), the system consisted merely of a weight 
or float initially raised by the rising tide, being caused to do work, via systems 
of links and levers, racks and pinions, as it fell with the receding tide. The 
gearing was eliminated, in certain of the patents, by attaching the float to a 
hydraulic accumulator and directing the output to a Pelton wheel. A simple 
analysis of the float arrangement confirms the very low mechanical output 
achievable by designs using this principle, even for considerable tidal ranges. 
The rotational motion imparted by a falling tide to a generator shaft would have 
been insufficient, certainly in the era under discussion, to achieve any 
significant usable electrical output.
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The second system, favoured by a number of early patentees, the so called 'tide 
mill', utilised physical water movement, the 'tidal stream', induced during 
ebb/flow of the tides, to provide motive power for the rotational operation of the 
water wheel immersed in the stream. There is considerable evidence in the 
literature that the tides have been harnessed in this manner for several 
centuries on a number of English (and other) rivers to provide energy for com 
grinding and irrigation purposes. Tide mills are in fact conventional water mills 
which utilise the tidal current as their source of power. Some of them included 
a refinement of a retaining basin or pond to impound some of the incoming sea 
for subsequent extension of the operating period of the mill. Their power 
output obviously depended upon physical size and tidal range; slack water at 
full and low tide required the basin refinement remarked upon earlier if the 
period of utilisation was an important factor in its operation.
The third system, the compressed air arrangement, was also a popular topic for 
inventors during the latter half of the nineteenth century, the French in 
particular leading the way in this method of tide energy utilisation. In 1845 
Havard and Lavalette acquired patents for arrangements of this type while 
Seiler took out an English patent (No:- 2244) in 1860 utilising the principle; 
that of compression of the air within an enclosed chamber by the rising tide. 
Nine of the fifty patents taken out over the period up to 1885 were associated 
with this method of tidal utilisation. Like other schemes, this method of power 
generation has a low efficiency due to the inevitably low expansion ratio; 
indeed, as Davey remarks (6), 'the system might possibly be used for the 
direct compression of air for sirens ....'.
The fourth method of extracting energy from tidal range involves the 
impounding of a quantity of water behind a suitably raised dam, the basin being 
filled by the rising tide. The filling or subsequent release of the impounded
12
volume of water via suitably designed and mounted turbines allows electrical 
power to be generated by means of machines connected to the turbines. This 
so called 'basin system' was identified as a suitable method of harnessing tidal 
power as early as 1839 - a French patent taken out by Lucas-Richardière 
confirming an understanding of a double basin inflow/outflow system. The first, 
provisional, patent was taken out in this country by Davies (No 518) in 1862, 
with numerous applicants for similar tidal cycle patents appearing thereafter. It 
is apparent from the number of patent applications, however, the French were 
extremely active in this field of tidal power throughout the period. Davey was 
of the opinion that the French had identified the first real understanding of the 
full tidal process, although William Murdoch was known to be working on ways 
to harness the tides at the time of this death in 1839. (310).
Although the French were responsible for much of the early analysis of tidal 
energy retrieval by the basin system, they were by no means the only country 
active in the field. Apart from the UK, the Germans had in 1912 identified a 
suitable location for a tidal basin or 'barrage' at Busum, Schleswig-Holstein, a 
plant being constructed at the site only to be dismantled at the outbreak of the 
first World War. Although no details of energy output or the machines are now 
available for Busum, the speed with which the construction was completed and 
subsequently dismantled suggests that it must have been a very small 
scheme.
Both Canada and America have examined possible sites around the Bay of 
Fundy - a remote region with some of the world's highest tidal ranges - with a 
view to extracting tidal power by the basin system. Schemes have been 
examined over many years, particularly with respect to Passamaquoddy Bay; 
in 1935 Roosevelt commissioned the US Corps of Engineers to undertake the 
construction of a power producing baiTage there but this was never completed.
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It is perhaps of interest at this point, (if not chronoligically correct to do so) to 
identify that a 20MW tidal plant has been constructed, over the period 1980-6, 
at Hog's Island, close to the town of Annapolis Royal-Nova Scotia, on the east 
coast of the Bay of Fundy. It is equally interesting to note that the power 
station was located at an already existing flood control barrier (7)(8).
The (then) Soviet Union also had expressed interest in tidal generation 
projects, identifying in 1923, possible regions for further study, particularly in 
the region of the White Sea and the specific location of the Gulf of Mezen (9). 
(A small, 400kW, tidal plant was in fact constructed and commissioned near 
Mezen in 1969).
Summarising this short review of the early interest in tidal power, it can be 
seen that much of the early effort was concentrated in obtaining some 
mechanical output, associated with tidal rise and fall, to assist with the manual 
work undertaken at sites local to a tidal river or estuary. Achievement of 
system high efficiency or continuous operation would not have been of 
overriding importance to the process which was basically to support the 
application of low cost readily available manual labour to a particular task. In 
any event, machines capable of converting any source of mechanical input into 
electricity and vice versa did not become available until the middle of the 
nineteenth century and following, after considerable delay, Michael Faraday's 
discovery of electromagnetic induction in 1831. (10). It is of interest to record 
that there had, however, been considerable improvement in the energy 
conversion efficiency of water wheels around this period, with Benist 
Foumeyron's outward flow turbine of 1827, by lonvial's axial flow turbine of 
1843 (which was more versatile because it was of the low head design) and by 
James Thomson's vortex wheel of 1852. (11).
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It will also be apparent that, of the four systems initially associated with tidal 
power retrieval, only the basin or barrage arrangement is capable of achieving a 
power output on a large scale and this arrangement will be further examined in 
the next chapter.
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Chapter 2
The Electricity Producing Tidal Barrage
The literature on this aspect of Tidal Power is extensive. Many learned books 
and treatises have been written, particularly since 1920, examining the 
background to and the aspects peculiar to the tidal barrage production of 
electricity. Robert Gibrat, considered by many associated with the subject to 
be the 'father of tidal power utilisation ', has produced many papers, culminating 
in 1966 with a searching and comprehensive analysis of the subject (12).
Clive Baker (13) has more recently completed an authorative and 'most 
readable account' (14) of his extensive experience and knowledge of the 
subject, particularly relating to but not exclusively dealing with Severn Barrage 
developments. Roger Charlier's book (15) also provides an absorbing if at 
times untidy account of 'Tidal Energy'. But the earliest, possibly the most 
celebrated, certainly at the time the most vilified of the English language tidal 
power dissertations is that due to Norman Davey (4) and published in 1923.
It is an interesting point at this juncture to note that one of the most vociferous 
antagonists of Davey's views on tidal power was Sir Eric Geddes (16). A 
member of the department of the Civil Service which had previously produced a 
poorly argued but nevertheless supportive report for a barrage across the 
Severn estuary at English Stones (17), Sir Eric reversed his attitude to tidal 
power when, as the Minister of Transport, he became responsible for the 
affairs of that department. 'Essentially uneconomic' became his view of barrage 
produced electricity (18).
Despite the attitudes of engineering 'specialists', as typified by Geddes, to 
question the possibilities for tidal power, various interests have continued to 
the present day to examine the potential of different sites and to consider
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methods of harnessing the energy of the tides in an efficient and economical 
manner, for electricity generation purposes.
Any tidal power barrage consists essentially of a basin (or basins) suitably 
enclosed to allow the sea to enter and to leave via a combination of turbines 
and gates (sluices). The variation in water level between the sea and the 
mass of water contained in the basin(s) provides the necessary head to drive 
the turbines and thereby the generators. It will be apparent that the potential 
energy available at any time within a basin is proportional to the mass of water 
it contains and to the difference in water levels between basin and sea. It 
follows also that the maximum energy available is proportional to the difference 
in 'height' squared, i.e. to tidal range (R) squared, (See Appendix B(d)). 
Although it is not the intention of this dissertation to examine in detail the 
highly complex variations which take place in respect of tidal range (which are 
dealt with elsewhere in the literature (20)(21)(22), it is necessary for the 
better understanding of the energy available from a tidal barrage to summarise 
those aspects which are particularly relevant to this subject. As identified in 
the above Appendix, it is due principally to the forces induced by the positions 
of the moon and the sun relative to themselves and to the earth that variations 
in the height of the tide at a point on the earth's surface not only takes place 
roughly in a sinusoidal fashion and approximately twice per day (semi diurnal 
variation) but also with a period of some fourteen days. These forces produce 
tides above the mean value, the so-called 'spring' tides for approximately 
seven days, followed by tides below the mean value, the 'neap tides', also of 
seven days duration. For the purpose of estimating energy output from a 
particular tidal banage over a significant period, it is necessary to base the 
evaluation on the parameter of ‘mean tidal range’. Modification of the 
theoretical tidal range will also take place due to the Coriolis force, induced by
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the effect of the earth’s rotation. This results, from a UK point of view, in the 
tidal ranges on the east side of the Irish sea being higher than those on the 
west and those on the south coast of England being lower than those on the 
north/west coasts of France. Furthermore, as an incoming tide reaches a 
region of diminishing depth of water, such as the continental shelf or the 
shallows of an estuary, the increased frictional forces reduce the speed of 
approach of the tidal wave thereby increasing the tidal range. This effect can 
be further exacerbated if the estuary is funnel shaped while, dependent upon 
the physical dimensions involved, the water in the estuary may be caused to 
resonate with the incoming tide, thereby to induce a further increase in tidal 
range (23) (24). The range associated with the Severn estuary is the result of 
the effect of these various factors. The Admiralty tide tables (19) provide an 
extensive list of such information and confirm that the highest UK tidal ranges 
occur along the west coast of England.
It is mainly as a result of the foregoing that the Severn estuary has received 
such a great deal of attention over the previous seventy years although there 
has been concentration on other sites, particularly the Mersey and estuaries 
associated with potentially large basin areas and significant mean tidal range 
such as Morecambe Bay, the Wash, the Solway Firth and the Humber. 
However, smaller sites of interest to tidal barrier electricity generation have 
been identified and it is of interest to note that some of them, originally pin­
pointed by Davey, have more recently received revived interest. As Davey 
pointed out in his treatise, while the huge costs associated with major civil 
works demanded by large barrage construction could perhaps not be sustained 
by either the public or private purse, smaller barrage schemes could be more 
successfully supported by either/both. It has to be remembered that, in 
Davey's times, there was no grid system to allow electrical power to be
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distributed and utilised other than locally, and while the competition was 
provided by steam (coal fired) stations of comparatively low thermal efficiency, 
his view, and that of others, was that tidal barrages and proposed pumped 
storage facilities went hand in hand, this basic requirement being reflected in 
high capital costs.
Davey identified a total of sixty nine sites on the mainland of the United 
Kingdom which he considered to have worthwhile tidal generation potential. In 
surveying these possibilities, he set a minimum mean tidal range requirement 
of ten feet (a little over three metres), continuous output potential of not less 
than lOOOHP (750kW) and a coastline which permitted realistic basin/barrage 
construction, i.e. estuaries, inlets and small bays. The Thames and Tyne/Tees 
estuaries were omitted for shipping reasons. Of the sixty nine sites identified 
under these conditions no less than forty nine were distributed around the 
English and Welsh coasts, the remaining ones being mainly on the west coast 
of Scotland. Thirty three of the forty nine sites were on the west coast, the 
rest being evenly divided between the south and east coasts of the country. 
Davey indicated that the water areas and range values used by him were taken 
from the Admiralty charts and tide tables and that the areas assessed from 
these data, particularly those pertaining to low water spring tides, were only 
'approximate and sometimes indefinite'. He was also of the opinion that 'not all 
of the stations listed are probable or even possible' due to 'geological factors, 
great depth of channel and shipping interference'. Bearing in mind the above 
observations and considering that Davey's evaluations were undertaken in the 
early 1920's and without the benefits of modem computational assistance, 
hydrographical surveys and the like, it is remarkable that his results, 
associated with twenty nine sites similarly located (but differently named) 
sites identified by Binnie and Partners (25) are in very good agreement with
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their findings, particularly in annual energy values. (There may, of course, be 
other reasons for this similarity!) It is no less interesting that two locations 
identified by Davey as 'Millom' and 'Fleetwood' (26) should, as 'Duddon' and 
'Wyre' respectively have only recently been recognised by the Department of 
Energy as sites worthy of preliminarv studv to confirm their suitability for tidal 
barrage construction (27).
As stated above, the Severn estuary has, over many years, attracted interest 
in its possible utilisation for tidal power generation in view of the considerable 
tidal range enjoyed by the region - the highest in Europe and the second 
highest world-wide. It is of concern therefore to undertake a review of the 
various schemes which have been proposed by the different investigational 
bodies involved and to comment on their conclusions.
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Chapter 3
The Severn Barrage Reports 1920 - 1950
3.1 The First Proposal: 1920
In November 1920, a proposal to construct an electricity generating barrage 
across the River Severn was put forward by the Civil Engineering department 
of the Ministry of Transport, that Ministry being at that time responsible, under 
the recently promoted Sir Eric Geddes, for electricity matters. Although copies 
of the actual report are no longer available for scrutiny, Davey's 1923 text (28) 
contains many of the pertinent aspects of the proposal. From Chapter XIII, it 
is gleaned that the original report recommended the construction of an 
impounding dam at the site on the Severn estuary known as 'English Stones' 
and almost directly above the GWR Severn rail tunnel; the capital cost being 
estimated at £25-30M and with a construction time of 'several' years. A road 
and rail crossing, together with lock facilities, were included in the civil works.
It is possible, indeed it is probable, in view of the subsequently identified ill 
considered nature of the electrical aspects, that the barrage scheme was 
induced as the result of a proposition, put forward earlier in 1920 by the Great 
Western Railway (GWR) to the Ministry of Transport, to construct over a 
period of five years and at an estimated capital cost of £5m a high level bridge 
at Beachley to ease the rail traffic congestion at other Severn rail crossings.
The steep gradients of approaches to the proposed bridge at Beachley had 
previously been identified and it was considered that not only would a barrage 
at the location alleviate this problem but would also provide facilities for a road, 
thereby shortening crossing of the Severn by some fifty miles.
The electrical aspects of the scheme proposed that the 18000ft (5500m) 
barrage should provide for 400 (3m runner) turbines, each geared to DC 
generators of approximately 1300kW average output, together with some
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6000ft of sluice length. (Davey considered unsound the proposed positioning of 
the sluices and thereby the subsequent area of openings available to be 
inadequate and argued that, unless additional inflow gates were provided at 
the turbines, the proposal's estimate of electrical output of the scheme would 
not be achieved).
Rotary convertors were to be provided to produce alternating current at 330 
volts, this to be transformed to 60kV for onward transmission.
In addition to the power generating barrage, the scheme envisaged a high level 
storage reservoir, situated off the River Wyre and ten miles from the main 
barrage, fed by a pumping station at Tintern which was in turn supplied with 
power from the barrage. The Tintern machines were to be designed as pump- 
alternators, capable of an output of around 750MW.
The contemplated Trelleck Grange reservoir was of considerable capacity,
55 X 10^ m3 , and it was anticipated that the water to and from this storage 
would pass along a tunnel forty feet (twelve metres) in diameter.
The electrical output from the barrage/reservoir complex was intended to be 
absorbed by the industrial area of South Wales 'lying within a radius of fifty 
miles' (eighty kilometres) of the barrage, 'the Midlands and London and the 
Thames Valley'. In order to distribute power to the latter area, however, a 
transmission line operating at 120kV and capacity of 500MW was proposed. 
The cost of the line (it is not identified whether the design was single or double 
circuit) was estimated at £ 1.25m.
An examination of the identified costs of the various items making up the 
scheme indicates that a specific total figure of £28m was applicable. Of this 
amount, some £2.3m was set aside for road and rail facilities, a figure which 
should be compared with the £5m estimated by the GWR for its own rail bridge 
scheme. The 1920 sum estimated for the reservoir and Tintern civil works, viz
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£2.5m, in today's terms perhaps £100m, appears relatively conservative in 
view of the magnitude of the scheme. It is, however, a fact that the capital 
costs of large civil schemes have, throughout the century, regularly been under 
estimated as those associated, for example, with the Channel Tunnel will 
confirm (29).
It was estimated that the annual output of the barrage, operating as an ebb 
system variable head working arrangement was electrically equivalent to 
1.36TWh (Terrawatt hours). Davey, although he obviously doubted the truth 
of this figure, nevertheless evaluated that, on this basis, the cost of a kWh to a 
consumer would lie between 0.6 and 1.08 penny, with ‘perhaps an additional 
0.2 penny per unit’ applicable to London customers due to transmission costs. 
He also pointed out that, since the rail and road authorities were expected to 
bear a proportion of the costs appropriate to the road and rail bridges, with the 
Post Office and shipping interests also benefiting from the work, a unit cost, at 
the barrage, ‘of around 0.5 penny’ might be applicable assuming the originally 
estimated outputs and efficiencies. The Civil Engineering proposal pointed that 
that power from the barrage would be available, at short notice, as a result 
from its considerable storage capacity, ' to absorb existing peak loads in 
industrial areas, working in conjunction existing steam power stations.'
It is doubtful, with hindsight, whether the technical expertise necessary to 
construct such a complex civil /electrical engineering project existed at the time 
of the proposal. In addition, it will be appreciated that no electricity 'grid' 
existed at that time to transmit large scale power into the industrial regions of 
the country. Despite the pumped storage facility, to attempt to absorb the 
output locally would create its own problems and inevitably affect the efficient 
utilisation of the barrage itself.
2 3
In any event, the project had no chance of survival due to the scepticism of the 
technical experts of the day including, as identified earlier. Sir Eric Geddes - 
who must have been a member of the team at least initially responsible for the 
drafting of the proposal. The learned Institutions also had little faith in the 
contents of the report, while the shipping and dock interests of the Severn were 
vehemently opposed to the scheme. The anti-barrage attitudes of the Welsh 
mining community and their MPs were voiced strongly as were the fears of the 
representatives of the local authorities, whose responsibilities included the 
inter-tidal zones above the site of the barrage, that severe flooding of their 
territories could take pace should construction go ahead.
In any event, the 1920 proposals were shelved indefinitely. It is extremely 
doubtful, in view of the lack of any data from any official source, that the 
scheme was even recognised by the government.
3.2 The Report of the 1933 Severn Barrage Committee 
In 1925, the Conservative Prime Minister of the day, Stanley Baldwin, took the 
decision, through the Economic Advisory Council, to have the possibility for a 
barrage across the Severn estuary ‘examined’; (perhaps ‘re-examined’ would 
have been more correct). The precise reasons for his decision at this point in 
time remain unclear from the literature, but it was known that the Prime 
Minister had grasped the 'political and economic importance of electricity' (30). 
The inefficiency of the coal fired plant in commission in the industry and the 
labour problems with the mining community may also have influenced his 
decision.
Whatever the reason(s), however, Baldwin could not have expressed any 
urgency in completing the investigation since it was to be 1933 before the final 
official report was presented by the Committee’s Chairman, J.T.C. Moore- 
Brabazon, to the then Prime Minister, Ramsay MacDonald of the National
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Party. The introduction to the official Report of the Committee (31) does 
confirm, however, that they had been actively engaged, behind the scenes, the 
first tentative interim report having assessed, in December of 1925, that a 
prima facie case had been established for the further expenditure of public 
money in the prosecution of the inquiry. A hydrographic survey of the English 
Stones site had been carried out by the Admiralty at the request of the 
Committee and, in addition, Professor A.H. Gibson, of the University of 
Manchester and a member of the Committee had been asked to construct a 
model of the estuary in the English Stones region - 'the point of the River 
Severn which appeared to offer the best site for a barrage' - and to conduct a 
series of experimental investigations. In July 1929 the results of both 
Professor Gibson's work and the Admiralty survey were presented as a second 
interim report; together with the conclusions that the practicality of building a 
barrage across the Severn estuary had been confirmed. The contours of the 
estuary as established by the Admiralty hydrographical investigations were 
found to be in very good agreement with those used by Professor Gibson (who 
had utilised 1849 data for his model). A further three years were to elapse 
before the final report, including the conclusions of detailed investigations 
undertaken by a sub-committee of experts under the chairmanship of Sir John 
Snell, the Chairman of the Electricity Commission and the Chief Advisor to Sir 
Eric Geddes, was submitted.
The results of the technical studies, annexed as an 84 page Appendix to the 
main report, provided an analysis of certain physiographical problems including 
an assessment of the geographical and geological features of the bed and 
banks of the estuary and surrounding district, the effect of a barrage on the 
regulation of water in the estuary and associated feeding streams and
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waterways, and included also an estimate of the possible interference with 
normal estuarine currents due to scouring and siltation.
In addition, the Appendix focussed attention on the problems associated with 
the intermittent and variable output of energy from a barrage, the question of 
storage to provide a more continuous output and the effects of the operational 
cycle on the turbines themselves. The requirements of maintenance and repair 
of plant, particularly those items operating under immersed or partially 
immersed conditions, were addressed. The transmission of the generated 
power to other parts of the country was also addressed. (It will be appreciated 
that the 132kV 'Grid' system was under active design and construction at this 
time - the regions of the south west of the country and South Wales were 
interconnected toward the end of the projected construction period 1927-1933). 
The possible effects of a barrage on navigation on the Severn were also 
examined, as were public health related interests associated with the modified 
water regime which would be induced by the construction of a barrage. ' Salmon 
fisheries of the Wye received some preliminary assessment, as did the Severn 
navigation canals and associated docks themselves.
The interim report produced by the sub-committee in 1929 included the 
submission that three sites had been examined prior to the conclusion that the 
English Stones would provide the most suitable one for a barrage. In fact, on 
examination of the details, it is apparent that all three sites lay in close 
alignment one to another, suggesting that the particular region around English 
Stones had already been accepted as most suitable for a barrage.
Professor Gibson's experiments confirmed that the tide levels would be 
modified by the operation of a barrage, the exact amount being dependent upon 
the mode of operation of the turbines. Using an operational scheme which 'in 
our view gives the best all round results' (the exact scheme appears not to
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have been identified nor the term 'best' defined), the lengthening of the flood 
tide and subsequent shortening of the ebb was assessed as was the degree of 
tidal interference induced by the turbines. It was estimated that a reduction of 
approximately 50% of the amount of tidal water flow into the Bristol Channel 
would be achieved, while the reduction in tidal range at a number of points on 
the Severn as a result of the barrage was remarked upon. At Beachley, for 
example, the spring tidal range was expected to reduce from 41 feet to a little 
over 14 feet, i.e. by some 65%.
Fears of possible siltation of navigable channels caused by the imposition of 
dams for hydro power development had earlier (1921) been remarked upon by 
the Water Power Resources Committee - chaired by Sir John Snell (32). This 
problem was examined, together with the associated one of power basin 
siltation, by the experiments o f Professor Gibson. His conclusions, contained 
in an appendix to the Committee Report (31), were that an increase in siltation 
of the impounded basin of '800,000 cubic yards per annum during the first 
twenty years of operation would occur' but that following this period, the rate of 
deposition 'would considerably reduce'. In addition, he concluded 'much of the 
siltation would take place remote from the navigable channels'. Dredging 
during the twenty year period to remove some 600,000 cubic yards per annum 
'would enable the navigable channel to be maintained at its existing level'.
The model investigations also confirmed that, without any dredging, the depth 
of the Avonmouth navigable channel would be somewhat greater with the 
barrage than without it. The model was used also to confirm that flooding of 
the regions above the barrage was unlikely with flood discharges of up to 
18000 cu secs (about four times the mean river flow), the high water level at 
spring tides being lower with than without barrage construction. In any event, 
the Report went on, ‘in times of heavy flood or exceptionally high tides, the
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water height above the barrage could readily be controlled by use of the 
barrage sluices or turbine gate openings’.
In reaching the conclusions in respect of siltation and the possible effects of a 
barrage operation on the configuration of the bed of the estuary, Professor 
Gibson had undertaken the series of experiments utilising 'an appreciably 
greater sluice area than that on which the original tests were carried out'. It is 
pertinent to remark at this juncture that, in his assessment of the 1920 scheme, 
Norman Davey had expressed the view that 'it is not clear whether or not 
inflow gates were also placed in the turbine dams, or if tide flaps were to be 
placed on the rock and clay core dam. Without some addition, the gate area 
provided ... hardly seems adequate'.
It is apparent from the tables included in the Report that a variable head ebb 
system of working was the favoured scheme, with a minimum head of 5 feet. 
Advantage had been taken of the effects of turbine development over the period 
since the early 1920's to recommend that seventy two Kaplan type turbines, 
each of twenty feet (6m) runner diameter, single regulation and coupled to 62.5 
r.p.m. alternators of 12.7MW output, should be installed in the 4550 feet 
turbine dam associated with a total barrage length of 15,375 feet (4660 metre). 
It was anticipated that sixty seven machines 'would always be available for 
use', resulting in a working installed capacity of 850MW and, on the basis of 
seven hundred and six tides per annum, a total potential annual output from the 
barrage of 2.25TWh. Allowing an approximate two per cent usage for barrage 
operation, some 2.2TWh would therefore become available for delivery to the 
'grid' - 'the national system now in process of being constructed by the Central 
Electricity Board'.
The consulting engineers were of the opinion that execution of the scheme 
would take approximately fifteen years and, in addition to providing the tidal
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generating station, would cater fully for rail and road cross river traffic, while 
satisfying the navigational requirements identified by other authorities.
The costs associated with the scheme were, as explained in the Report, to 
some extent speculative in view of the uncertainty with regard to interest 
rates. It was anticipated that a long term loan could be raised under 
government guarantee at approximately 3^2 per cent per annum but, in view of 
the identified starting date of 1937 and the projected period to completion by 
1952, an estimate of cost based on an interest rate of 4 per cent was 
considered more prudent.
On this basis, the total cost of the scheme, utilising 4 per cent cumulative, 
approximated to £37.8m, of which £8.4m was due to interest charges over the 
fifteen years. The capital cost of the barrage generation project itself, i.e. 
omitting road, rail and harbour costs, was estimated at £20.3m; (£25.5m 
including interest charges). While the estimates included a contingency 
allowance of 121/2 per cent, no provision was included for the acquisition of any 
land required for construction and other purposes, nor for any Parliamentary 
expenses likely to be incurred during the passage of the necessary Bills.
Based on the figures above, it was estimated that the cost of energy at the 
generator transformer terminals or, as expressed in the Report 'sent out to 
transmission lines', would be 'about 0.18 penny/kWh', (including an element for 
annual maintenance and operational charges).
At this point, the Report refers to the varying and intermittent amount of 
energy derivable from the barrage, dependent upon the time and state of the 
tide and the necessity 'for some secondary storage scheme', as, without such a 
scheme, it would not be possible to reduce the size and number of coal-fired 
stations already providing energy to the grid and including the necessary 
provision of standby plant. A comparison of the cost of barrage produced
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electricity with that of the firm supply from a coal-fired station could therefore 
be made only on the basis of the cost of fuel saved by operation the barrage. 
Assuming the annual generation from the barrage to be 2.2TWh, the cost of 
coal of around £0.75/ton (the precise cost depended upon the region of the UK 
to which the fuel was delivered) and the efficiency of generation, estimated for 
the 1930's to be approximately 1.651b/kWh (the Report uses the figure 
1.751b/kWh), it follows from the foregoing that an estimated 1,650,000 tons of 
coal, of a value £1.24m, would be saved for other purposes by operation of the 
barrage. As the above makes apparent and as the Report itself comments 'it is 
clear that unless suitable means can be devised by which a secondary storage
system may be ad d ed  the scheme is not economically practicable'.
Two storage schemes received consideration; the first provided for pumped 
storage facilities, the second identified the conversion of some sixty per cent of 
barrage energy into some form of thermal storage and its subsequent 
utilisation in steam turbines. The latter proposal was deemed impractical and 
attention was turned to the water storage scheme included with the 1920 
Ministry of Transport proposals for the Severn Barrage, i.e. the use of Trelleck 
Grange for the purpose of storing 'surplus' energy over the lunar cycle.
As with the 1920 scheme, it was envisaged that the barrage electrical output 
would be divided; part of it would pass directly to the grid system for national 
transmission and the rest would be utilised for pumping purposes at Trelleck 
Grange. By a process of iteration, and bearing in mind the expected efficiencies 
of pumping and generating plant, it was anticipated that the total annual output 
from the combined barrage/storage facility would be 1.64TWh, i.e. 
approximately 75% of the ban age only output figure. As a result of this 
expected reduced output, the cost/kWh was increased from 0.18 of a penny to 
approximately 0.24d.
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There follows in the Report (33) an assessment o f the cost of generation 'from 
good coal-fired stations' which, at face value at least, suggests a difference in 
cost/kWh of around 0.14 of a penny in favour of the barrage/storage 
combination and indicating that the generation of 1.64TWh using fossil-fuel 
facilities would result in approximately £ lm  higher costs than if the 
barrage/storage was utilised. Since the capital costs of providing the water 
storage, pumps and pipework at Trelleck Grange were, according to the Report, 
estimated at £10.26m and which, including the cost of the transmission line 
between barrage and Trelleck Grange and annual compound interest of four per 
cent over the seven year construction period amounted to a total of not less 
than £13m, (i.e. a sum total for barrage and storage of some £50m) the 
conclusion drawn in favour of the barrage appears, at first sight, not a little 
surprising. However, the Report itself provides some insight into what could 
perhaps be called an element of 'creative accounting'. From the identified 
relevant paragraph (34), it can be noted that while it takes into account the 
variation in load factor to estimate the annual cost of output from the coal-fired 
plant, this factor is completely ignored in the case of the barrage/storage 
combination. When the effect of this omission is taken into account, the 
cost/kWh of the tidal plant becomes 0.37 of a penny, i.e. 0.07 of a penny or 18.9 
per cent higher than that identified in the Report as the probable cost of a unit 
produced by modem coal-fired plant of the period. Paradoxically, paragraph 
forty three of the Report states that the 'assumption (of the cost of a coal fired 
unit) does not err in generosity to the barrage'.
One of the principal conclusions reached by the Committee was that the best 
site for a barrage on the River Severn would be 'at the point known as English 
Stones'. It also concluded that, in view of the intermittent and varying nature of 
supply from the barrage, there could be no reduction in the number and size of
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coal-fired plants feeding the National grid system; moreover the cost of energy 
generated by the barrage would not be competitive with that produced by 
modem 'selected' (i.e. Central Electricity Board - CEB) grid-connected coal- 
fired stations. However, (and despite the comments included in the foregoing 
paragraph) the Report asserts the view that in conjunction with a secondary 
storage system, the scheme would in total produce ‘an economically attractive 
project which could, when completed in 1941, provide around one thirteenth of 
the anticipated annual supply requirements of the country’. It is of worthwhile, 
if minor, interest, to note that the total GWh figure used by the Committee to 
make their latter assessment was exceeded by some 6GWh, or approximately 
thirty per cent, in 1941 (35).
The capital cost of the proposed scheme, including provision for road, rail and 
harbour facilities and also compound interest, estimated at approximately £50m 
has already been remarked upon. The electricity generating aspects of the 
construction were estimated at £38m.
The eighty four page Appendix included with the main Report is a model 
example of the literary art of the expert sub-committee, full of their views of 
many of the facets of the combined barrage and storage schemes. In absorbing 
the contents of what is an excellent but highly complex engineering document, 
with its great wealth and depth of detail, the impression is gained that, 
between the lines, caution is being urged in approaching 'a scheme of such 
magnitude'. Possible problems with the turbines, despite the fact that the sub­
committee itself was recommending their installation, were identified, while a 
number of further investigations were proposed particularly in respect of the 
pump turbines, where siltation problems were envisaged. Concern is also 
apparent in respect of the storage reservoir, its disposition, and that of the 
pumping/generation plant and associated pipelines. Such aspects must, in
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truth, have been particularly wonying to the committee since the very viability 
of the scheme, even as evaluated within the Report, depended upon the 
construction of the Trelleck Grange reservoir and its engineering facilities. 
Small wonder, in fact, that the final comment of the Moore-Brabazon 
Committee included a significant note of caution and delaying any decision 
whether or not to proceed with the scheme. ‘In coming to a decision’, the
Report concluded, ‘......   many considerations, not of a technical character, such
as social, economic and industrial must necessarily arise, but important
though they may be, they are outside our terms of reference and do not concern 
u s’.
There may be some significance in the fact that the type print used for the 
‘Conclusions’ is of different face from that of the rest of the Report, suggesting 
late modifications. So far as can be ascertained from the records, no official 
immediate action was taken by any Parliamentary Committee to examine the 
proposals put forward by the 1933 Severn Barrage Committee although, 
according to Hannah (36) some 'serious consideration' was given to them - by 
whom is not clear since no one, other than the Committee members 
themselves, is identified. The costs of construction were considered to be such 
as to 'effectively rule it out at a time of increased stringency in government 
expenditure'.
3.3 The 1945 Report on the Severn Barrage Scheme
It becomes apparent, from an examination of the terms of reference provided, 
on this occasion, by the Minister of Fuel and Power of the period. Major 
Gwilym Lloyd George, to the Panel of Engineers associated with the 1945 
investigation of a possible Severn barrage that, behind the scenes at least, the 
conclusions of the 1933 Report had received some consideration. The 
Chairman of the Panel, A.G. Vaughan-Lee, in his introduction to his Report,
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confirmed that the panel was appointed in November 1943 ’to review the 
conclusions of the Severn Barrage Committee of 1933'. (37). He went on to 
enlarge the requirements by adding 'in the light of later engineering experience 
and practice and of other developments and to suggest what modification, if 
any, should be made in the proposed scheme, in the programme for its 
execution and in the estimates of its costs'.
Appendix 1 of the Report includes a Letter of Instructions suggesting that a 
more detailed identification of the Ministry's requirements had been sought and 
obtained. An examination of the contents of this Letter confirms that 
practically all aspects of the 1933 conclusions were to be scrutinised, including 
the barrage site, the necessity or otherwise for storage facilities, the prime 
revised costs of the scheme and the related economic value of energy produced. 
The extent to which the grid system would be associated with barrage 
production of electricity was to be examined, bearing in mind probable load 
growth and costs of transmission. ‘The probable minimum time of construction, 
consistent with economy’ was to be assessed.
No less importantly, the possible effect of the barrage on shipping interests 
was to be considered, with estimates of costs to include provisions to enable 
shipping to continue to use the docks situated above the site of the barrage. 
The technical feasibility of providing for road and rail crossings of the Severn 
via the barrage was to be examined, as were the possible costs of such 
provisions. In other words, the possibility of an energy producing barrage over 
the Severn was to be re-examined from a new beginning.
It will have been noted, from the opening words of this Chapter, that the level 
of political seniority for possible barrage development had been diminished; it 
was now associated with the office of the Ministry of Fuel and Power and not 
with that of the Prime Minister directly.
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A major decision of the Panel, taken early in their Inquiry, was that ‘it would be 
best to treat the Severn barrage on the basis of a power generation scheme 
only in the first instance’. Aspects such as road and rail crossings, and 
development of dock area and navigation would be dealt with separately .
In considering the conclusions of the 1933 Committee's Report, the Panel were 
able to agree to that Committee's findings in respect to the disposition of the 
barrage site, describing it as 'the best, particularly from the point of view of 
construction' and that variable head ebb generation was definitely the more 
advantageous' under the Severn tidal conditions. The 1933 estimates of 
available power and energy at the English Stones site were also confirmed, as 
were the views, based on Professor Gibson's previous experiments, that 
navigation on the Severn 'would be in no way prejudiced by construction of the 
barrage at that site'.
Three major changes to the conditions which had applied at the time of the 
earlier Report were, however, considerably to influence the conclusions which 
would be reached by the 1945 Committee. The design and output of turbine 
and associated alternator equipment had dramatically increased over the years 
with much larger and therefore fewer machines being required to deal with the 
identified power available at the English Stones. In turn, these changes 
impinged upon the hydraulic conditions likely to be required at the barrage, 
thereby modifying the dimensions of sluice gates, turbine intakes and outlets 
and thus the disposition of the sluice, turbine and embankment dams 
themselves. Secondly, 'the price of coal delivered to generating stations had 
increased significantly'. Whether this aspect of the investigation was, in fact, 
of material importance is, in retrospect, doubtful. Coal, a competitor for direct 
heating and for providing motive power for the private generation of electricity 
and for mechanical handling equipment had, as identified by Lingard and
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England (38) lost its favourable economic position post 1935. Interconnection 
of generating stations by the transmission grid, the improvement of boiler 
combustion and turbine efficiency, together with higher system load factors 
over the period in question had, in all probability, offset the effects of the 
doubling of coal costs to a station. In any event, only seven or eight per cent of 
coal mined was utilised by the electricity generation industry at that time 
which, as identified in the Economist, was providing its product at a lower price 
than burning the primary fuel, coal, in an open grate (39).
The third condition, very closely related to the second as the above 
observations confirm and possibly the most important of the changed criteria 
identified by the Panel, was that due to the 'great expansion in the supply and 
control of electricity and the development of the grid interlinking the major 
power stations'. It is as a result of the effects of this last aspect that the 1945 
Report departs so fundamentally from the conclusions of the 1933 document.
It will be recalled that one of the conclusions of the previous Reports required 
the construction of a suitable dam, reservoir and pumping facilities at Trelleck 
Grange to provide a reservoir of sufficient capacity to smooth out the variable 
and intermittent nature of the generated supply from the tidal barrage over the 
lunar period in order to provide one based on the more socially adaptable solar 
cycle. It will also be recalled that the expert sub-committee of 1933 had voiced 
some concern over the Trelleck Grange site, the effect of pumping on the River 
Wye, and other related matters.
As a result of such reservations, the 1945 Panel undertook a comprehensive 
study of pumped storage facilities throughout Wales, twelve sites being 
investigated. In their opinion, two of the sites evaluated were 'more 
economical' than Trelleck Grange. In addition, the Panel concluded (40) that 
'pumped storage would increase the capital cost of the Barrage scheme by
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about forty per cent and reduce the amount of energy available by twenty seven 
per cent’. The Report went on: ‘this has resulted in the cost of Barrage energy 
with pumped storage being greater than that supplied from coal-fired stations 
of the same output and saving less coal than by the direct use of the tidal 
energy. We are led to the conclusion that pumped storage is not an essential 
nor an economic factor as applied directly to the barrage scheme'.
The Report also referred to an engineering Appendix prepared by one of the 
members of the Panel which included the results of a detailed assessment of 
the normal operating regime of a tidal barrage and the possibilities of utilising 
its varying and intermittent output in the chemical industry or for the purpose of 
district heating. The parallel operation of tidal plant with conventionally fired 
and with hydro stations was explored and the conclusion reached, as a result of 
these studies, that with the transmission system capacity and control 
capability provided by the now fully operational grid system, there was little if 
any financial gain in attempting to use the barrage output in other than the 
'conventional' way, i.e. as it became available at the generator busbars.
The Appendix also updated the output figure deduced by the 1933 Committee 
by some five per cent, this being attributed to the higher efficiency expected of 
the more modem Kaplan turbines; an annual output of 2.36TWh was now 
anticipated. However, an estimate of the likely summer night demand on the 
transmission grid network confirmed that the barrage output itself could 
approach fifty per cent of the system’s Southern region requirements at spring 
tides, as aspect which the C.E.B. viewed with some caution since such reliance 
on a single source of supply was not considered acceptable. (A figure of not 
greater than twenty per cent of system load supplied from any one source was 
favoured by the C.E.B.). Taking this limitation into account, some restriction in 
barrage output was considered inevitable until the natural growth in system
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demand eliminated its necessity - this was expected to occur around 1970.
The output available at the load centres as a result of barrage operation, taking 
the above and the effect of transmission losses into consideration, was 
estimated at 2.1TWh until 1970 and 2.21TWh thereafter.
The scheme put forward by the Panel anticipated that this output would be 
attained from thirty-two vertical shaft Kaplan type turbines and their directly 
coupled alternators, each of 25MW capacity, operating on the ebb tide variable 
head principle of working. The installation of larger machines than those 
available at the time of the 1933 Report required a major re-assessment of the 
civil works proposed at that time - one of the changes involved the turbine dam 
being divided into two parts. That part on the western side of the barrage was 
to be equipped with additional turbine gates enabling them to be used as 
sluices in order to enhance the water input to the basin during the rising tide; 
further confirmation of the accuracy of the forecast by Davey that the sluice 
gate area which had been put forward previously had been too restrictive.
The basic constructional method proposed was similar to that advocated in the 
1933 Report, i.e. the utilisation of temporary cofferdams to provide dry working 
conditions; the estimated time of construction was eight years.
Although the 1945 proposals included provision for a road and railway across 
the barrage, with lifting bridges at the locks, these were to be provided only for 
servicing of the barrage and its plant. As expressed at the outset, the Panel’s 
view was that full road and rail crossings were better treated independently of 
the barrage scheme, with any attempt at combining the scheme resulting only 
in delay and with little prospect of economy. The development of a deep water 
basin above the barrage, as identified in the 1933 Report, was agreed, but it 
was considered advisable to point out that 'the impounded area would have a 
tidal variation level of twenty feet, making it virtually a tidal basin and
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comparing unfavourably, from an operational point of view, with the amenity of 
the docks in the Bristol Channel itself.
The capital cost of the barrage and plant was considered difficult to estimate in 
view of the prevailing wartime conditions and their effect on prices. It was 
confidently anticipated that the war inflated figures 'would fall substantially 
when industry reverted to peace time activities'. Costs were therefore based 
on figures for 1936, inflated by sixty five per cent, with appropriate contingency 
charges and with interest charges of three per cent compounded annually. A 
total cost of a little over £40m was estimated for the barrage project, the 
interest charges attributed to the eight year construction period being £4.2m. 
The transmission system, inclusive of barrage and other sub-stations, 
transmission lines and complete with engineering and contingency costs was 
estimated to cost £6.4m (£6.8m with interest charges), resulting in a cost for 
the complete scheme of £47m.(41).
The cost of operating the complete barrage scheme, including repair and 
maintenance of plant, stores, dredging, administration and overhead charges, 
together with an element for local rates was estimated to lie between £262,000 
and £350,000 per annum; i.e. around five per cent of the capital cost of the 
scheme. The Report points out an interesting aspect of rating a water- 
operated generating station when confirming that they had had some difficulty 
in producing a figure for this provision. The basic problem was associated with 
the practice of valuation and rating based on the net revenue raised or 
attributed to a business. In the case of a generating station, the costs of the 
prime fuel and of interest charges were included with other 'deductible' items. 
Such a method of assessment was obviously very much in favour of coal-fired 
stations, where fuel was a significant item of cost, in comparison with hydro 
stations, where the basic cost of fuel was negligible. Some permanent relief in
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local rates had been proposed in Scotland for their hydro electric plant in view 
of this anomaly, and the Panel recommended that similar relief should be 
applied to the Severn barrage station. Their estimates included an annual rate 
levy of £100,000, a significant reduction in what could have been anticipated as 
a more usual one of perhaps two or three times that value. The absolute value 
of the burden was not, however, of material consequence to the running costs 
of the barrage, which would remain at about five per cent of the capital cost of 
the scheme.
The estimated costs of a kilowatt hour produced at the barrage were divided on 
the basis of output restricted (as discussed earlier) and unrestricted (post 
1970), the relevant figures being 0.209 and 0.199 of a penny respectively for 
generator terminal output costs, or 0.275 and 0.262 of a penny at the point of 
commercial supply. It was further estimated that nine hundred and eighty five 
thousand tons of coal per annum would be saved over the first fifteen years of 
barrage operation, but the Report was at pains to indicate that, with regard to 
subsequent years, increases in the price of coal and in the likely increases in 
efficiency of the coal-fired stations would inevitably affect the future value of 
the barrage.
The Report concluded that the Barrage scheme as recommended, i.e. without 
storage reservoir, was practicable from an engineering point of view and that 
its construction could be economically justified 'under the conditions identified'. 
It also went on to state that 'before arriving at a decision to proceed with the 
construction of a scheme of this magnitude, many considerations other than 
technical arise which are outside our terms of reference'. None of the 
considerations were identified in the Report.
Although neither the Government, in the form of its Ministry of Fuel and Power 
- whom, it will be recalled, commissioned the production of the Report, nor any
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other government department appear to have commented officially on the 
conclusions of the Report, it is apparent from the literature that both the C.E.B. 
and the incoming British Electricity Authority (B.E.A. - the nationalised 
electricity supply authority) must have had some association with the decision 
ultimately made. But, as Hannah records 'no action was in fact taken' (42) as a 
result of their involvement.
Nevertheless, it is of interest to note that, although no action was taken on the 
1945 Report's conclusions, engineering interests were intent on examining the 
possibilities for a barrage across the Severn estuary.
3.4 The Headland Initiative
In June 1949, H. Headland (43) introduced his paper 'Tidal Power and the 
Severn Estuary' to a specialist gathering at the Institution of Electrical 
Engineers (lEE) and which, over the following two years, provoked a 
considerable stoim of criticism together, it must be said, with a degree of 
support in the lEE regions of the UK. Taking the conclusions drawn by the 
Vaughan-Lee Panel in 1945 as a starting point. Headland provided additional 
statistics in general support of the scheme, now having capital costs estimated 
at not less than £50m, emphasising once again that there was 'no technical 
reason why construction of the barrage should be delayed'. In addition, he 
argued that the basic criterion on which the value of tidal energy was assessed 
depended essentially on the fixed charges of the scheme and demanded that 
the 'capital cost of associated plant, civil works, and transmission equipment 
should be reduced to a minimum'. In spite of the support for the scheme 
identified in his Paper, Headland hedged his bets by stating that 'the 
possibilities of tidal power development appear to justify further investigations 
of plant and civil engineering design - 'the construction of a pilot plant, with one
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or two full sized units, would provide valuable operating data on which the 
Severn barrage design could be based'.
Comments on the Headland paper throughout the lEE regions varied from 'go 
ahead with such a prestige project for the good of the UK image' to 'an effort 
made which collapsed under the weight of its own absurdity '.... 'to save face, 
inquiries and commissions continue and look as though they will continue to do 
so' (44). The incorporation of gas turbines at the barrage to produce, in 
conjunction with the tidal output, a degree of firm power, was recommended by 
another subscriber to these discussions, while Sir John Kennedy, then 
Chairman of the Electricity Commissioners, supported the proposal for an 
integration of steam stations on the Welsh coalfields with the barrage (which 
had already been identified in the 1945 Report). A Mr. Nimmo had the opinion 
that power from the tides was 'alluring but disappointing' and pointed out that 
Canadian consulting engineers had estimated that the cost of tidal energy from 
the Petitcodiac and Memrancook Bay (Bay of Fundy) regions to be 'double the 
cost of generation from steam power stations', while the cost of production from 
Passamaquoddy (also Bay of Fundy) had been estimated by the US Federal 
Power Engineers to be 'three times that from hydro plant on nearby rivers'.
Such comments were themselves of little relevance and, without supporting 
evidence, of no great worth. Professor Gibson's results pertaining to the 
minimal problems due to siltation, were questioned by doubters, including 
shipping interests, while others identified possible difficulties with the Kaplan 
runners as a result of sand and silt impact. UK-wide discussions on the 
contents of the Headland paper produced widely ranging views. One 
discerning contributor, A.C. Kay, noting that all economic estimates had been 
based on the cost of coal, enquired whether conclusions would be modified in 
the event of the substitution of ‘atomic energy for coal’ being taken into
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consideration. A further, and no less discerning comment came from A.P.M. 
Bennett who enquired whether, 'in view of the enormous capital cost of a 
Severn barrage scheme and the intermittent nature of the output from it, the 
expenditure should be devoted to the provision of gas turbine plants sited at or 
very near the load centres'.
The major figures involved with the discussions on the Headland paper, in the 
main those having direct and considerable association with conventional 
electricity generation, system design and consultancy, urged caution in 
considering the Severn barrage's attributes and apparent advantages, prestige 
etc., suggesting that such schemes should be 'kept back for a time of 
depression, when labour and materials could more easily be made available'. 
Others mentioned, as Headland himself had suggested, the construction of 
small demonstration designs of a few MW to allow technical and 
environmental/ecological evaluation to proceed.
As assessment of the many detailed comments recorded on the Headland 
paper strongly suggests that, although there was considerable interest in the 
proposals put forward (intimately related, it will be recalled, to those included 
in the 1945 Severn Barrage Scheme), the real conclusion reached remained one 
of caution, with the conventional interests in particular leading this point of 
view.
A companion paper had been produced by B.D. Richards (45) a few months 
prior to the Headland dissertation, identifying the special characteristics of 
tidal power and the possible problems which could arise in the period of 
development and utilisation. The Paper included a comparison of various tidal 
power projects (including the Severn Barrage) and summarised the conclusions 
which had been arrived at by the experts who had reported upon them (and as 
identified previously in this review).
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Chapter 4
Tidal Power Interest during the period 1950-78
The literature suggests that, during the 1950-60s, much of the UK interest in 
tidal power, and particularly official government involvement, waned to be 
replaced by the assessment of wind and wave technology (particularly the 
latter subject).
G. Wickert (46) produced a short paper in 1956 reviewing man's attempts to 
harness the powers of the tides which examined the fundamentals of tidal 
power utilisation. Various types of development, including single and double 
basin, use of auxiliary basins, single and two way working, Defours three basin 
system are identified in the paper, which also considers the conditions which 
must be fulfilled by the designs of tidal turbines and pump turbines.
France, however, retained its interest in Tidal Power. In 1956, Kervran (47) 
published the results of his interesting study of the possibility of producing 
tidal power from the Cotentin peninsula, between Lessay and Carentan. With 
this design, no dam, intakes or gates were necessary, the scheme being based 
on the construction of a canal to utilise the difference in the times of the tides 
between the east and west coasts of the peninsula. A virtually continuous 
supply, of average 50MW, was envisaged from this novel project which was 
considered to be particularly economic in view of the low capital cost estimated 
for the construction of the canal. Gibrat (48) continued to present his views on 
tidal power. In his 'Utilisation Cycles for a Tidal Power Project’, he dealt with 
the most economically attractive methods of filling and emptying tidal basins, 
especially the 'double effect' (two way) cycle. The role of pumping energy was 
examined in relation to interconnected operation with fossil-fired and nuclear 
stations. In a further paper, he examined the operation of a tidal plant from the 
fuel economy aspect. His previous calculations were updated with regard to
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the value of incremental units of energy provided on a variable output basis not 
only as a function of time but also as a function of the total thermal/nuclear 
power required to be available on the total power network. R. Rath (49) 
provided an insight into problems with and possible solutions to sea-water 
corrosion of tidal power station plant. Protection plating and painting, cathodic 
protection, choice of materials and metals of differing anti-corrosion abilities 
were identified and a summary of test results obtained was included in his 
Paper.
In 1963, Sandover (50), identified the Ranee tidal scheme and described its 
design in some detail. So far as can be ascertained, this is the first intimation, 
in any publically available literature, of the existence of this project although 
the contents of the papers identified previously (47, 48, 49) confirm that a 
possible tidal project on the Cotentin peninsula was under examination.
UK interest in tidal power appears to have revived in the middle 1960's, 
possibly as a direct result of the public identification of the Ranee project by 
Sandover, supported by the interesting studies reported by Hicks (51) and 
others (52) of tidal power possibilities on the Bay of Fundy.
The economic aspects of a possible barrage across Morecambe Bay were 
subjected to scrutiny by Pearce (53) while Wilson examined in considerable 
detail the economics of a Solway Firth barrage (55) and of constructions at 
Strangford and Carlingford Loughs in Northern Ireland (54), envisaging pumped 
storage facilities at Rostrevor in common support of both the Strangford and 
Carlingford schemes. Interestingly Davey (56) had in 1923 considered that the 
narrowness of the connection between Strangford Lough and the sea greatly 
impaired its generation possibilities - estimating that no more than ten per 
cent of the potential energy of the Lough would be available for generation 
purposes. He did not, however, identify any advantages of pumped storage for
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that specific site. Wilson considered that recent developments in low head 
turbine and generator designs, together with the efficiency of newly available 
reversible pump turbines would bring the cost of tidal energy into direct 
competition with other more conventional sources of electrical power. In the 
case of the Solway Firth project, he assessed the technical and economic 
possibilities of such a scheme, including the estimate of tidal output under 
various operating regimes. In addition, he examined methods of integrating the 
output from the barrage with the mixed thermal, hydro and nuclear generation 
of the Scottish network and recommended a major upgrading of the existing 
Loch Sloy pumped storage facility to 1200MW in order that the entire project 
could compete favourably with the conventional energy sources available to the 
total Scottish system.
Turning his attention to the still moribund Severn barrage. Professor Wilson, a 
long time advocate of tidal energy schemes around the world (56), proposed 
the construction of a generating barrage very much larger than had hitherto 
been contemplated for the Severn, projecting from Lavernock Point in South 
Wales, via Flatholme (an island in the Bristol Channel) to Brean Down on the 
English side of the Severn (57). An installed capacity of some 7.26GW was 
envisaged for the scheme, with an estimated annual output of approximately 
13TWh. As he had recommended with the previous Irish and Scottish 
schemes, a high head pumped storage development of 4GW (at Aberdovey), 
was also associated with the barrage scheme. Novel turbine/generators of the 
fixed blade type with the generator rotors mounted at the propeller blade tips 
and fully immersed ( ‘Straflo’ or ‘rim generator’ design) were also proposed. 
The proposal identified that the power station would be constructed from 
concrete caissons which would be floated out and towed to their respective 
sites before being sunk. The method differed from that used for the La Ranee
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station which, at the time of the Wilson paper, was being constructed 'in the 
dry' behind two coffer dams (58), although it was similar in concept to the 
method employed in the building of the much smaller Kislaya plant (59).
Gibrat (60) in 1966 produced an extensive theoretical treatise on the problems 
of harnessing tidal energy, including in his treatment further details of the La 
Ranee project and of other proposals in Canada, USSR, UK and elsewhere.
The review and speculation around this period in respect of the construction of 
barrages across some of the estuaries and bays around the UK induced the 
water authorities to become interested in their use for water storage and a 
variety of other purposes. Howell (61) summarised a list of these projects and 
their proposed uses, noting that 'included in the list is the Severn barrage since 
it is the only one in this country to have been subjected to a complete 
engineering investigation and evaluation', (sic.)
In October 1967, Shaw presented a 'new case' for tidal power and the Severn 
barrage (62), while in August 1968, Heaps (63) produced a paper 'Estimated 
Effects of a Barrage on Tides in the Bristol Channel' which drew attention to 
the importance of evaluating how the introduction of a barrage would affect the 
overall tidal conditions in the estuary. Using a fairly simple iterative numerical 
procedure, estimates were made of possible changes which could occur in both 
tidal elevation and current. Meanwhile Braikevitch (64) produced, in 
conjunction with Wilson and others, his paper to the World Power Conference 
which critically examined and exposed the inherent limitations of the 
pump/turbine concept employed at La Ranee before comparing it with the 'more 
adaptable' tidal power pumped storage method (as identified by Wilson), 
whereby the low grade energy generated on the ebb tide was stored until 
required. He suggested that the barrage generating plant was more simple and 
robust as a result, with better economics.
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The straight flow turbine and rim generator design, the 'Straflo', referred to 
earlier, was also described in some detail as was the method by which the 
number of turbines and sluices could be selected in order to optimise energy 
costs. (In passing it is worthy of note that the ‘Straflo' rim generator turbine 
was patented by Harza in 1919 and that the current patents are held by Sulzer 
Escher Wyss of Zurich. The design has not only the hydraulic advantages 
identified by Braikevitch but also the further and highly important 'electrical' 
advantage of high rotational inertia and thereby better stability in the event of a 
large disturbance on the electrical network to which it is connected).
In June 1970, Shaw and others (65) identified that, despite the very 
disappointing economic conclusions which had been reached by earlier Bay of 
Fundy studies, continuing changes in generation patterns could still produce 
tidal projects of economic interest, particularly if pumped storage was 
incorporated with the barrage scheme. In a further paper on the same subject, 
Shaw (66) used the Severn estuary as a model to expound the economic 
virtues of combining the storage, by pumping, of large quantities of off-peak 
energy with a conventional tidal power generation project to produce power as 
required at a constant rate over a full day-time period. It was the considered 
view of the paper that coupling energy sources in that way could have many 
beneficial advantages over their separate development, particularly in terms of 
efficiency and overall cost.
On a similar theme, Sorenson (67), in his paper to an International Conference 
on Tidal Power, provided supportive data to Shaw's arguments asserting that, 
with (underground) pumped storage and nuclear plant generation, large tidal 
basins could produce electrical energy at high daily load factors and with only 
minimal variations in daily, monthly and annual capacity. At the same 
Conference, Wilson (68) examined the features of a single pool, one way
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scheme and compared them with those of multi basin anangements, arguing 
that compensation for tidal output variations would be uneconomic even where 
it was practical to provide for it. Any solution must be 'a compromise between 
costs and convenience of operation of the tidal plant and other interconnected 
generation' he asserted. Suggested solutions included pumped storage and 
'tide-boosted' pumped storage.
Other submissions to this International Conference on Tidal Power, which took 
place at the Nova Scotia Technical College, Halifax over the period 24-29 May, 
1970, included papers dealing the the subjects of power units and sluice gate 
design, connections to electrical supplies, the economics of tidal power 
generation, the effects of tidal generation on the tides themselves, and on 
caisson construction and flotation. The contents of these documents (and 
indeed many of the other papers to the Conference) can be identified as re­
iterations, some of them updated, of previously published work.
In 1972 an indication of some German interest in tidal power was identified in 
an article by Huebner (69) which summarised the potential of tidal power when 
examining the positions which had been reached in studies in the UK, USA, 
France and Russia. Experience which had been gained with the La Ranee 
barrage during and subsequent to its construction over the period 1959-67 was 
the basis for the preparation of a number of articles presented in a special issue 
of the publication La Houille Blanche in 1973. Faral (70) summarised views on 
the materials used for the bulb turbine casings (principally 17/10 austenitic 
steel), with stainless steel and aluminium bronze having been found to be the 
best combination for the turbine blades. Leborgne (71) identified a list of 
materials used on the Ranee plant, describing their application to and behaviour 
on the gates, runner blade vanes and associated pipework and providing 
special emphasis in respect of the effects of corrosion on mundane items such
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as nuts and bolts and shrink-fit pipe assemblies. Legrand (72) (73) identified 
the types of cathodic protection methods available and summarised their 
individual effectiveness, as found after six years of plant operation, when 
applied to condensers, pumps and lock gates. Gandon and others (74) 
provided papers dealing with the evaluation of the bulb generator design, 
including those of up to 40MW in their survey. Civil, mechanical and 
operational aspects of the Ranee project were also included.
Also during 1973, Wilson (75) produced a further article which briefly reviewed 
the principles of operation of various types of tidal power project, summarising 
the possible development of suitable sites. The effects of barrage construction 
on the estuaries themselves were touched upon, together with views 
concerning the integration of the resultant electrical output from such schemes 
into existing power networks. The experience gained from six years of 
operation with the Ranee scheme was also discussed while Russian 
experimental work on the subject of tidal power extraction was described. The 
paper provided an update of existing technology and discussed modern thinking 
with respect to sites such as the Severn estuary and the Bay of Fundy. 
Interestingly, while Wilson was emphasising the tidal power possibilities of 
sites on the Bay of Fundy, others (76) were examining the power potential of 
Ungava Bay, a site off the Hudson Strait in Northern Quebec and 
approximately a thousand miles north of the Bay of Fundy. Although the mean 
tidal range at this site is considerable at approximately nine metres. Baker 
(77) suggested that, in view of its extreme remoteness in conjunction with the 
severity of the climatic conditions, development of the region for tidal 
generation was unlikely to be considered seriously.
This conclusion was perhaps a little surprising in view of the fact that 
Bernstein (78) had confirmed continued Russian interest in tidal technology by
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providing a paper dealing the 1963-1968 Kislaya Bay project, a small scheme 
successfully installed and operational on the Kislogubsk River, near Murmansk 
and operating some 10° further north than Ungava Bay. The Kislaya Bay plant, 
although only of 400kW installed capacity, was interesting to the tidal power 
experts since it utilised a reversible bulb turbine of the Ranee type; moreover 
the installation involved, for the first time, the use of precast concrete caissons 
floated into position and submerged on to a prepared bed. The severe arctic 
conditions had provided considerable constructional and operational problems, 
many of which were identified by Bernstein. Other aspects of the Kislaya plant 
are identified by Charlier (79). Despite Bernstein's enthusiasm for the 
construction of other tidal plants on the White Sea (he visualised, for example, 
a large plant at Mezen Bay, close by the Kislaya Bay scheme, capable of 
producing an estimated annual output of 14TWh), no further developments 
have in fact taken place to date, which may provide additional support for 
Baker's assertion, referred to previously, that climatic problems and 
remoteness are factors which are particularly pertinent to the construction of 
tidal plant.
The June 1974 article by Shaw (80) examined the details of the 1945 
Government sponsored study of tidal power from the Severn, English Stones 
site (referred to in Chapter 3.3) suggesting that an estuary pumped-storage 
project would, despite the Report's views to the contrary, have offered 
worthwhile economic and operational advantages over the purely tidal 
development recommended by the Committee. The Shaw article is unique in 
that, for the first time in this intensive literature search, the environmental 
factors associated with a tidal plant situated on the Severn estuary were 
specifically identified and discussed.
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Also in 1974, the French continued to emphasise their interest in tidal 
generation and in the bay of Mont-Saint-Michel in particular. Deniaux (81) 
examined the background to the development of tidal power in France, 
including the Ranee construction and identified the special features of the north 
coast of France which could be exploited by tidal plants. The civil and specific 
environmental problems related to the construction of the proposed plants were 
examined. (It is an interesting point and one which is particularly worthy of 
note in view of the reference in Deniaux's paper to site specific environmental 
problems that, so far as can be ascertained from the library search, no 
environmental studies associated with the Ranee scheme, prior to the plant's 
construction, were undertaken. Charlier (82) indicates strongly that none were 
undertaken). Clare also confirmed that America had not completely lost 
interest in the topic (83), when reviewing R & D funding levels of renewal 
energy resources. Estimates of renewable energy costs were compared with 
those associated with more conventional plant and, as a result, it was 
concluded that tidal power generation was feasible technically but economically 
'uninviting at present'.
Cotillon's (84) view of the service experience gained with the Ranee tidal plant 
was contained in his 1974 paper, in which he confirmed that no major problems 
had been obsei*ved in the six/seven years of plant operation. His breakdown of 
the costs incuned in constructing the Ranee scheme is of interest; in particular, 
he concludes that the civil works, excluding coffer dams, amounted to 
somewhat in excess of 299m Fr or twenty eight per cent of the total cost of the 
project. The use of coffer dams increased the cost of the civil works to some 
forty one per cent of the total. Such data may be compared with those 
pertaining to the conclusions of the Severn Tidal Power Group (STPG) 
reported during discussions in 1986 (83) which suggested that in excess of
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sixty two per cent of the total costs were attributable to the civil works; this 
despite the fact that the supposedly more economic caisson method of 
construction was being proposed.
A paper summarising the attitude of the Central Electricity Generating Board 
(CEGB) to tidal power projects was presented to a Symposium organised by 
that body in 1974 (84). The nationalised electricity industry had previously 
indicated little if any interest in renewable energy projects, their views being 
associated specifically with the principles of steam produced 'firm power' and 
by plant representing 'economy of scale'. These attitudes were further 
reinforced during the Symposium, when a scheme to convert the intermittent 
output from a barrage on the Severn estuary to a firm supply by means of a 
combined dam/banage was discussed.
Interest in tidal power was identified in Korea and in Western Australia during 
1975. (85)(86). The Korean paper confirmed the possibilities for the extraction 
of tidal energy in the south of the countiy, where mean tidal ranges approaching 
six metres were applicable. However, as Baker also confirms (88), many of 
the apparently suitable bays and inlets are shallow at low tide and with 
intertidal flats which make such sites useless for power generation. According 
to the Korean paper two sites, one at Garolin Bay, the other on the Gulf of 
Asam, were considered to be capable of development (and Baker has also 
confirmed their adequacy for the purpose). In the case of Western Australia, 
Scott indicated that, unlike the coal rich eastern states. Western Australia is 
almost totally dependent on oil for its energy requirements. Studies have been 
made to harness the tidal power at Secure Bay, in the Kimberley region, some 
two thousand five hundred kilometres north of Perth, which have suggested a 
firm power capability of one hundred and seventy megawatt when combined 
with pumped storage. This region had also been reported upon by others (89)
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when both Secure Bay and Walcott Inlet had been identified as sites useful for 
tidal generation. Baker's views on both sites (90) confirm that, in the event of 
agreement to develop them, considerable difficulties would be likely in view of 
the very fast tidal currents induced by the exceptionally narrow entrances to 
the areas to be impounded. In addition, both sites are remote from civilisation 
and their output could not be absorbed locally. Moreover, as Baker remarks, 
both basins are deep, (Secure Bay being somewhat less so) and would result 
in difficult constructional problems. In noting the suggestions in respect of 
pumped storage and identified previously. Baker has commented on the 
possibility of linking both Walcott Inlet and Secure Bay by means of a 
connecting channel, and locating the turbines in the channel. He concludes that 
the combination would not be an economic one.
In continuing his assessment of the potential of the Severn estuary, Shaw (87) 
put forward his support for as large an impounded area as possible, with 
generating equipment installed at the estuary's seaward limit; i.e. basically as 
recommended by Wilson. His views on the environmental effects on the area 
of such a construction remained cautious, with comments such as 'possibly 
some improvement in some aspects' and 'suitably sited and operated need not 
cause further disruption of biological systems' being typical of his approach. 
These assertions, cautious as they may have been, were however questioned 
by the Hydraulic's Research Station (91) following their study of both Wilson's 
single barrage scheme and that of the double basin design which had been 
proposed by Shaw. The station concluded that the tidal regime would be 
significantly affected by such schemes, despite previous conclusions to the 
contrary, with possible problems with flooding and land drainage on and around 
the estuary and with considerable sediment re-distribution affecting 
navigation.
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There is evidence at this time (92) that UK government sources were not 
completely inactive with respect to tidal power. This report from the Energy 
Resources Sub-Committee presented the evidence of the proponents for a 
Severn barrage, stressing the (technical) feasibility of such schemes in general 
and bringing together the differing views of the consultant engineers and water 
authorities associated with evaluating various aspects of the proposals. 
Central Electricity Generating Board (CEGB) witnesses were also called to 
provide the investigating sub-committee with their views on interconnecting 
the project with the electrical transmission system and the possible utilisation 
of the intermittent supply from the barrage. It is apparent from their replies 
that significant dissension between the views of these experts on the many 
aspects of barrage generation on the Severn remained.
This conclusion is further supported by the contents of a paper by Green (93) 
compiled from hitherto unpublished work of the Geological Science Institute. 
The paper argues that, contrary to evidence provided to the Select Committee, 
much of the region of the proposed barrage had bedrock exposed at the seabed 
and was not covered by drift. The paper went on to propose that a detailed 
survey of the region should be undertaken.
Shaw, meanwhile, continued to press the case for a barrage on the Severn, 
reiterating much of the earlier published work in the process (94) (95). In the 
latter dissertation, he accepted that, although it was agreed that tidal power 
remained a real alternative to conventional methods of electricity production, 'a 
number of doubts have been raised regarding its viability'. He nevertheless 
concluded that a Severn barrage was worth the most serious consideration in 
the role complementary to thermal sources. On the other hand, the CEGB 
views, summarised in their Report to UNIPEDE on 'Electricity from Natural 
Energy Resources', (96) concluded that the identified alternative natural
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sources of power could not make any large contribution to overall energy 
requirements by the end of the century. Energy conservation and nuclear 
power were believed to be the only effective alternatives to the increasing 
consumption of fossil fuels and the resultant environmental problems 
associated with their combustion.
The Watt Committee on Energy (97) reached the general conclusion that, in 
the short to medium term, much of the basic research and some of the 
development work necessary to provide for the nation's future energy 
requirements had been completed. Beyond 2000, the committee visualised that 
the country would again become a nett importer of energy and believed that 
new energy sources must be developed as identified by many of the individual 
reports on the subject. The committee's report emphasised the length of time 
necessary to exploit any energy resource of substance and the considerable 
expenditure involved in the process.
Yet a further paper from Shaw (98) at this time argued that the tides offered 
the greatest number of advantages of all forms of energy suited to conversion 
to electricity and capable of supplying all the needs of the UK via the nation's 
coastal waters. He also concluded that tidal energy 'compares favourably with 
other renewable forms of electrical supply from both the environmental and 
economic points of view'.
Wilson (99) presented a paper to the University of Southampton which traced 
the history of tidal power for the convenience of the Symposium's delegates 
and examined construction techniques, turbine/generator designs and possible 
power outputs for various sites across the world. A comparison of possible 
costs of tidal generation with those of more conventional methods was included 
in the paper.
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The Select Committee on Science and Technology produced its report 
concerning the 'Exploitation of Tidal Power in the Severn Estuary' (100) early 
in 1977 which summarised and reviewed the evidence which had been received 
on the subject up to the end of 1975 (92). In considering the case for a barrage 
across the Severn, the various aspects for and against the case, including the 
views of the CEGB and the Government itself were taken into account. In 
particular, the Committee regarded the governmental position on tidal power to 
be 'excessively timid', particularly when compared to the recent interest by the 
Dept, of Energy (D of E) in wave power, a subject which, unlike tidal power, 
had 'not been proven on any significant scale and which lacked engineering 
techniques'. No conclusions were, however, reached in respect of 
recommendations for the go-ahead for any Severn scheme.
In like manner, the Department of Energy published the results (101) of 'three 
studies into different aspects of the feasibility of constructing a tidal barrage 
across the Severn estuary'; the basic conclusion of the work being that any 
barrage would be 'in the region of Cardiff and Weston-Super-Mare'.
Further criticism of the governmental view on renewable sources of energy 
were contained in a paper from the Select Committee on Science and 
Technology in July 1977. (102). Having stated in a previous paper that, in their 
view, the Government were 'excessively timid' with respect to tidal power, 
they reinforced their opinion with the view that government spending on 
renewable sources of energy had been 'grossly inadequate'. Accepting that 
renewable resources would be likely to provide only modest contributions to 
total energy supplies before the end of the century, they believed that they 
should nevertheless be given greater priority by the Department of Energy 
with R & D investment increased so that 'those which prove technically and 
economically viable can make a worthwhile contribution to UK energy
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requirements by 1990 when self-sufficiency in indigenous fossil fuels has 
passed'.
Wilson also believed that research into tidal power had been neglected by the 
authorities. In his view (103) this had been caused by the revived interest 
which had been created by wave power, this being in turn due to the contents 
of the Rothschild report on 'Energy Conservation' (104) and the Advisory 
Committee on Research and Development (ACORD) Report on 'Energy R & D 
in the UK'. (105).
Wilson's paper also welcomed the renewed international interest in tidal 
power. In this respect, the IEEE PES (the Power Equipment and Systems 
branch of the American Institute of Electrical and Electronic Engineers) had 
been active, at their summer meeting of 1977, in pursuing the tidal power 
possibilities for the Bay of Fundy and Passamaquoddy regions of the USA and 
Canada (106)(107). The west coast of South Korea was again identified as a 
possible site for economic tidal power in a paper to the tenth World Energy 
Conference in Turkey (108). The paper restated the fact that this region has 
mean tidal ranges of the order of six metres and, with a highly indented 
coastline, appears to present the capability of tidal power extraction.
However, as Baker had previously confirmed (109), many of the bays so 
formed were very shallow and thereby were of little use for power extraction; in 
addition, land reclamation projects were being undertaken in the same area.
An intriguing paper by Ryle (110), in discussing the large diurnal, day-to-day 
and annual fluctuations in heating demand, postulated the construction of low 
grade heat systems to minimise the necessity to provide electricity generation 
catering for peak demand. The provision of such storage facilities would 
obviously be of particular economic benefit to intermittent generation schemes 
such as tidal power projects. It is of particular interest, therefore, to recall that.
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during their deliberations into the subject of the Severn Barrage Scheme (111) 
the 1945 Committee had examined the possibility of utilising the output from 
the tidal scheme to provide district heating for the surrounding neighbourhood. 
The Severn Barrage Committee had formed the view, fully supported by Ryle, 
that the costs of transmitting the electrical energy to storage systems for low 
grade heat was low in comparison with those associated with pumped storage. 
However, they had formed the opinion that the facilities for district heating 
were virtually non existent at the time, that the possible rate of such 
development would likely to be very slow and that special legislation would in 
any event be required for such scheme(s) to go ahead. It was considered, as a 
result, that such projects 'would not be possible for many years to come' and 
further consideration was abandoned as being outside the committee's terms of 
reference.
The potential for 'unconventional', i.e. renewable energy sources for the United 
Kingdom was discussed at some length at the World Energy Conference, 
Istanbul in September 1977 (112) when Leighton and others reviewed, once 
again, the 'present state of knowledge' of each potential resource, including its 
likely magnitude. The conclusions expressed in the paper's review of the 
different renewable technologies included views on 'their prospects for the next 
century'. Tidal power was not considered in a particularly favourable light, 
particularly in comparison with wind power, in terms both of environmental 
impact and in relation to conventional technology.
In a no less interesting article. Sir Hermann Bondi, the Chief Scientist to the D 
of E (113) discussed the (then) current proposals for harnessing tidal power. 
He was of the opinion that, while the unique features of the Severn estuary, 
'one of the world's most suitable tidal power sites' could not be ignored, tidal 
power was 'less promising in the long term than either wave power or solar
5 9
energy'. To go ahead with even the 'most simple Severn estuary barrage 
scheme' would, he claimed, 'cost at least £1000m'. (The 1986 estimated cost for 
a barrage at the English Stones was £1000m, or £1150m with contingencies. 
(294X
Wicks (114) in his assessment of the power potential of waves, tides, and 
tidal currents, remained of the view that only the salinity and thermal gradient 
forms of energy derived from the sea could rival the density of conventional 
energy sources. His earlier work had led to this conclusion but, as he 
admitted, schemes involving these processes had not retained the attention of 
scientists as had tidal, wave and, of course, thermal power. Charlier (115) 
confirms that the theoretical powers of thermal gradients (OTEC) and salinity 
gradients are greater, by several orders of magnitude, than that attributed to 
tidal power. (OTEC - 40,000 x 10^ MW; Salinity Gradient - 1400 x 10^ MW 
and tidal power 3 x 10^ MW). In a similarly, depressing, report to the 
American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME), Griffin reviewed the 
feasibility of extracting power from the sea (116) and discussed the technical 
and environmental acceptability of tidal, wind and thermal gradient for power 
generation. When comparing the costs of these alternatives with conventional 
nuclear and coal-fired outputs, he totally rejected tidal power as 'economically 
uninviting' at least from a USA point of view. (It tends to follow that, on the 
basis of Griffin's environmental assessment at least, tidal power would also be 
less than inviting to the UK). Just as importantly, the views of the Central 
Electricity Generating Board (CEGB) as expressed by Denton (117) were 
equally discouraging for tidal power, since their assessment of worthwhile 
renewables did not even include this method of energy extraction. However, 
possibly of some small comfort, Denton maintained that all the renewables 
examined were uncompetitive when compared with nuclear power although
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'wave power might be worth considering and solar energy might be useful for 
domestic water heating'.
This view of tidal power (and other renewables) is shared by Madeley (118), 
who makes no mention of tidal power during his exploration of the different 
scenarios capable of meeting the UK's future energy requirements. In noting 
the possible decline in primary energy supplies by the year 2000, he examines 
the principles of energy conversion through solar, wind, wave, geothermal and 
waste energy systems, while the possibilities of catering for predicted future 
requirements by the availability of wind, wave and solar systems are explored. 
On the other hand, a short dissertation by Beatson (119) suggests that all the 
different renewable energy sources are viable but depend for their success 
upon further research and development to be of any practical use. The views 
expressed by Beatson are perhaps better stated, and certainly are reinforced, 
by the EPRI (Electrical Power Research Institute) Report (120). Reviewing 
the features of wind, wave and tidal power, ocean thermal energy and biomass 
conversion, the conclusion was reached that ‘these long shot, indirect solar 
(sic) technologies have potential and promise but they all have unsolved 
technical problems’. None could be counted on to provide significant electric 
power needs by the year 2000.
The June 1978 issue of ‘International Water Power and Dam Construction’ 
contained two features on the subject of tidal power. The first, by Shaw (121), 
reviewed the existing status of the subject and examines once again the Bay of 
Fundy scheme(s), prospects for the west coast of India, identifying a very 
large Gulf of Cambay scheme and a smaller possibly less attractive project on 
the Gulf of Kachehh. The low cost of labour at both these sites and its effect on 
unit costs are identified by Baker (122). The second article (123) on the 
subject of tidal power dealt with the experience gained at the La Ranee power
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scheme and included suggestions that the scheme could have achieved better 
economy by the installation of bulb turbines of larger runner diameter. Further 
details of the mechanical design and operational characteristics of the La Ranee 
barrage plant were provided (124) in a paper to the Chartered Mechanical 
Engineer in 1978. This author also briefly explored the characteristics of the 
prototype Kislogubsk plant before embarking on a detailed historical appraisal 
of the Severn barrage project.
During the latter part of 1978, the American press showed renewed interest in 
ocean energy schemes. In one paper (125), the authors provided support for 
the assessment, also expressed elsewhere (126) that, of the three terrawatt 
(TW) of power continuously dissipated as a result of tidal motion across the 
surface of the earth, only a minute fraction could be harnessed for useful power 
applications. They believed, nevertheless, that this represented up to five per 
cent of world-wide all source generation and, as a result, supported any action 
to obtain and to utilise the tidal source of power. The article listed some of the 
published data re tidal extraction but provided no new thinking on the subject. 
In the second paper dealing with ocean power technology (127), it is apparent 
that American thinking remained firmly along the line of ocean thermal energy 
conversion. Other power conversion schemes, including tidal power, were 
briefly examined but the main thrust of the paper concerns the technology, 
equipment, funding and future plans for OTEC. Despite considerable 
expenditure on the process (some five hundred and twenty million dollars were 
expended over the period 1978-1986, amounting to about 20% of the total 
research and development expenditure for renewables) (128), the position 
presently reached with OTEC appears not dissimilar to other ocean related 
schemes.
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Further thoughts concerning renewable sources of energy and its possible 
impact on conventional generation were voiced by Glyn England (129), Chief 
Executive of the CEGB, in an internal paper to members of his staff. In it, 
England considered the feasibility of off-shore wind generators, wave 
machines and tidal generation on the Severn. The possible harnessing of 
geothermal energy by the rock cracking (hot rocks) process, a research project 
in conjunction with EEC experts, was also examined. The future possibilities 
for renewables were then discussed against the background of North Sea oil, 
coal production and nuclear power. (The utilisation of natural gas for 
generation processes was not mentioned in the paper since the nationalised 
utilities of the period were excluded from burning this prime fuel). The view of 
the CEGB to renewable sources of electricity generation, as portrayed by 
England’s comments, obviously remained at best sceptical, believing them to 
be of little significance in their continuing search for economy of scale and 
increased generation efficiency.
On the other hand, Civiak (130) indicated that some change in direction for 
tidal power had perhaps occurred, identifying the fact that both governmental 
and private interests had now joined forces in certain parts of the world, to 
study the harnessing of tidal power for electricity generation. His paper also 
reviewed the technical possibilities of regulating power production and 
examined methods to minimise the environmental impact of tidal generation on 
estuaries’ ecosystems. His paper also made reference to the high cost of tidal 
energy as identified from evaluation of earlier studies of Bay of Fundy 
schemes, but argued that, from a life cycle cost analysis point of view and not 
the shorter term evaluation favoured by conventional financial techniques, tidal 
power remained an attractive proposition.
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Chapter 5 - Tidal Power 1979 - to date
5.1 The Severn Estuarv
The criticisms of governmental ‘lack of urgency’ and ‘timid approach’ to 
renewables in general and tidal power in particular, expressed during 1978 by 
various official committees (ref. 97, 101, 102) together with the large increases 
in oil prices during the 1970’s may well have induced a government re-think on 
the subject of tidal barrages. No less importantly, the public’s growing 
aversion to nuclear generation may have combined to provide the reasons for 
Wedgewood Benn, the Secretary of State for Energy in the 1976-9 Labour 
administration, to call for a re-appraisal of the feasibility and relative merits of 
a Severn estuary electricity tidal generation scheme. Whatever the real 
reason(s), a second Severn Barrage Committee (SBC) was appointed for this 
purpose in late 1978, under the chairmanship of Sir Hermann Bondi, the official 
report of their findings appearing during March 1981 (132).
5.1(a) The Bondi Inquirv
An internal progress report, produced by the Bondi Committee in 1980, had 
concluded that although (large scale) tidal power from the Severn estuary was 
technically feasible, (a conclusion reached by a similarly named committee 
some thirty five years earlier), it seemed unlikely that its unit cost could 
compete with that provided by nuclear generation. Nevertheless, it was 
considered that the output from such a plant might compete with fossil-fuel 
generation if coal and oil prices continued to rise in real terms. The official 
report from the SBC, presented to David Howell, the Conservative Secretary of 
State for Energy, 1979-81, was somewhat less pessimistic in outlook than 
was apparent from the Committee’s earlier comments, although the report still 
retained the view that any investment in a barrage was unlikely to be as 
attractive as one involving nuclear plant. A detailed examination of the report
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confirms that the Committee and its experts had examined no less than six 
alignments for a banage constructed to the ‘east’ of English Stones before 
concluding that it was technically possible to enclose the estuary by a barrage 
located ‘in any position east of a line drawn from Porlock due north to the 
Welsh coast’. The economic assessment of various schemes for the estuary 
resulted in the elimination of all but three of the different possibilities, these 
being examined in further detail. The first of the schemes examined, the so- 
called ‘Outer Barrage’, to be constructed from Minehead to Aberthaw on the 
Welsh Coast, was considered to be able to account more or less for the whole 
energy potential of the estuary. Estimated to cost almost nine billion pounds 
at 1980 prices, not including interest and other charges, the single basin ebb 
generation scheme was expected to produce around 20TWh annually, or about 
ten per cent of the electricity requirements of England and Wales, from an 
installed capacity of 12GW. The second of the initially preferred schemes, the 
‘Inner Barrage’, required an impounded basin to be created by a barrage 
constructed from Brean Down, a promontory close by Western-Super-Mare, to 
Lavernock Point on the Welsh Coast and a few miles south of Cardiff. This ebb 
generation scheme was estimated to produce about 13TWh annually from the 
single basin, and installed capacity of 7.2GW and to require a capital 
expenditure, on the same basis as the larger scheme, of £5,600m. The third of 
the initially preferred schemes, the ‘staged scheme’, envisaged an extension to 
the ‘inner’ baiTage by enclosing Bridgewater Bay as a second basin. The 
committee considered that this scheme would produce as much energy as the 
outer barrage itself and with a similar economic performance while, if the 
second basin was to be operated in a ‘flood’ regime, electricity production could 
take place for over twenty hours each day. After reviewing their provisional 
conclusions on the merits/demerits of the three alternative projects, the
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committee formed their opinion that the staged scheme could be deferred to 
some future date without affecting the attractiveness of the inner barrage. 
Moreover, it was their view that the engineering complexities associated with 
the construction of an outer barrage, together with its possible environmental 
problems, were such as to impose considerable risks to the project as a whole. 
The inner barrage scheme was ultimately recommended by the committee.
In assessing the economic viability of the project, the committee concluded that 
about six million tonnes of coal equivalent would be saved each year although, 
as a result of the intermittent operation associated with barrage generation, 
the necessity for future power station capacity would not be reduced by ‘more 
than about one Gigawatt’. The unit cost of the barrage produced generation 
was estimated, on the basis of five per cent discount rate, to be within the 
range of future costs of generation by conventional coal and nuclear plant; a 
figure of 3.1p/kWh was identified. The possibility of part generating’, as 
barrage construction progressed, by the inclusion of non equipped generator 
caissons in the early construction ‘float-out’ phases, was also explored, 
leading to the view that ‘the first electricity may be generated within nine 
years of commencement of construction and not the originally envisaged 
sixteen years’.
The Report emphasised the critical importance to the viability of a barrage 
scheme of increases in fossil-fuel prices and of discount rate, making the point 
that with ‘unexpectedly’ high energy costs, a barrage would be of great 
advantage. It also explained the reason for its higher level of optimism than 
had been previously expressed. The change was due, the Committee stated, 
to later estimates of energy possible from the barrage amounting to perhaps 
forty per cent higher than the original figures employed, for the same capital 
costs.
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The possible impact on the environment and its ecological systems of the 
barrage had been given consideration in the report which, however, 
emphasised that while a number of preliminary judgements could be made, 
‘much work remains to be done’ in order to study ‘all the possible effects on 
man and the environment’. In particular, important subjects such as the effects 
on ports and navigation of the estuary and upon the social effects of 
employment (it was envisaged that the project would provide about 21,(XX) 
new jobs for periods of up to ten years) were identified as requiring further 
assessment before any definite decisions could be made. The rate of 
manufacture of the one hundred and sixty turbo generators and associated 
ancillary equipment required for the barrage could , the Committee believed, 
‘strain UK industrial capacity’.
The possible effects on the upstream (of the barrage) water levels were noted 
and the necessity to introduce additional treatment plants, at a cost of £120- 
130m and with annual running costs of perhaps ten per cent of the capital 
outlay, reported upon. The Report commented that the need to maintain any 
specific aspect of tidal water quality in its existing state would demand a 
‘policy decision’. (In view of the number of different authorities having 
interests on the estuary, its banks and inter-tidal zones, the provision of a 
single policy acceptable to all would obviously present a formidable task). In 
assessing the effects of a barrage on land drainage, sea defences, birds, fish 
and of its use and application to water based recreation, the Committee 
concluded that it was evident that its environmental, social and industrial 
acceptability had not been established and that these aspects must be major 
objectives to be addressed in any future work.
The Committee therefore recommended that a further phase of work be 
undertaken forthwith, this to be concentrated on the region of the ‘inner
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barrage’. It expressed its great concern of ‘the yet imperfectly understood 
impacts of a barrage and recommended the early setting in train of deeper 
studies to establish the acceptability of a barrage’, the aim being to put 
Government ‘as soon as possible in a position where it could responsibly 
decide whether to authorise the construction of a barrage’. The Committee 
believed that a combined acceptability and preliminary design study’ should not 
take more than four years or cost more than £20m; although a decision would 
also be needed, part way through the study to decide whether to proceed, at a 
further cost of £25m, with handling and foundation trials of a prototype caisson 
in the estuary. Since the civil plans of the proposed scheme and the ‘early 
generation’ aspects of the project necessitated the use of caisson construction, 
towing to site and setting-in position, it is difficult to understand why the 
Committee had decided that the vitally important trials were not to be included, 
from the outset, as an integral part of the envisaged acceptability and design 
study at a total cost of £45m.
It is worthy of note that, despite studying a different barrage line, the second 
SBC was able to confirm in its Report, in similar vein to its 1933 forebear that, 
in the view of the Committee, a barrage (on a line from Cardiff to Weston- 
Super-Mare) would be both economically and technically feasible. Sacks (147) 
believed the Committee’s conclusion to be ‘yes - b u t ...’ while an article in 
W ater Power Dam Construction (148) considered the verdict ‘favourable’. 
5.1(b) Formation of the Severn Tidal Power Group (STPG).
Soon after the publication of the SBC Report in March 1981, an industrial 
consortium comprising Sir Robert McAlpine, Taylor Woodrow Construction, 
Balfour Beatty, GEC Turbine Generators and Northern Engineering Industries, 
(to be joined in early 1985 by Wimpey Major Projects -see also pl03), was 
formed as the Severn Tidal Power Group (STPG), which announced their
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joint investigation of a £5000m private sector scheme for the Severn. Members 
of the group had individually been active in the Bondi assessments, providing 
confidential and other information to the SBC. (133)(134). The group proposed 
to the Secretary of State for Energy that they should now undertake an interim 
series of studies aimed at reducing many of the uncertainties identified by the 
SBC Report and, with part funding provided by the Department of Energy, this 
work was undertaken during the period 1983-85. At a symposium organised 
by the Institution of Civil Engineers during 1986 Clare (135) summarised many 
of the results of various investigations undertaken, noting that ‘within the 
limited funds available it was not possible to commission new field work of a 
technical nature, studies being limited to those which might result in major 
savings in cost and time or increase the confidence in the different estimates 
included in the SBC Report’. As a result of such work, it was proposed that 
the alignment of the barrage as recommended by SBC should be revised to 
eliminate a ‘dog leg’ around Steep Holm (an island in the estuary), providing 
better turbine intake characteristics, a shortening of the barrage by around one 
and a half kilometres and ‘incidentally an increase in the impounded basin area 
by a small amount’. Moreover, the STPG were of the opinion that the 
necessity for the preparation of a prototype to assess the performance of the 
45MW nine metre runner design of bulb turbine, as proposed by SBC, could be 
avoided by what was considered to be 'an acceptable extrapolation of the 
service performance and experience' of bulb generators already in service. As 
a result, the installation of one hundred and ninety two bulb turbines of 8.2m 
runner diameter, each with a nominal output of 37.5MW, was proposed for the 
modified alignment. A further modification to the original SBC proposals 
concerned the scheme for connecting the tidal generation into the main 
transmission network. As discussed in detail in the paper by Barr (136), it
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was believed that, by taking account of the power loading cycle associated with 
tidal generation together with the fact that expansion of the barrage substation 
would not be required, a more economic ('mesh') layout of substation could be 
designed and constructed while still retaining the required electrical security. 
Moreover, the total barrage output could be cabled to the English side of the 
estuary, and not to both English and Welsh shores as envisaged by the SBC, a 
further significant saving in capital costs. STPG also proposed to construct 
'embankment' sections (basically dam structures comprised of rock or plain 
caissons), simultaneously with the installation of those caissons intended to 
incorporate generators and sluices. This change of construction was estimated 
to shorten the total construction programme by two years and to provide full 
electrical output within nine years.
The funding levels agreed with the Department of Energy at the outset of the 
STPG assessment were considered insufficient to undertake any major new 
environmental studies. However, papers by Shaw (137)(138) to the 
Symposium held at the Institution of Civil Engineers, based mainly on an 
analysis of experts' views to the SBC and other organisations' studies, must 
have presented a very useful insight to STPG on possible ecological and social 
impacts of the proposed barrage.
Interestingly, and despite the low level of funding available to them, ‘interim 
studies’ were undertaken by STPG during 1985/6 to re-examine English 
Stones as a possible region for a tidal barrage. The main objective of the study 
undertaken by Binnie and Roe, (139) was to evaluate the commercial viability 
of a privately owned and operated barrage selling electricity into the (then) 
nationalised electricity network, (see also Section 5.1j). As others had 
concluded previously, the authors reported their view that construction of an 
electricity generating barrage at the English Stones was technically feasible.
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They argued, however, that despite the earlier work at Manchester University 
by Professor A.H. Gibson, a siltation problem could well exist at the region 
chosen for the barrage, some two kilometres downstream from the earlier 
English Stones site.
The problem of siltation was considered in some detail by Kirby (140). This 
investigator prefaced his evaluation of the region with the comment that the 
level of knowledge of sedimentary movement in the English Stones vicinity 
was less advanced than at other sites on the estuary due to a lack of study of 
the region and of detailed information pertaining to barrage design. 
Nevertheless, he identified English Stones as having one of the highest tidal 
ranges and strongest tidal cunents in the estuary, noting, as other 
investigators before him had done, the proximity and the effect of the Shoots - 
a narrow deep channel truncating the English Stones site. Referring to the 
very high level of fine suspended solids in this region of the estuary and to the 
movement of several million tonnes of such sediment per tide, Kirby was of the 
view that much of this efficiently mixed, high concentration of suspended solids 
would pass through turbines and sluices to be deposited, at slack water, 
behind the barrage, remaining there and ultimately reducing the volume of 
water in the impounded basin. Suggesting that 'further work was necessary' to 
confirm his assessment of the situation likely to result from a barrage at the 
English Stones site, Kirby predicted that the life span of the basin would, as a 
result of siltation, lie between forty and eighty years. Such a period would be 
sufficiently short to seriously affect the economic viability of a generating 
barrage at the site and was obviously at variance with the conclusion reached 
some fifty years previously by Professor Gibson, who had voiced the opinion to 
the 1933 Committee that siltation would be unlikely to pose any problem to 
barrage operation. It is significant, however, that although Gibson had
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deliberately neglected any significant input of sediment from the seaward side 
of the barrage, arguing that river borne sources were the major infeed of 
sediment to the basin, Kirby's studies had, on the other hand, supported the 
view that the main sediment input to the scheme would be from the seaward 
side. This complete change of emphasis was estimated by Kirby to result in an 
order of magnitude greater deposition rate than had originally been estimated 
by Gibson. It is no less obvious from the discussion on Kirby’s paper (308) 
that Dr. Kirby's own views concerning sediment mobility (which had 
incidentally resulted in his suggestions for modifications to the SBC Cardiff- 
Weston line) were also open to considerable scrutiny, confirming that author’s 
comments that much careful additional consideration would be needed in any 
future studies of a tidal barrage on the Severn.
Although at the time of the initial involvement of STPG with Severn barrage 
generation, no fully identified proposal for the privatisation of the Electricity 
Supply Industry had been tabled, the necessary scenario for such action had 
been well publicised in 1982 by the new Tory Administration. Furthermore, the 
sceptical views of the public generators and distribution boards to expenditure 
relating to 'environmentally friendly' but infirm sources of power and their own 
support for economy of scale were no less well known. As a result and unlike 
the SBC whose remit had included the re-appraisal of the technical, social and 
environmental problems likely to be faced by the construction of a barrage at 
various locations on the Severn estuary, the STPG were required, as part of 
their study, to assess the prospects for attracting private capital to fund the 
construction of a barrage drawn on the Cardiff-Weston line and also at English 
Stones. The financial problems involved were summarised in an extremely 
interesting and detailed paper to the ICE Symposium held in 1986; 'The
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economics and possible financing of two barrage schemes' by Dr. J.G. Carr 
(141).
5.1(c) An Economic Assessment
In discussing the difficulties and possibilities of privately financing generating 
stations, the outputs of which were to be sold to a public body. Dr. Carr chose 
two parameters to evaluate the economics of the two plants; as a result, their 
real pre-tax rate of return and the cost of a unit based on a discount rate of five 
per cent were subjected to close examination. It was mainly supposed that the 
output of each station would be purchased, at the time required by the CEGB 
and in accordance with their published bulk supply tariff (BST), although the 
effects of other purchasing scenarios, used by the CEGB in support of their 
Sizewell B nuclear station submission, were also examined.
The paper concluded that neither project was economically - more correctly 
commercially - viable within the terms appropriate to private sector funding, 
due basically to the fact that the barrage output, and thereby the economic 
return from the privately financed constructions, would effectively be controlled 
by the public sector method of evaluation. In addition, the remote possibility of 
finding equity funding for the preconstruction phase, when the very costly risks 
of cancellation of the project, or of unforseen difficulties to be overcome, was 
emphasised.
During discussion of the paper, Grubb (142) identified his view that, in terms of 
national economic benefit, cash flow should be assessed at a rate which 
reflected the mean social rate of time preference (SRTP) across the population, 
a representative figure for SRTP at that period being in the range 2-5%. In an 
ideal free market economy, this figure, increased by a factor representative of 
the entrepreneurial risk involved and an allowance for any corporation tax, 
would therefore be expected to apply to financial returns associated with the
7 3
private sector. It has to be stated that the private market rate for equity in this 
country in particular is very high, major financial support for any large project 
being available mainly from Company pension funds who, together with the 
banks, demand a high return for their investors. Few companies or funds 'will 
invest at a level where their capital yields less than the current interest rate'.
In this respect, 'it is interesting to note that the average annual rate of return 
on investments over the period 1977-88 in this country was no less than 24.8% 
while in the USA, West Germany and Japan the figures applicable were 15.6%, 
14.3% and 7.6% respectively' (143).
David Hunt, the Parliamentary Undersecretary of State for the D of E (1984- 
87), reviewing the discussion of tidal energy assessment summarised at the 
ICE 1986 Symposium, considered that progress had been achieved in 
improving knowledge on tidal power 'during the last few years' and remarked 
on 'the commitment of the Government to tidal energy'. He went on to indicate 
that the 'next phase of work' presented an exciting opportunity to all in the field' 
to prove that tidal energy projects in the UK could be built to time and cost', 'to 
be environmentally acceptable' and 'economically viable'. He referred to the 
tidal projects at La Ranee and at Annapolis and expressed the view that the 
success of 'these schemes showed that well planned tidal projects could be of 
significant benefit to the UK's energy economy'. T h e  next two or three years 
will be a vital and challenging period to both the private and the public sectors 
in establishing the case for tidal energy in the UK' he asserted.
Other commentators took heart from Hunt's comments, in conjunction with the 
SBC and the initial STPG assessments, believing that tidal power was no 
longer in the doldrums in UK Government thinking and could come to fruition in 
the Severn estuary. Ruffard (159) was of the opinion that this country 'still 
retained an interest in tidal schemes' which, in his view, bore technical and
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economic comparison with the more conventional methods of generation. This 
attitude was strongly supported by Moore (160) and by others (157)(158). 
5.1(d) The STPG Report and Companion Energv Paper 57.
In July 1986, the STPG published their long awaited report of the interim 
studies made on the estuary (161). The views of the group included the 
conclusion that the English Stones site might be more liable to progressive 
siltation than the Cardiff-Weston line which had in 1981 gained the support of 
the SBC. In confirming that a barrage on the Cardiff-Weston line was their 
preferred scheme, however, STPG stated that the rate of return available from 
the project was likely to be insufficient to attract private funding bearing the full 
risk of the project particularly when the power system into which the 
generating barrage would transfer its output was a publically funded body. 
Nevertheless, their view remained that, since the project would bring regional 
and non energy benefits in addition to the advantage of diversification of energy 
resources, further detailed work should be undertaken into barrage design and 
construction, possible environmental effects, regional aspects, and include a 
re-assessment of the economic viability of the project. Consideration would 
require to be given, the STPG Report went on, to a range of legal aspects, by 
the collection and collation of relevant data and, finally, the study would be 
expected to define what further assessments would be required in order to 
decide whether or not a barrage should be built. The Report also noted that 
'due to the effects of the proposed privatisation of the Electricity Supply 
Industry, it was not considered appropriate to proceed with studies of the 
organisational and financial aspects at that time'.
The proposed 'further study' programme drawn up by the STPG was included in 
a Consultation Document which was issued for public assessment and 
comment in February 1987, the replies obtained to be used to review and to
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revise the programme of work. A further two year period of study and 
investigation ensued prior to the publication by the D of E of Energy Paper No 
57 the ‘Severn Barrage General Report’ (162) which was in turn followed, 
during April 1990, by the five volume Detailed Report dealing with the subjects 
of Energy Capture and Plant Engineering, Physical Environmental Effects, Site 
Investigations and Civil Engineering, and with Nature Conservation Aspects 
and Regional Development Effects.
The executive summary of the General Report identified that the sixteen 
kilometre barrage would comprise a number of concrete caissons floated to 
site, after construction in local yards, and sunk into position. Alternative 
construction methods had also been studied, including the use of steel caissons 
and in situ construction. A dual carriageway would be provided across the 
barrage linking with the main road system on both English and Welsh shores. 
The power output from the sixteen kilometre barrage, generated by two 
hundred and sixteen, 40MW 9m runner diameter turbines and providing an 
annual energy output of some 17TWh, would be transformed and transmitted, 
via 400kV cables, from the barrage to two substations, one on each shore, and 
thence into the national grid system. The necessity for certain system 
reinforcement, at both 275 and 400kV, was also identified to cater for the very 
large but intermittent supply from the barrage. Locks capable of accepting the 
passage, at most states of the tide, of the largest ships trading into the ports 
enclosed within the basin were included in the scheme as were smaller locks 
suitable for the movement of inshore vessels. A barrage design life of 120 
years had been assumed but it was accepted that, with adequate maintenance 
and plant replacement procedures, this life could be substantially extended.
The construction programme envisaged a production and installation range of 
forty four turbine generators of bulb design per annum, with seven years to
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closure of the barrage and first commercial electricity production from the 144 
turbines then installed, with two further years to completion and full output. It 
is to be noted that included within the detail of the operational mode of the 
barrage, ebb generation with flood pumping was the preferred method.
The capital cost of the project, including the additional feasibility and 
environmental studies proposed, but not including the costs associated with 
the road across the barrage, was estimated at £8,280m. An additional £850m 
was also identified for the off-barrage connections and system reinforcement 
required (somewhat higher than this figure should additional undergrounding of 
connections be necessary - a further £380m was set aside for this purpose). 
The cross barrage road was estimated to cost upward of £200m. The annual 
costs associated with the operation of the barrage were estimated at £70m.
The cost of electricity at the barrage boundary was assessed at 3.4p/kWh at 
5% discount rate. It will have been noted that the estimated capital cost of the 
project had escalated from £5000m, as determined by the SBC and using 1980 
prices, to £8280m in 1988 money terms. The effects of inflation on the project, 
together with the addition of larger ship locks than hitherto envisaged were 
identified as the main causes for the increase in costs. The report also drew 
attention to the revised generating capacity (from 7200MW to 8640MW) and 
the increased annual output (from 14TWh to 17TWh). On the basis that 
inflation over the period would account for an increase of around 20%, the cost 
of generation had increased only slightly over the period from around £938/kW 
to £958/kW installed, figures which compare not unfavourably, but purelv in 
terms of £/kW installed, with the cost of nuclear generation. Accepting that the 
firm power delivered by the barrage would not be more than about lOOOMW 
(163) this comparison is interesting but of little practical relevance.
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The possible environmental effects of the proposed barrage were dealt with in 
some considerable detail, although the report prefaced its review by stating 
that 'the study was never intended to provide a complete environmental 
assessment' although 'the scope of work was probably as wide as any carried 
out on an estuary in Britain'. The report went on 'the work has reduced 
uncertainties but further assessment studies would be required'. The 
modelling undertaken had predicted that mean spring tide levels within the 
basin would be reduced by around half a metre, depending upon the degree of 
flood pumping required for generation purposes; while low tide levels would fall 
to about present mean sea level. Tidal currents within the basin area were 
expected to fall drastically as a result of the barrage but less significantly on 
the seaward side of the baiTage. The sum total of the hydrodynamic changes 
would, it was believed, result in a major change in the transportation rate of 
sediment in the estuary, substantially reducing the level of sediment held in 
suspension and, as a result, reducing the turbidity in the region.
While the increase in water clarity due to the reduction in turbidity ‘should lead 
to an increase in primary biological production in the estuary and thereby an 
increase in food supplies for the birds and fish’, the Report believed that 
‘further studies, particularly of specific areas’, were required to reduce 
uncertainties. Damage caused to fish and other species as a result of their 
passage through the turbines also remained an uncertain aspect which would 
require further assessment. The possibility of developing fish ladders or their 
equivalent to minimise fish damage was identified.
The work involved in rectifying any difficulties to land drainage created by 
changes in the water levels caused by the barrage was considered to be of a 
local nature and of minor cost. No less importantly the effect of a barrage on 
the sea defences of the region bounding the basin area was not considered to
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be of any significance and the measures necessary to deal with local problems 
were not anticipated to require other than minor additional expenditure.
The Report also commented that, in producing the anticipated output of 17TWh, 
annual fossil-fuel burn would be reduced by the equivalent of eight million 
tonnes, thereby reducing carbon dioxide emissions by some seventeen million 
tonnes annually. Barrage generation would not of itself create acid rain.
As previous reports dealing with the subject of a Severn barrage had done, the 
STPG document emphasised that the construction would create many jobs, 
both temporary and permanent and provide a major boost to the economy. It 
also affirmed that, in addition to certain other studies, mainly environmental 
and already outlined, possible options available for promotion and financing of 
the barrage would need to be addressed. It was accepted that this aspect 
could not be proceeded with until the results of the privatisation of the 
Electricity Supply Industry had been assessed.
5.1(e) The Assessment of Public Responses to Energv Paper 57 
The publication of the Severn Barrage General Report and its five detailed 
volumes was followed by subsequent public debate and presentations to 
interested groups, local authorities and other private and public bodies in order 
that a period of consultation could take place as had previously been invited by 
John Wakeham, the 1989-92 Secretaiy of State for Energy. The detailed 
results of the consultation process were included in the Report (164) produced 
by the STPG in 1991 under contract as part of the D of E’s Renewable Energy 
Research and Development programme and managed by the Energy 
Technology Support Unit (ETSU). More than three hundred responses were 
subsequently analysed, by the same body, the conclusions reached also being 
embodied in an ETSU Report (165).
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The difficulties associated with any attempt to summarise, in as concise, 
objective and unbiased manner as possible, the mass of data included within 
the correspondence from subscribers to the Secretary of State’s invitation to 
comment on the Report and its Appendices must be freely acknowledged. The 
problem is further exacerbated when the organisation responsible for the 
analysis is the one responsible for the initial data. Nevertheless, it is difficult 
to reconcile the many opinions and reservations on record with the simple 
conclusion reached by the STPG Report that ‘on balance comments on the 
Reports are generally in favour of the project’. (207). For this reason, an 
individual assessment has been made of the many replies included in Ref 164; 
the results are included in the following paragraphs.
Major reservations were expressed by the Statutory National Public 
Authorities, with the Nature Conservancy Council (NCC) in particular being 
highly critical of the reports although it did welcome ‘the intended continuation 
of ecological studies during the next stage of the environmental implications of 
the proposed barrage scheme’. (166). The NCC was concerned at apparent 
inconsistencies between sections of the general report (162) and the detailed 
report on the Implications for Nature Conservation (Volume IV). NCC 
believed that a misleading representation of the detailed findings were included 
in the general report, with ‘examples of perceived benefits of the barrage 
scheme’ being included ‘while mentioning disadvantages only in the context of 
further work required’. In particular, it took to task the STPG view that ‘the
work to date has not identified environmental changes which could not be
countered by various means’. The NCC view was that the Severn estuary 
‘was of particular conseiwation importance because of its hypertidal character
and the associated unusual flora and fau n a   If a barrage were to be built
the loss of this attribute could not be countered by any conceivable engineering
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means’. The NCC considered that it was ‘perhaps not surprising’ that the 
‘report makes no attempt at explaining how this major effect would be 
ameliorated’. The Council were equally concerned with the problem of 
protecting fish and carideans during their passage through the barrage and 
which, they believed, the Report had dealt with in a superficial manner. 
Obviously the ‘slant’ of the detailed Report of Environmental and Regional 
effects of the Barrage also annoyed the NCC. Taking as an example the 
second paragraph of the Introduction of this document which begins ‘The 
Severn estuary, with its very large tidal range, is a severe example of this 
characteristically stressed system’, they had the opinion that, perhaps not 
deliberately but certainly by implication, the report had set out to suggest that 
any change reducing the ‘stress’ was of positive advantage to the region and 
to nature conservation itself. In contradiction of that view, the NCC believed 
that the large tidal range was ‘a prime feature of nature conservation 
importance and responsible for the unique ecosystem of the estuary’. Further, 
examples of the report’s ‘slant’ were identified. ‘The work on environmental
issu es  has resulted in the identification of some positive benefits’ according
to the Report - the ‘disbenefits should also have been equally positively 
recorded’ according to NCC. No less importantly, the Report states that
‘future work for the benefit of the p ro ject ’ but, as noted by the NCC ‘future
work may NOT be for the ultimate benefit ’. It could therefore be construed,
said NCC, that any future work intended by the STPG could be designed 
specifically to ensure that ‘only the benefits are identified’.
The NCC also believed that the reduction of the large tidal range of the Severn 
imposed by a barrage should have been particularly emphasised in the STPG 
Report, suggesting that a paragraph identifying that ‘the loss of the largest 
tidal range in Britain and the second largest in the world (sic) must be seen as
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a significant reduction of the nature conservation resource of Great Britain’. 
‘Before the construction of a barrage is firmly promoted and approved, proper 
consideration must be given to this particular change to the present 
environment’. The loss of the Severn ‘bore’, which would result from any 
barrage across the Severn, appears not to have been considered by NCC.
The environmental and ecological groups were, perhaps understandably, and 
with the exception of the Sevemside Green Party, universally critical of the 
STPG’s proposals. The detail of the criticisms, however, varied widely. For 
example, the Bristol Ornithological Club, via their Chairman, expressed their 
view of ‘the difficulties caused by the short deadline for comment and the 
apparent reluctance of the Energy department, ETSU and STPG to provide 
(additional) copies to interested parties. ‘A project of this magnitude’ their 
letter asserted, ‘surely required more open-handed communication with as 
many parties as possible than it has received so far’. (In fact, as stated 
earlier; apart from the invitation from John Wakeham to the general public that 
they examine and, if possible, comment on the STPG proposals, presentations 
were also made at a number of schools and libraries, while the attention of 
some four hundred companies, organisations and individuals whose interests 
lay on or around the Severn estuary was drawn, by letter, to the existence of 
the STPG Report. Although no reply to the summary sheets was specifically 
requested, more than three hundred replies were received).
Like other bodies critical of the barrage proposals, the Bristol Ornithological 
Club stressed ‘the oveiriding impact of the barrage scheme on the estuary and 
the effect on the unique bird populations of the area’. The barrage would 
‘irretrievably alter the nature of the estuaiy - a wetland which this government
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has commendably pledged the UK to maintain in its present entirety under the 
RAMSAR Convention’.*
The Councils for the Protection of Rural England and Rural Wales cojoined 
(168) in producing their comments on the STPG Report, believing that 
development pressures on their regions, caused by the existence of a barrage, 
‘would be equal to or even exceed those associated with construction of the 
barrage itse lf. They were of the opinion that the proposed dual carriageway, 
to be built across the barrage, would induce ‘greater regional development 
pressures’ due to development along the road network. It is also apparent 
from the contents of their letter, that not only were the Councils concerned with 
possible commercial pressures induced by the barrage and its carriageway, but 
also by the possibility of encroachment ‘along the banks of the Severn and 
generally’ of tourism and leisure development, ‘all of which will have a 
considerable potential impact on the surrounding countryside’ - whether for the 
good or otherwise is not made clear although the implications are there.
The response to the Report, provided by the Friends of the Earth (FoE), 
although critical in general terms (169) was, perhaps surprisingly, low-key, 
and welcoming 'the research which had so far been undertaken' and applauding 
the further investigations proposed. They were nevertheless anxious to see 
other studies undertaken, such as the ‘quantification of pathogens, persistent 
chemicals and radionuclides, the effect of sediment contamination on species 
composition, on the food chain and bio-accumulation’, and also a detailed study
* A convention on the subject of The Wetlands of International Importance 
especially as Wildfowl Habitats' was held at RAMSAR in Iran in 1971, which 
designated sites coming under the definition. Hence 'RAMSAR' site. A further 
‘International Conference on the Conservation of Wetlands and Waterfowl was 
held at Heilingenhafen in Germany in 1974 which set down criteria for sites of 
international importance. For example, a site which supports more than 20,000 
waders is an internationally important one.
8 3
of sediment movement and changes in Bridgewater Bay. FoE endorsed the 
recommendations for additional work to be undertaken on fish migration, 
commenting that the 'Severn has a higher diversity of migratory fish than any 
other British estuary'. 'Studies of migration routes and numbers, the 
qualitative and quantitive effects of hydrodynamics, water quality (including
algal blooms), salinity and sediment changes ' were also proposed, adding
that the normal minimum period for such studies would be five years' (sic).
FoE concurred with the views previously identified (166) of the NCC in 
requesting an investigation into fish damage due to turbine passage and argued 
for studies to be undertaken on 'all the Severn's migratory fish species, nursery 
fish and invertebrates to determine what damage, if any, is caused by 
generating, sluicing and pumping'. No time scale was included for these 
studies! In its conclusions, the letter from the FoE argued that 'the estuary as 
it is has an intrinsic value and a right to exist'. Construction of a barrage would 
destroy the unique character of the estuary 'which would be an absolute loss'.
In its single technical comment, FoE believed that the energy cost of 
construction of a Severn barrage should be evaluated; energy conservation 
being the main thrust of their engineering opposition. This aspect was also 
identified in the submission of the Royal Society for the Protection of Birds 
(RSPB) to STPG (169) who believed there to be 'a distinct lack of any national 
overview or rationale to national energy policy'. The development of a national 
strategy was, in their view, vital in allowing 'individual energy projects to be 
placed in context and their relative environmental impacts properly weighed' 
before reaching a decision. The body responsible for such analysis, the 
weighting processes to be applied and the myriad of other points of 
assessment which would need to be undertaken were not identified. In 
concluding their detailed comments on the contents of Energy Paper 57 (162),
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RSPB underlined their view that they remained 'fundamentally opposed to the 
concept of the Severn barrage and its consequent impact on an estuary of 
international value'. They believed that the work which had been undertaken 
'failed to predict adequately the quality of the post-barrage environment' and 
that should the 'ill-judged' proposal be proceeded with, 'much further work' 
would be required.
The Severn Estuary Conservation Group (SECG) (170) was no less anxious 
to present its credentials - 'formed in 1976 from sixteen national and local 
organisations with the object of the conservation of the Severn estuary and its 
flora and fauna for the advancement of science and for the education and benefit 
of the public' in arguing against many of the views recorded in the STPG 
Report. Its overall attitude to the report was very much in line with that of 
other similarly minded bodies, i.e. that the over simplification of approach to 
environmental aspects used in the report led to optimistic solutions to the 
problems identified. The SECG also identified their attitude to the assumption 
of continued escalation in energy demand and of the necessity to cater for it 
which, they believed, should be dealt with by 'taking an end-use approach to 
energy management', and devoting the same degree of commitment and finance 
to energy conservation as 'to novel methods of generation and to expanding 
energy production', which 'inevitably is at the expense of the natural 
environment'.
The submission of the Sevemside Green Party (SGP - a consortium formed 
from twenty local Green parties in Gloucestershire, Avon and Somerset) to 
STPG in July 1990 (171) was in itself a document of considerable size and 
technical complexity, giving consideration to the present electrical generation 
resources, present and future anticipated demand for electricity and the impact 
of renewables on scenarios based on zero and on a little over two per cent
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annual growth. SGP believed that green environmentally friendly policies 
should wherever possible, be based upon the principle that 'small is beautiful' 
and keeping 'a community (sic) self-sufficient in its needs including the need 
for energy', both principles of course being breached by the construction and 
operation of a Severn barrage and by its own submission. Nevertheless, SGP 
concluded that a barrage should be constructed, but not until more experience 
had been gained by building and commissioning the Mersey barrage (sic). [In 
passing, it is of concern to note that other commentators, of greater experience 
and understanding than Dummett (the author of the Sevemside paper), 
including Headland and contributors to his lEE paper (43), had also suggested 
that small barrages could be constructed as models for larger schemes.
Indeed, the La Ranee project was, in all probability, constructed as a model for 
the much larger Chansey Islands scheme (172). Shaw (173) had, however, 
concluded that 'the environment of each estuary is unique'. 'Whereas the 
results from both (La Ranee and Annapolis schemes) are instructive as to the 
changes which can occur' he said, 'there is no case for anticipating that either is 
likely to be more than broadly indicative of the consequences of a barrage in the 
Severn or in any other estuary'. 'In fact, the Ranee barrage could give a 
particularly misleading impression of the environmental effects of this type of 
project'.
The SGP Report includes the conclusion that the financial incentive to build (a 
barrage) 'should reflect the tme cost of saving fuel' and that 'the price of coal, 
oil and natural gas should be progressively raised through the tax system'. 
Whether this conclusion was expressed with a view to increasing the cost of 
electricity generated by fossil-fired stations or to reducing the fuel bum at such 
stations is not clear; in any event, the relationship of nuclear produced 
electricity to the Sevemside argument is not identified.
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Both the Somerset Trust for Nature Conservation (STNC) (175) and the Wild 
Fowl and Wetlands Trust (WFWT) (176) emphasised in particular the loss of 
intertidal mudflats and saltmarsh in the event of a barrage being constructed.
In their submission the WFWT argued, as had others, that the Severn was a 
unique natural system and because it would interfere with the tidal process, a 
barrage would inevitably destroy that system. The suggestion that the 
'barrage could enhance some aspects of interest for nature conservationists 
was no compensation for loss of others'. The requirements of the Ramsar 
Convention would be breached by construction of the barrage since the 
'ecological character' of the estuary would be destroyed, this being 
'unprecedented in the history of the convention'. The STNC were more 
pragmatic in their approach to the contents of the STPG Report, despite 
identifying 'impact', 'inesponsibility' and 'intrusion' in the proposals, while 
proposing additional topics for further research (in particular pertaining to the 
road crossing of the barrage).
The attitude expressed by the Country Landowners Association (CLA) (177) 
was more pecuniary in its response to the STPG approach. While noting that, 
both during and after barrage construction, the movement of migratory fish 
would be affected, the CLA 'would be looking for compensation for any damage 
to fisheries especially upstream of the barrage'. Moreover, the Association 
urged that 'realistic financial provision be made for any pumping, dredging or 
other costs to safeguard landowners' and farmers' interests both during and 
subsequent to barrage construction'. Any proposals (for compensation) 'must 
be fair and equitable to both freeholder and leaseholder'. Their only 
'environmental' comment included was that 'sufficient consideration must be 
given to the effect which construction of the barrage will have on agricultural 
land'.
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The Salmon and Trout Association (STA) 178 were no less pedantic in 
defending their particular interests - 'wish to lodge a formal objection to the 
Barrage proposals, purely on fishery grounds 'It would appear that the 
proposals have not taken (into account) not only the financial value but also 
the employment and sporting/leisure value'. Greater investigation into the
effects of the barrage on salmon species was requ ired  'to prevent them
coming into contact with the turbines'.
The necessity for a comprehensive environmental study of the Severn estuary 
and its surrounding wetlands was recognised by the South Western Council for 
Sport and Recreation (SWCSR) (178), while the impact of all types of 
recreational activity within the region was an aspect which needed to be taken 
into account also. A plea for a detailed plan, integrating the planning, design 
and management aspects for the area to minimise the possibility of conflict 
between environmental and recreational interests was lodged.
The South West Region Sports Council (SWRSC) (179) believed that it was 
misleading to add any discussion of possible tourism impact on the area to that 
of recreational considerations, since the region of the barrage zone was already 
- without a barrage - well established as a considerable recreation resource. 
High and sustained water quality was considered to be an important 
requirement, not only as an environmental necessity, but also as a result of its 
direct bearing on the popularity of the area as a recreational resource. The 
SWRSC letter took the opportunity to endorse the views of others concerning 
possible difficulties with fisheries and on migratory fish stocks.
The Sports Council for Wales (SCW) (180) welcomed the STPG report, at 
least in principle, believing that the barrage would 'create a vast inland lake to 
provide new opportunities for sport and physical recreation which have hitherto 
been unavailable owing to the tidal regime and inaccessible environment'.
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Twenty three million people will live within three hours' driving' of the region. 
The lack of definition of the terms 'leisure', 'tourism', 'recreation' and 'sport' was 
remarked upon, each term relating to different types of people and forms of 
activity. Again, the necessity for high water quality in respect to fishing and to 
any recreational activity was stressed and the necessity for early stage 
management planning of opportunities for motorised activities such as water 
skiing and power boating emphasised. It was also accepted as inevitable that 
residents already local to the proposed barrage and its basin, and presumably 
enjoying the present state of the estuary and its environment, could well object 
to the STPG proposals in view of the greater influx of tourists, and others 
seeking to participate in the new leisure and recreational facilities.
The Welsh Tourist Board (WTB) (181) felt that the development of the 
Bairage project warranted further study, while the Welsh Federation of Coarse 
Anglers (WFCA) (182) fully supported its construction, its only reservation 
being possible damage to fish passing 'in both directions through the 
turbines...'. An interesting and obviously controversial comment from this 
Federation argued that 'the objection ... by the enthusiasts o f ... bird watching 
is based on deeply-flawed information’. Their letter considered that T here  
should be a complete re-appraisal of shoreline bird species' populations and 
distribution, using an impartial research team'. .... the source of information of 
the original study is wholly unreliable'. An equally controversial topic was 
included in the recommendations put forward by this body. Under item 7.5 of 
their letter, 'justification of the recreational pastime of shooting wild birds .... by 
a few score of individuals .... many acres of foreshore per person in a 
conurbation around the Severn estuary of one million people has to be proved'. 
The letter from Associated British Ports (ABP) (183) expressed its concern 
that emphasis of the STPG Report centred, obviously too strongly for the liking
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of the Ports Authority, on 'the ecological impact (of the barrage) with less 
attention paid to the effect on ports and their operations'. The letter pointed 
out that 'a high cost dredging regime can render a port unviable and hence ABP 
must reserve proper comments until extensive research has been undertaken'. 
The submission by the Severn Estuary Ports (SEP) (184) confirmed their view 
that the work undertaken and reported upon by STPG was unlikely to lead to 
an early decision on the building of the barrage. 'The atmosphere of uncertainty 
will persist', the Ports believed, and a ‘pronouncement from the Minister 
responsible’, John Wakeham, was urgently required to remove marketing 
difficulties being experienced by the ports as a result of possible barrage 
construction. The question of 'who pays for movement of vessels through the 
barrage' was, in the Ports' view, included in the barrage running costs. On the 
other hand the Detailed Report (Volume 5) dealing with this aspect had 
included the suggestion that 'it would not be unreasonable for shipping to make 
a contribution in recognition of the improved tidal regime'. The shipping 
community regarded any possibility of a transit payment as 'adding insult to 
injury' since the presence of a lock between sea and berth was itself a 'major 
encumbrance'. The Ports authority considered that the ownership of the 
barrage and the responsibility for controlling development of the impounded 
basin area posed fundamental questions which required answers; they were 
equally adamant that such aspects 'should not fall under the control of a third 
party independent of port operations'.
Welsh Water (WW) (185) 'welcomed this exciting initiative to generate non­
fossil fuel energy  bringing the prospect of overall growth to the Region'.
Nevertheless, they emphasised that the costs associated with interference to 
their own responsibilities, such as additional treatment plant and pumping 
costs, would 'need to be borne by the promoters of the barrage'. They
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identified, for example, the proximity of a recently constructed outfall to 
Lavemock Point which could require relocation thereby drawing 'substantial 
one-off and recurring costs to the promoters'.
Wessex Water (WXW) (186) were no less supportive of the project but 
believed that the effects of the barrage 'on discharges and sewage effluent 
made by Wessex Water into the Severn estuary had not been adequately 
addressed'. They were also very anxious to ensure that their customers did 
not 'bear any unnecessary increases in water charges' caused by any barrage 
development.
Companies with interests bordering on the Severn estuary broadly accepted 
the STPG barrage proposals, the majority commenting on the necessity to take 
account of environmental issues. Typical of the views expressed were 'would 
support the concept, as developed so far, since it would appear to produce a 
major asset by the creation of a unique water amenity' (ASW) (187) and 'a 
significant, welcome and desirable boost to the economy of South Wales and 
the English side of the estuary' according to Burley House (BH) (188). The 
Bristol Initiative (BI) (189) saw the 'vital and imaginative proposals not only 
as a highly visible contribution to future energy problems' (sic) but also as a 
'golden opportunity to enhance the whole environment of the Severn estuary'. 
The BH Group (188) were 'positively delighted' by the possibility of better road 
facilities offered by the barrage construction. Road building across the Cardiff- 
Weston line was, however, viewed with some caution by Brain and Co (B) 
(190) who believed that the additional road links necessary could have a 
damaging effect on the Penarth, Sully and Barry regions which could be avoided 
by the construction of a shorter barrage and road link nearer to the present 
Severn road bridge. Chem Bank (CB) (191) reinforced the necessity for 
additional communications, in the fomi of a second crossing between Wales
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and England, believing that a great deal of business had already been lost to 
Wales due to problems caused by the present Severn bridge. It was only 
'unfortunate that it (a new crossing) is going to take fourteen years to 
happen....'. The CBI (192), while supporting the project in principle in view of 
its 'probable considerable economic benefits for the regions', were concerned by 
'the absence of financial information', 'a detailed business plan' and a firm 
indication that the 'power generated would be taken up at a fair market price'. 
The Dale Owen Consultancy (DOC) confirmed its enthusiasm for the project 
(193), believing that the economic benefits which would accrue to Wales and 
the South West of England could help to offset the 'tilt which 1992 and the 
Channel Tunnel would inevitably bring to the South East'. Urgency in 
completing all additional studies was requested; in addition, the raising of the 
barrage link road to full motorway standard was considered 'essential to 
ensure maximum economic and commercial benefit'.
While the Cardiff Chamber of Commerce (CCC) commented on the 'staggering 
proposed cost' and 'the necessity to check the arithmetic very carefully' (194), 
the Newport and Gwent Chamber of Commerce (NGCC) (195) considered the 
'costs as portrayed were reasonable' particularly 'when taken against the cost 
of Nuclear Power Stations, with the extended expenditure on close down after 
the short life span of 20/25 years'. The Wales TUC (196) declared its whole 
support of the project, believing that it would 'considerably benefit the economy 
of South Wales'. The South West Regional Council of the TUC (SWRTUC) 
also welcomed and supported the main conclusions of the STPG Report (197). 
They were anxious 'that further work should be encouraged', accepting that 
there was a need 'to complete studies leading up to an environmental 
statem ent...'. Moreover, the body believed that 'an arrangement should be 
established' to bring together all those with a particular interest in the project
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to 'share information and to discuss potential future developments'. Study of 
the impact of the construction and operation of a barrage on the economy of 
industrial South Wales and on the rest of Wales was urged by the Welsh 
Committee for Economic and Industrial Affairs (WCEIA) (198), who declared 
that 'no doubt others will be pressing the need for an environmental impact 
study and similar work'.
In this latter respect, perhaps the most comprehensive review of the Report 
and its Appendices was made by the National Rivers Authority (NRA) (199). 
In it, the NRA ‘broadly welcomed’ the results of the research reported, 
commenting that the Severn estuary was now ‘probably the best studied 
estuary in the UK’. It also ‘broadly accepted’ the conclusions which had been 
reached by the STPG. However, from a detailed analysis of the views put 
forward by the NRA, it becomes apparent that their recognition of ‘broad’ 
acceptance was in fact strictly limited, with much additional information, on 
many aspects, being required ‘in order that (the NRA) may be satisfied that 
the construction and operation of the barrage will have no unacceptable 
adverse effects on any of its statutory responsibilities’. The NRA admitted 
that many of the necessary investigations ‘will be difficult to undertake and 
may be innovative at the threshold of intellectual and technical capability .... 
with a significant input of resources to provide the necessary information’.
‘Any remedial works consequent upon a decision to proceed (with barrage 
construction) were to be borne by the promoters of the barrage’. If this 
financial arrangement was not agreed the NRA would ‘have no option but to 
oppose’ the development. Further, unless the impacts of the barrage on 
migratory and estuarine fish stocks and fisheries and on the ecosystem of the 
hypertidal estuary were resolved, ‘the NRA would oppose the barrage 
proposals’. It was again pointed out that the intertidal area of the estuary was
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designated an SSSI (of special scenic and scientific interest) and that the 
entire estuary had been proposed as a Ramsar site. A particular NRA concern 
was the possible damage to fish during their passage through turbines. 
Observations at the La Ranee project had suggested that such problems had a 
low order of probability but the Authority ‘believed that the data should be 
treated cautiously’. The NRA considered that there was a need to complement 
experimental studies ‘with field experiments at La Ranee, under differing 
operating conditions and using the fish species relevant to the Severn,
particularly salmon and shad’. ‘The apparently high risk of dam age when
turbines are sluicing and pumping remains a substantial obstacle to NRA
acceptance and must be resolved’. Numerous additional proposals for
further work were identified by the NRA as a result of the deficiencies which, 
they believed, arose from the STPG proposed programme of future work. For 
example, NRA considered it essential to review many of the areas impinging 
on water quality such as hydrodynamics and sedimentology, the effect of 
reduced tidal levels on farm drainage and water disposal schemes and the 
implication on effluent disposal in Swansea Bay of circulation patterns which 
might evolve as a result of the barrage. NRA believed that the sediment issue, 
already identified as a problem area by other investigators, required to be 
examined in further detail, particularly in respect of the changed capacity of 
sediments to absorb contaminants and the subsequent effect on possible public 
health and ecological patterns. The redistribution of sediments subsequent to 
barrage construction was considered to require additional studies in respect of 
possible effects on outfall performance, on fisheries’ interests and on present 
and future recreational sites. Better information on the survival times of 
bacteria and viruses following barrage construction was considered to be 
essential, with a prediction of probably microbiological quality at existing and
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new recreational sites requiring to be undertaken. The public health aspects of 
water quality changes caused, for example, by discharges known to contain 
contaminants and, by saline intrusion needed to be assessed. NRA believed 
that ‘major programmes of work remained to deal with the problem of water 
quality’; these could ‘be resolved provided that adequate resources were made 
available’. Despite the fact that the STPG Report had identified no problems 
with ground water rise due to barrage construction, the NRA considered that 
flood defence issues needed to be addressed, listing a number of investigations 
which were necessary to satisfy the Authority. It considered that the effects of 
global warming, although not specifically dealt with by the Report, were ‘likely 
to affect regions of concern to the NRA no less than the barrage construction 
itself’.
Previous paragraphs have considered the plethora of views received by STPG 
from the numerous organisations which had requested a sight of the Report and 
its Appendices. Although, as would be anticipated, (and has been noted here), 
many of the comments received were biased, almost inevitably, toward their 
specific speciality, by the bodies concerned, and by NIMBY attitudes, it is 
apparent from the depth and detail of the majority of replies that the D of E 
documents had received very fair consideration. In marked contrast to this 
appreciation, what can only be described as a paltry, even derisory, response 
was made by the South Wales Institute of Engineers (SWIE) (200) following 
the presentation by Dr. Tom Shaw of the contents of the Severn barrage 
Report. Thus, (reported their Secretary), the ‘Council of the Institute on 11 
April decided to address to you a written response to Energy Paper No. 57 to 
the effect that it offers general support for a tidal power project in the Severn 
estuary’. The guarded reply received from the then South Western Electricity 
Board (SWEB) confirmed its ‘broad’ welcome for the Severn barrage but
9 5
believed that the ‘scope, cost and potential benefits are so great that the 
impetus to make the scheme a reality could only come fronj national or supra­
national agencies’ (201).
Despite, or perhaps because of, copious reports produced as part of the reply 
by the Standing Conference of Sevemside Local Authorities (SCOSLA) (202), 
it is difficult to draw an absolute conclusion in respect of their views concerning 
the Severn barrage. A consensus view could be drawn that the project was 
welcomed, in spite of many identified reservations, by all but one of the 
authorities represented. Stroud Council (SC), the single objector, ‘did not 
support the principle’ of a barrage, especially in view of the ‘potential 
disadvantages to the District and estuary upstream of the barrage’. The 
Council also believed that ‘energy conservation .... far outweighed the benefits 
of an electricity generating barrage’ and at ‘far less cost than the £8000m cost 
of the banage’. (203). (It is of interest to note from Page 3 of the relevant 
minutes of SCOSLA that the contents of the Stroud letter were merely to ‘be 
noted and referred back for discussion pending further information’.!)
The financial and legal implications of the construction were of particular 
concern to the cities of Cardiff (204) and Bristol (205) and to the County of 
Avon (206) which, they believed, should be better identified and with the ‘clear 
establishment that no financial burden, either direct or indirect, would fall upon 
local authorities as a result of the barrage’. The possible effects of the barrage 
on the working of their respective ports was also an obvious issue of prime 
importance to these Authorities. Bristol, however, considered that the main 
problem ‘overshadowing all others’ was the ‘spectre of uncertainty’. Referring 
initially to the Bondi Report of 1981, in which ‘a working bairage was seen as 
fifteen years ahead’, the City complained that ‘it is still no nearer’. The effect 
of such uncertainty was imposing ‘a constraint on the ports and on future
9 6
planning in the broadest sense’. Delays were seen as tending ‘to invalidate 
the results of previous investigations’ and it was ‘therefore imperative that the 
Government should now be invited to move the project forward with 
momentum or not at all’.
5.1(f) Conclusions Drawn From The Public Responses.
A survey of the comments summarised in earlier paragraphs indicates that one 
submission only, that of the Bristol Initiative (a business leadership 
established under the auspices of the CBI) supports unequivocally the barrage 
project proposed in Energy Paper 57. ‘We would urge the Government to do 
everything in its power to enable early achievement of the development’, it 
states. Environmental bodies, perhaps with the surprising exception of the 
Sevemside Green Party, were generally critical of the proposals, as were those 
other organisations who saw their responsibilities for flora and fauna under 
threat as a result of barrage construction and operation.
The majority of the remaining authorities, i.e. those with local or national 
statutory responsibilities or with industrial, commercial and labour interests, 
even those concerned with leisure activities in the area likely to be affected by 
the barrage in the short and longer term merely expressed ‘support in 
principle’, ‘welcomed the progress’, ‘noted the preliminary results’, ‘looked 
forward to new infonnation’ and to ‘further open discussion’. This cautious 
‘support’ was supplemented by additional provisions and requirements 
sufficient to make, in many cases, even their meagre acceptance meaningless. 
The response of the National Rivers Authority is a case in point. On the 
surface, its ‘broad’ acceptance of the conclusions reached by the Report is 
stated but beneath that assertion lies a plethora of research demands which 
the NRA itself accepted ‘will be difficult to undertake and may be innovative 
and at the thresholds of intellectual and technical ability’. ‘Major and lengthy’
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programmes of investigation ‘thought to be capable of resolution’ and ‘provided 
(that) adequate resources are made available, are identified for water quality 
assessment, while ‘very significant problems’ require resolution in respect of 
fish and fisheries. The NRA were especially ‘keen to ensure that the D of E 
and STPG did not underestimate the complexity of the mathematical modelling 
required to adequately forecast the physio-chemical and biological effects of 
the barrage’. The many man-years of study necessary to satisfy such 
demands must be obvious - many of the investigations could themselves bring 
forward other interesting and time absorbing fields of research and 
examination. Overhanging the evaluation of these many issues lay the implied 
‘threat’ that, should the matters not be resolved to the satisfaction of the 
NRA. that body would have ‘no option but to oppose the (barrage) 
development’.
One senses, from many of the heavily qualified replies, a desire to ‘sit round 
the table’, to ‘keep a finger in the pie’, to ‘defend their own comer’ and to 
maintain at least some involvement, perhaps as a right, to keep a watching 
brief on the progress of a very large and costly project. But certainly not to 
have any responsibility for carrying it out or to become financially involved in 
any way. Perhaps the most important response came from the City of Bristol 
who, as quoted earlier, insisted that ‘it was imperative that the G overnm ent.... 
move the project forward with momentum or not at all’. The French had 
displayed similar feelings of frustration in the very early days of Channel
Tunnel negotiations - ‘Cesson d’écrire des a rtic les  creusons le sol avec
des machines puissantes - AGISSONS!’ ( ‘Stop writing - start digging - 
ACTION!’) (207).
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5.1(g) Comparison of Conclusion Drawn with STPG views.
The detailed assessment of the replies received during the consultation 
process associated with Energy Paper 57 strongly suggests that the main 
conclusion drawn by the STPG - ‘on balance, comments were in favour of the 
project’ was more than a little too optimistic and, not unnaturally, biased in 
favour of their own project. It is acknowledged that the STPG may have had 
access to information not contained in Ref (164); nevertheless, it must be the 
conclusion of this dissertation that the best that can be drawn from the 
available data is that in practical terms, an outright ‘NO’ to the project came 
from those bodies expected to veto the construction of a barrage, i.e. the 
environmental groups. Or, perhaps a little more graciously, the conclusion 
which had been reached, some years previously, by Sacks (147) in respect of 
the SBC 1981 Report ‘yes BUT ...!’ could still apply.
5.1(h) The Third ICE Conference on Tidal P ow er-1989.
Clare, opening the Third Conference on Tidal Power at the Institution of Civil 
Engineers in 1989 (209) confinned that, as a result of the public consultation 
process, adjustments had been made to the original STPG programme of future 
work and that additional ecological studies had already been commissioned.
He referred particularly to the findings of the earlier geological survey and to 
their influence on barrage alignment - an aspect reviewed in one of the 
numerous Department of Energy bulletins issued on the Severn barrage project 
(210) and discussed in much greater detail by Kerr et al (211) (212).
Of possibly greater interest than Clare’s technical appraisal of the future for a 
Severn barrage is a comparison of the conclusions drawn by him in his 1986 
paper with those included in his 1989 assessment of the position. Gone is the 
positive, optimistic, 1986 view that the ‘STPG remain convinced that in the 
Severn Estuary there is a major source of renewable energy that should be
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developed to the benefit of UK L td ....’ (213); the 1989 summary merely 
reiterates the (old) fact that ‘The barrage is technically feasible, would produce 
7% of the present electricity consumption of England and Wales ....’. (214).
In their Paper to the 1989 ICE Symposium, Petty and MacDonald (215) 
examined whether Kapeller (adjustable runner - single regulated) or Kaplan 
(adjustable runner and guide vanes - double regulated) turbines should be 
installed in the Severn barrage, based on the fact that they would be required 
to operate over a variety of tidal ranges from neap to spring and over a single 
tide. On the basis of maximum energy recovery, it had been evaluated that no 
less than 86% of the annual energy would be generated over the 4-8 metre 
range of tide which, ‘on present day technology and economics’ determines 
that turbines should be single regulated direct driven bulb machines’. The 
design details associated with the bulb generator identify modifications which 
would be necessary to increase its known low inertia constant (a factor 
reflecting the ability of a generator to maintain synchronism following a severe 
power system fault) of a conventional bulb machine (around IMW.sec/MVA) 
to one more appropriate to its connection to the barrage transmission system. 
More significantly, the report confirmed that, .... as it may be several years 
before the final design phase, the (final) choice should be re-evaluated at that 
time’. The report, surprisingly perhaps, makes no mention of the use of the 
turbine for flood pumping, although mention is made of the fact that the Kaplan 
double regulated machine ‘recovers some 2^/2% more energy that the Kapeller 
machine’ when operated in a total ‘216 machine scheme with ebb generation 
and flood pumping’. The paper by Goldwag and Potts (216) to the same 
conference supports the application of the Kapeller machine to the Severn 
barrage on the basis that the extra two and a half per cent more energy 
obtained from the Kaplan design is more than offset by its cost. In confirming
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its preferred operating regime for the Severn machines, i.e. ebb generation and 
flood pumping, the paper recalls that, although the La Ranee double regulation 
bulb sets were intended for all four modes of operation, only ebb generation and 
flood pumping are now used. The benefit of flood pumping was variously 
assessed, using different models, to lie between 3.7% and 11.2% with 216 
machines being brought on stream sequentially, prior to equalisation of water 
levels at the barrage. The report also indicates, surprisingly, that the 216 
machines envisaged for the barrage would utilise only some 54% of the energy 
potential of the impounded basin. In order to achieve a higher percentage 
retrieval, the installed capacity would have to be substantially increased; 
moreover , it would be necessary ‘to limit generation to a short period of time 
around low tide when available heads would be at their highest’.
In an interesting paper to the ICE Conference, Kirby (217) considered one of 
the most important aspects identified during the consultation process; that of 
sediment regimes and associated ecosystems and the extent to which physical 
processes (waves and currents) control them. He argued that, as a result of 
its hypertidal (mean tidal range greater than six metres) range, the Severn will 
exhibit quite different problems from those likely to occur from barrage 
construction on either the Mersey or the Humber (both macrotidal - i.e. less 
than six metres). In particular, he identified (as he had done in his 1986 paper) 
(140) the instability of the Severn’s sediment and the fact that the extremely 
high suspended load it sustains are in marked contrast to other estuaries.
Kirby was of the opinion that construction of a barrage may cause changes in 
the sedimentary regime, particularly in the medium or longer term, which would 
in turn have radical effects on land drainage, coastal defences and other man 
made structures. In emphasising the possibility of such changes, he argued the
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necessity for special and accurate modelling techniques, together with an 
adequate understanding of sediment strengths and their erosion potential. 
Shaw identified and discussed the results of the numerous environmental 
studies made of the Severn estuary during the 1987-9 period (218). He 
emphasised the necessity to continue to study the estuary by both modelling 
its principal features and also by studying ‘other similar estuarine systems’. 
Many of his comments regarding sediment regimes, including turbidity, 
movement and erosion were in close accord with those due to Kirby. He 
argued for the incorporation, in any barrage, of suitable fish pass facilities since 
a review of the provisions made of low head hydro schemes ‘had not clarified 
fundamental questions regarding the actual risk to fish, according to species 
and size, of passage through the turbines. It was believed that the effects of a 
barrage on the environment need not necessarily be damaging although some 
change would be inevitable’. A list of further studies was included but Shaw 
concluded that ‘this short list of priority studies must not be taken to suggest 
that causes for environmental concern are now regarded as minimal’ .... recent 
... studies appear to have given confidence in the likely outcome of further 
priority work’.
A further paper to the ICE symposium by Moon (219) provides a new and 
interesting local authorities’ view of the Severn barrage. For example, it 
confirmed that the Standing Conference of Sevemside Local Authorities 
(SCOSLA) ‘was formed to bring pressure to bear on the government to make a 
decision on the recommendations of the Bondi Committee’. Their co-operation 
with the Department of Energy and the STPG through the years was recorded 
in the Report but it was also to be noted that, despite their continuing interest, 
‘the local authorities in SCOSLA have never at any time committed 
themselves to unequivocal support of the barrage project’. Nevertheless,
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SCOSLA had ‘demonstrated enthusiasm for the completion of all the 
necessary studies so that Government and others can take a decision on 
whether a barrage should be constructed’. Moon identified many legal and 
other issues of concern to the local authorities, accepting that ‘it has not been 
appropriate to discuss these issues so far but they are matters which will 
require thought and discussion before any legislation is introduced in 
Parliament’. He also believed that public participation in any barrage decisions 
was important, arguing that ‘the situation which prevailed in the last century 
when an extensive rail network was constructed throughout the country relying 
simply on private act powers is not seen as appropriate to the present day’.
Moreover, he visualised that ‘people in all parts of the countrv  will be
interested in the barrage ... should have an opportunity of expressing their 
point of view’. A local paper had spearheaded the campaign for more 
consultation (220) claiming that ‘a major public inquiry .... would be a great 
thing to have on a scheme of this size’. ‘It’s really the only time that a whole 
mass of detail could be brought together and a proper judgement made’, (sic). 
On the other hand, the STPG had previously argued (161) that, if the scheme 
was to attract private funding, there could be no question of a full scale Public 
Inquiry since that ‘could introduce even more delay and increase the financial 
burden even further’. STPG had therefore proposed that the ‘well proven 
procedure of a Private Bill’ be adopted. To date, however, there has been no 
official public assessment of the STPG barrage proposals other than the 
(public) consultation process previously refened to. As noted later in this 
dissertation, there has, however, been significant discussion with the House of 
Commons Select Committee on (Renewable) Energy.
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5.1(j) A Comment On The Hooker Proposals
It will have been noted that, despite the concentration of activity at the Cardiff- 
Weston line, the literature continued to include reference to work undertaken in 
the region of English Stones. The Autumn 1990 edition of NATTA (Network 
for Alternative Technology and Technology Assessment) (221) contained a 
short note concerning studies, ongoing under the auspices of Wimpey Atkins, 
at English Stones, which indicated that ‘more recent studies have suggested 
that siltation could be cut by up to seventy five per cent if water intake is via 
high level sluices’. ‘Further studies are underway’.
In examining the background to this continuing interest in English Stones, an 
interesting insight into a possible reason for the inclusion, in early 1985, of 
Wimpey Major Projects in the STPG Consortium has been obtained, which is 
worthy of inclusion here.
During 1970, A.V. Hooker of W.S. Atkins and Partners, introduced his views of 
‘Sevemside of the Future’ (307), including a barrage/road crossing of the 
Sevem. The scheme, based on English Stones, re-emerged in 1977 and was 
assessed, with others, by the Bondi Committee who decided in favour of the 
Cardiff-Weston line. Hooker persisted with his scheme, describing it at a 
Weston Conference on Tidal Power in 1982 (273), emphasising its better 
chance of obtaining private capital and in particular the provision of a road of 
motorway standard across the Severn (at a cost of £50m) which he considered 
to be of greater interest than the power output. In November 1983 the project 
was taken up by a Consortium comprising Wimpey Major Projects,
W.S. Atkins and Partners and Westminster Bank, which applied for 
‘Prefeasibility Studies to be undertaken for the alternative, less ambitious, 
tidal barrage scheme to be located a few miles downstream of the existing
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Sevem Bridge’. No further action appears to have been taken on the proposal, 
but, in early 1985, Wimpey Major Projects, representing the Consortium, joined 
STPG.
5.1(k) The Attitude of The ('Renewable) Energv Select Committee to STPG 
Proposals.
It is interesting to study the exchanges between members of the all-party 
Select Committee on Energy (Renewable Energy) and STPG which was 
reported in November 91. (222). A memorandum from STPG to the Committee 
dated 29 August 91, which formed the basis of discussion, confirmed that since 
the publication of EP57 (162) ‘additional small parcels of priority work’ had 
been put in hand. It noted also that Govemment funding for the project had, to 
date, totalled £6.48m. The memorandum went on, ‘the STPG had reported that 
the project cannot be funded in the private sector without some Govemment 
support’ and pointing out that ‘the substantial non-energy national and 
regional benefits would not accrue to the private developers of the barrage’. 
Moreover, the memorandum asserted, the considerable up-front pre­
construction and legal costs, in excess of £200m would, without commitment by 
Govemment ‘to act as guarantor of last resort’, be regarded as ‘too high a risk 
to be funded in the private sector’. In his response to the request from 
Dr. Michael Clark, the Committee Chairman’s request that the barrage capital 
and annual running costs be updated, Clare, Chairman of the STPG 
Management Board, indicated that the best estimates at September 91 were 
£10.2 billion and £86m respectively, an increase of some 24% over the 1988 
figures. Mr. Lofthouse, a member of the Select Committee exploded ‘you are 
telling us about these studies, studies, studies; you must have shoals and 
shoals of paper. When are we going to get some movement?’ (incidentally 
supporting the view held by the writer (223)). ‘What do you foresee the time
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period to be before the studies stop and we start getting some action 
questioned Lofthouse. Based on the present method of economic analysis ‘this 
scheme will not go ahead’, retorted Clare; hence the requirement ‘for some 
Govemment backing’. Referring to the fact that no govemment funding had 
been made available to the Channel Tunnel consortium, the Chairman asked 
whether any willingness for the Govemment to ‘give any finances’ had been 
detected by the STPG. The answer was ‘NO’. But, as Mr. Rost quickly 
asserted, STPG had not put to Govemment a costed proposal, identifying the 
minimum support necessary either in cash terms or guaranteed loans - ‘you 
have got to put down a firm proposal to the Govemment, surely?’ ‘You cannot 
be surprised if the Govemment does not lie down and offer you what you 
want’. Mr. Clare admitted that he did not have an answer to how the scheme 
would be funded. A risk-free return of 20% and full repayment over eight years 
were the private sector requirements for a ‘risky and pioneering manufacturing 
project’ according to Mr. McAllion of the Committee. Mr. Clare believed that a 
Government commitment ‘in the region of two billion to three billion pounds’ 
would be necessary to create private sector interest in the scheme. (Whether 
such sums were in addition to NFFO support was not established during 
discussion but the present NFFO deadline of 1998 would have passed long 
before any generation had been achieved at the barrage). The necessity to 
develop such a large barrage was questioned by the Committee - ‘why have 
you not gone for the River Parrett instead of the River Sevem and got on with 
it, it is a small project, you could cope with that one?’ ‘Why not concentrate on 
something that is more realistic?’
On the question of the number of environmental studies already undertaken 
and others yet to be completed, Mr. Claie confirmed that, in the case of the La 
Ranee barrage, ‘an environmental assessment of the pre-barrage conditions
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was not done, “they” just went in and built it’. No ‘before’ and ‘after’ 
comparison was therefore available, ‘which was unfortunate’. In answer to the 
question of what further studies were to be undertaken with ‘this £4-5m’, Mr. 
Clare declared ‘The key to the whole thing .... is the movement of fine 
sediment, that is the key to everything. We are beginning to understand that 
movement, we have got to make sure that we totally understand i t ....’.
These studies continue.
5.2 The Mersev Estuarv
Although the Mersey estuary, with a mean spring tidal range of eight metres 
had been identified by Davey in his 1920’s studies as a promising site for tidal 
generation (144), no further consideration of the region for such a development 
can be identified from the literature until 1981, when a short paper by Paynting 
(145) re-opened the subject. More importantly perhaps, also in 1981, the 
Merseyside Enterprise Forum, a body comprising a number of Merseyside 
businessmen and public figures, examined in detail the concept of a barrage, 
apparently ‘first mooted by Mr. James Fitzpatrick’ - Chief Executive of the 
Mersey Docks and Harbour Board (224). The Forum recognised that many 
non-energy benefits would accrue to the region by the construction of a barrage 
impounding the ‘largest lake in England’ providing opportunities for both 
recreation and tourism. A project of ‘the magnitude envisaged’ would, it 
believed, ‘do much to improve Merseyside’s tarnished image’.
5.2(a) Pre-feasibilitv Studv 1
As a result of the Forum’s enthusiasm, the Merseyside County Council 
(MCC) were encouraged to undertake pre-feasibility studies of a barrage 
scheme and the Northern Universities’ based Marinetech consultancy was 
retained for this purpose. The consultancy’s report identified three possible 
sites, designated ‘Lines 1, 2 and 3 for the barrage (146) (225), with Line 2 the
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least favoured of the three. Annual outputs of 1.2TWh and 0.965TWh were 
identified for Lines 1 and 3 with energy costs of around 2.8p/kWh at 5% 
discount rate. However, as with so many previous barrage reports, the 1983 
Marinetech document ‘merely’ concluded that while the project was a 
‘developable project’ and, based on construction technology similar to that 
proposed for the Severn estuary ‘technically feasible’, the internal rate of 
return of less than five per cent made the project ‘unattractive’.
5.2(b) Pre-feasibilitv Studv II
In view of, or perhaps despite the as yet unquantified non-energy benefits 
which had previously been identified by the Forum, the MCC in 1985 
commissioned a further pre-feasibility study, using funding provided by the 
Council, the European Commission (EC) the Science and Engineering 
Research Council (SERC) and the Department of Energy. Line 2 was excluded 
from this study in view of the earlier findings. The likely barrage construction 
costs were, on this occasion, assessed by Marinetech in conjunction with 
consulting engineers Rendel-Parkman. It was concluded that the costs of 
building the barrage could be drastically reduced by the use of the sunken hulls 
of scrap very large crude carriers (VLCCs) in conjunction with the construction 
of a series of diaphragm walls providing cells for the turbines and sluices. ‘An 
excellent piece of lateral thinking’ remarked Mr. D. Kerr of Sir Robert 
Me Alpine’s (226) during subsequent discussion, who wondered whether due 
consideration had been given to the necessity to create an even bed and to 
prevent scouring beneath the tankers and whether the forces acting on their 
hulls during placement had been considered.
The reduction in costs achieved by the use of this novel form of construction, in 
excess of 38% of the original assessment, resulted in a return on capital 
employed somewhat greater than eight per cent which, although ‘not sufficient
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to ensure commercial success, caused considerable excitement because of 
other benefits the barrage might bring’. Hayward (156) believed that tidal 
power was poised for take-off in the Mersey!
5.2(c) Formation of the Mersev Barrage Companv (M BCl 
On the basis of this more optimistic report, the soon to be abolished MCC 
encouraged the formation of a private company to further the project. By mid 
1986, the Merseyside Barrage Company (MBC), a consortia of twenty four 
companies and associations - including the University of Liverpool and the 
Merseyside and North Wales Electricity Board (MANWEB) had been formed, 
(the D of E offering strong support and funding to the tune of £400K), ‘to 
investigate, design, build and operate a tidal power generating barrage on the 
Mersey’. The Board of the MBC included shipping, financial and parliamentary 
interests, selected to ensure that any future approach to the EC would receive 
a sympathetic hearing. From an early stage, the Board’s attitude to the 
barrage was that ‘it would remain a private sector operation’; moreover that 
any barrage scheme would stand or fall on its ‘commercial viability’. 
Notwithstanding these views, it is interesting to note that the embryo 
company had received ‘a grant towards half the study costs’ from the D of E.
(227). The D of E also commissioned a series of studies covering a variety of 
engineering and environmental interests which had a direct bearing on the 
possibilities for a Mersey barrage.
5.2(d) MBC Stage 1 Studies
Under the new management. Stage 1 of the feasibility studies commenced in 
October 1986. The studies were undertaken to identify whether any 
fundamental impediments to the barrage existed in respect of the modified tidal 
regime, water levels, sedimentation; also upon the ecology of the estuary and 
its water quality. A further financial appraisal was undertaken. The effects of
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barrage site on shipping were examined, while the changes likely in social and 
industrial patterns were identified. As explained earlier, two possible barrage 
sites, designated Lines 1 & 3, had previously been identified and, although it 
had been anticipated that one or the other of these locations would become the 
preferred site, as a result of the studies, no primary contender had emerged 
from them. However, as Davey had noted so many years previously, a barrage 
at the mouth of the estuary posed significant problems for shipping and for 
navigation generally. In an attempt to reduce the possible impact of a barrage 
in this region, the Line 1 alignment was moved upstream by a few hundred 
metres - a re-alignment of relatively minor importance for study purposes
(228); the new barrage line was identified as Line lA . Line 3, some seven 
kilometres upstream was also retained in the study.
The detailed results of the Stage 1 studies are contained in the 1988 D of E 
Report ‘Tidal Power from the Mersey Estuary ETSU TID4047 (225) which 
concluded that the studies had ‘highlighted a number of problems’ ... ‘none are 
considered to be overriding impediments that preclude further feasibility 
studies’. It was pointed out in the environmental assessment chapter of the 
report that the Mersey estuary met the criteria for designation as a wetland 
area under the Ramsar Convention and that ‘a modified design and operational 
regime of the barrage .... could reduce the impact on ornithologically important 
components of the ecosystem’. The status quo of the estuary was to be 
maintained to the ‘greatest extent possible’; an aspect which needed to be
‘given considerable emphasis in the next s tag e  the need for interfacing
between engineering and environmental studies’. The studies had confirmed 
that ‘on balance Line 3 was ... marginally preferable to Line 1(A)’. The 
Navigation and Lock study concluded that ‘the findings indicated no clear 
overall location preference (for the banage) as a result of the ‘diversity of
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interests and the way that they are affected’. Significantly, ‘most maritime 
interests stated a clear preference for a barrage not to be built’ (sic). All these 
bodies were concerned about ‘aspects such as local currents, local siltation, 
lock security and charges’, which the study had not previously addressed. The 
energy yields for the two sites had been assessed on the basis of ebb 
generation, with and without flood pumping; Line 1(A) being estimated to 
produce 1.33TWh with flood pumping and 1.27TWh without pumping from its 
twenty seven 7.6m runner diameter 25MW turbines, with Line 3 producing 
1.06TWh and 1.02TWh respectively from its twenty one machines. Studies 
involving an increased number of turbines for both Lines were also undertaken 
which confirmed that an increase in net yield would be ‘probable’ and that 
‘substantial environmental and sedimentation benefits could be introduced’ as 
a result of the increase.
In its own, undated, handout (229), but obviously produced subsequent to the 
1988 ETSU Report, MBC indicated that the Mersey Barrage Project would be 
a ‘unique opportunity to create a ‘truly alternative energy source’, a ‘catalyst 
for regeneration within the North W est’ and ‘for future barrages’. The studies 
‘carried out by the Company’ had ‘again concluded that there were no 
overriding problems’ and that the barrage ‘will’ create both direct and indirect 
employment, with over five thousand jobs created during construction’. The 
barrage ‘could be a significant factor in the economic generation of the 
Liverpool area’. MBC went on to state that ‘well tried engineering solutions 
were available to overcome and/or offset any adverse effects’ created by the 
barrage on shipping interests, navigation and locks.
Not everyone was happy with the idea of a barrage across the River Mersey. 
Professor Minford of Liverpool University (the University was identified as an 
investor in the scheme) claimed that it was ‘likely to be uneconomic’, to
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interfere with shipping, ‘irrelevant’ and ‘potentially damaging to the estuary, 
its business and its ecology’ (240).
On the other hand Professor McDowell in his letter to the Times (241) argued 
that, in common with many other estuaries, the Mersey in its present form was 
‘man-made’ - ‘not just locally but on a massive scale which has affected their 
whole hydraulic and sedimentary behaviour’.
‘The preliminary results of the Stage 1 studies encouraged the Company with 
continued support and financial assistance from the D of E to embark upon the 
Stage II studies’ stated the MBC handout. In a most important departure from 
the main conclusions of its Contractor Report (225), the MBC note included the 
comment, under Section 6 ‘Barrage Location’:-
‘The Stage 1 studies were unable to state a clear preference for the location of
the B arrage  The Company has now stated its preferred line as being a
revised Line 3 - some six hundred metres upstream of the original Line 3’.
‘The barrage .... will comprise twenty-eight generators .... giving a rated 
capacity of approximately 700MW and a net power output of 1.5TWh’. (sic). 
The revised cost of the barrage, to be constmcted over a period of five years, 
was put at £880m at 1989 prices, with an operating cost of £10.5m per annum. 
The precise reasoning behind this somewhat abrupt decision by the MBC to 
prefer Line 3 (modified) is not made clear in its Report. A later D of E Project 
Summary (231) indicates that the decision was made on the basis that, ‘on 
balance (the new site) would yield electricity at the most economic cost’. Line 
lA  was rejected in view of ‘the significantly greater capital costs’.
It is of particular relevance to examine these latest views of the location and 
generated output of a Mersey barrage with those put forward by Davey (230). 
Davey’s views took into account interference with shipping interests which he 
accepted ‘was a very vexed question’ and that such interests would be
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‘adversely affected’ where the barrage lay downstream of ports.
Nevertheless, he accepted that the advantages of a greater depth of water at 
these ports as a direct result of the barrage could be an advantage to them.
His preferred site for a barrage on the Mersey lay ‘above Liverpool’ and a 
comparison of the map associated with this location (Ref 230 - Chart 38 Page 
229) with that proposed by MBC very strongly suggests that the two locations 
are identical. Moreover, the annual energy generated by Davey's two 
thousand metre long barrage assessed, using his ‘horsepower’ data, to be 
1.5TWh per annum, is identical to the figure quoted by the MBC. Even more 
intriguing is the fact, included in the 1990 D of E Project Summary (231) that 
the Mersey barrage now proposed would be ‘approximately two kilometres 
long’ i.e. also identical to Davey’s proposal. The anticipated annual output for 
the revised Mersey barrage was also identified (in Ref 231) at 1.5TWh, with 
flood pumping (1.3TWh without such assistance), a factor overlooked in the 
MBC report itself. The capital cost of the project, without interest charges, 
was assessed at £880m; the unit cost at 5.65p. It is also relevant to note that 
the use of ‘scrap LCCTs’ had been discarded in favour of concrete caisson 
construction although the D of E report hedged its bets by the inclusion of the 
view that ‘other construction methods-specifically the use of steel caissons 
and in-situ diaphragm walls ... could be incorporated if appropriate’ to do so. 
5.2(e) Stage II Studies
Both the MBC and the D of E reports refer to the ‘Stage II studies’, the cost of 
which had been assessed earlier at £1.74m, to be shared equally by the 
Company and the D of E. The studies were expected to be completed within 
‘four years’; the D of E report also comments that ‘work on Stage II is due for 
completion towards the end of 1990’, confirming that initial reviews in respect 
of engineering, barrage construction and costs had already been undertaken.
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The additional work associated with the Stage II studies involved a more 
precise determination of the line of the barrage (the presence of ‘recent’ glacial 
deposits of the proposed Line 3(A) was expected to require the use of load 
bearing piles to support the civil works) confirming that the ‘final location of the 
structure will not be determined until further site investigations have been 
completed’.
The monitoring of environmental conditions in the estuary, already taking place, 
were to be supplemented by additional studies, ‘particularly those pertaining to 
the roosting and feeding patterns of wading birds and wild fowl’, declared the 
Stage II proposals. Further, a ‘long term’ review of the possible impact of the 
barrage was to be set in motion and, in addition, an appraisal of the possible 
non-energy benefits and development opportunities likely to emerge to the 
economy of Merseyside as a result of the barrage was to be undertaken.
The MBC report included, as part of their Stage II scenario, the creation of a 
funding/finance plan for the detailed design of the project, its Parliamentary 
approval and for the construction and operation of the barrage. Also included in 
these proposals was an anticipated timetable for the barrage to its completion 
‘in late 1998’, together with the statement that ‘in order to raise the funds for 
the Development and Parliamentary stages and to enable the MBC to 
commence the Parliamentary process in November 1991, the barrage MUST be 
included within the initial tranche of the Non-Fossil Fuel Obligation (NFFO)’. 
It has to be stated that the banage was not included in the 1990 NFFO, nor 
was it accepted as part of the 1991 NFFO.
The decision by the ‘government’, (presumably referring to the D of E), to help 
fund the detailed studies of the Mersey barrage was criticised by the Royal 
Society for the Protection of Birds (RSPB) in a short article under the heading 
of ‘Barrage Protest’ (232). The Society claimed that ‘a tidal barrage across
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the Mersey estuary’, making it the largest single source of renewable energy 
in Britain’ would ‘put at risk mud flats that are internationally important 
feeding grounds for 20,000 waders’. However, in late 1990, Mr. Baldry the 
Parliamentary Under Secretary for the Dept, of Environment compounded the 
felony by confirming, during his meeting with the MBC that, ‘my department 
will continue to fund the feasibility studies required for the next (Stage III) of 
the Mersey barrage project’ (233). Moreover, he asserted, ‘Consultation with 
interested parties will continue’.
New objections to the project emerged, in early 1991, when a report, prepared 
by the Port Advisory Services, commissioned by the Mersey Docks and 
Harbour Company (whose 1981 Chief Executive - Mr. James Fitzpatrick, it 
will be recalled, had claimed the credit for the original idea of a Mersey 
barrage), in conjunction with the Manchester Ship Canal Company and Shell 
Oil, predicted ‘increased risks to shipping due to floating construction plant and 
cross-currents on the approach to locks’ (234). The Report, which was 
supported in its views by Delft University and the Hydraulic Laboratory of 
Delft, envisaged queues of up to a hundred vessels long due to the cross­
currents problem.
A more important problem on the minds of the MBC was identified in an article 
‘Mersey barrage scheme in peril’ printed in the Sunday Times in June 1991. 
(235). The article maintained that the MBC ‘may be forced to wind itself up’, 
having concluded that the govemment would ‘fail to provide £8m of public 
money to match pledged private investment for the next stage of the project, 
which needs £ 16m to proceed’. ‘The existing credit lines will allow the 
completion and reporting of Stage III investigations’ according to James 
McCormack - a director and general manager of the Company - claimed the 
Sunday Times report, which went on to indicate that the private sector backers
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had stated that they would not commit more money ‘until the govemment gives 
the official go-ahead’.
5.2(f) Stage III Studies
A two hundred and fifty page report from the MBC, summarising the results of 
the Stage III studies, had resulted in the D of E requesting more details on the 
effect of the barrage ‘on shipping and navigation’, plus an ‘environmental 
analysis’.
The report stirred the govemment ‘to provide a further £I.2m  to extend the 
existing feasibility studies’ according to Electrical Review (of 6/19 September 
1991), although ‘the Consortium behind the scheme had hoped for an £8m 
injection to take the project to the next stage’. Issues ‘which will be studied
over the next fifteen m onths will allow the D of E to look more closely at
the prospects for tidal power in general and the Mersey scheme in particular’. 
The Electrical Review, went on, McCormack, the MBC’s general manager 
says ‘the Government’s decision could result in parliamentary approval for the 
scheme being delayed by a year from its target date of November 1992’.
A request from the Govemment for a twelve month standstill for the project 
was feared by the Company which, according to McCormack, would result in 
the private backers ‘walking away’.
The financial problems being faced by the MBC had perhaps been ‘predicted’
(a better term would be re-iterated’) in September 1990 at the World 
Renewables Conference in Reading, when a report by the Watt Committee on 
Renewable Energy Sources (236) was introduced by the Chairman of that 
Committee, Professor Michael Laughton. ‘The long term pay-back period 
associated with large scale renewable energy projects such as major tidal 
projects made them unsuitable for solely private sector funding’, asserted 
Professor Laughton, referring specifically to the proposals pertaining to the
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Sevem and the Mersey tidal barrages. His working party ‘urged a measure of 
public sector funding for all such major projects’ with ‘continuing govemment 
support for research and development across all the renewable energy 
technologies. A ‘rough ride’ was also predicted for renewable energy projects 
‘in the new era of privatisation’. Professor Laughton emphasising that ‘new 
institutional and financial factors would seem positively to harm the prospects 
.... of electricity supply by renewable sources’. A plea was entered that large 
renewable systems such as tidal barrage generation should be funded by the 
State using public sector rates of return in recognition of their potential national 
importance in the longer term.
5.2(g) The Attitude of the (Renewable) Energv Select Committee to MBC 
Proposals.
In November 1991, representatives of MBC were summoned before the House 
of Commons Select Committee on Energy in support of that Committee’s 
inquiry ‘into the prospects for the commercial implementation of renewable 
energy technologies and the role of Government, in the context of energy and 
environmental policy, in promoting the development, implementation and export 
potential of these technologies in the UK’.
A lengthy and detailed memorandum had previously been submitted by MBC 
to the Select Committee in reply to certain questions raised by the latter and in 
defence of the request for the continuation of funding for the Mersey barrage. 
The advantages of the barrage were identified in the summary to the 
memorandum which included the warning that ‘unless action is taken to ensure 
the development of renewables, the private sector will look for other 
investment opportunities’. A likely project budget of £966m (£1337m including 
interest and inflation) based on January 1991 prices was now envisaged, the 
power and energy data remaining as included in the Stage II assessment.
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The memorandum also confirmed that the Stage III studies had been 
completed, with an ‘interim’ report submitted to the D of E. The studies had 
determined that the barrage should be located ‘slightly upstream’ of the earlier 
Line 3(A) position ‘to found the barrage on better ground conditions’ (it will be 
recalled that ‘recent’ glacial deposits had been found at the Line 3, (3A) sites 
which necessitated piling). In addition, the Stage III investigations had 
confirmed that the ‘remaining concerns of the shipping interests could be 
overcome or accommodated by on-going engineering development and 
refinement’. Moreover, the report went on; ‘with continued sympathetic 
consideration, creative conservation and careful habitat management, the 
environmental impact (of the barrage) would be minimised and any adverse 
effects could be managed’ (237). The conclusions of the Stage III report led 
the MBC to recommend to the D of E that the project should proceed 
immediately to Stage IV of the development in order to ‘answer or crystalise 
outstanding problems and ensure that the necessary and extensive 
consultation took place’ prior to any decision to proceed to the Parliamentary 
stage and secure the necessary project approvals’. The vital part of the MBC 
submission then followed.
‘In proceeding to Stage IV, the MBC statement asserted, it was necessary for 
the D of E to confirm that a long term NFFO contract would be available and 
that the 1998 cut-off date imposed by Brussels would be removed for non­
nuclear renewables’. Private sector funds of £8m (i.e. half the expenditure 
associated with the Stage IV investigations) ‘were or would be made available 
assuming a clear D of E statement on the issue’. It was noted that the D of E 
had not endorsed the MBC views relating to the remaining work to be 
undertaken but had agreed to continue with the environmental and other 
studies essential to any continuance of the project. The MBC stated finally
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that ‘unless the D of E provides clearance to proceed to Stage IV and secures 
long-term levy contracts, the MBC will not be able to agree to a further
piecemeal extension and the ‘support within the M B C  will be lost, possibly
for ever, as supporters turn to other investment opportunities’.
The MBC memorandum referred to the Government’s acceptance of the Large 
Combustion Plant Directive (LCPD) with its attendant requirement to reduce 
SO2 emissions which, together with their target also to reduce CO2 
discharges, strongly implied a reducing role for fossil-fired generating stations 
in the future. The memorandum also took the opportunity to compare what it 
called the ‘transitional technology’ of combined cycle gas turbines (CCGTs), 
emphasising their short life cycle of ten to fifteen years and the uncertain future 
envisaged for nuclear generation, with the long life (one hundred and twenty 
years plus), and environmentally friendly aspects of a tidal barrage providing 
low marginal cost energy.
Inevitably, the questioning of the MBC delegates by members of the Select 
Committee centred on the novel method of financing the barrage proposed by 
the Company. In simple terms, the plan put forward proposed an extended 
(twenty five year) NFFO contract, with advances of the levy being made 
during the five year construction period totalling £829m. ‘But’, said a member 
of the Comrhittee, ‘it looks as if you are asking £829m in advance out of a total 
capital project of £966m; it sounds to me as if you are expecting the whole thing 
to be financed by the purchasers?’ ‘No’ said Mr. J. McCormack, the leader of 
the MBC delegation, ‘£966m is the cost in January 1991 terms - if one puts in 
in terest... inflation during construction, the overall figure one is looking for over 
the five-year construction period is of the order of £1.4 billion ... just over half 
by way of advances’.
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In answer to further questioning on this subject, the MBC leader confirmed that 
he faced ‘a simple situation, which all renewables do: my electricity is not 
immediately competitive with the traditional fossil fuel. All I need is a 
framework which the Government has already devised, the NFFO and I need a 
long take-off contract’. ‘You would like the NFFO to be extended beyond 
1998’ queried the Chairman Dr. Michael Clark; ‘Yes’ retorted MBC, ‘it is 
essential, otherwise we will not continue beyond this year’. ‘We wish you 
every success with your project’ was the Select Committee’s final comment. 
The back page of the Financial Times of July 21 1992 contained an article (238) 
entitled ‘Setback for £ lbn  Mersey Barrage scheme’ which stated that the 
project had failed to win government backing. The barrage, it said ‘would not 
qualify for public funds (presumably a reference to the NFFO) to subsidise the 
cost of its electricity’. It was anticipated that shareholders of MBC would 
meet to decide ‘whether to keep the ten year old project alive and team 
together with an injection of £14m. While supporters of the scheme were of the 
opinion that the decision ‘raised questions about the government’s 
commitment to environmentally friendly power generation’, others pointed to 
the ‘high energy costs’ and the opposition of ‘shippers who use the three 
Mersey ports of Liverpool, Garston and the Manchester Ship Canal’. The 
article also referred to the ‘mixed feelings’ of the environmentalists, who, while 
‘favouring renewable sources of energy are worried about the impact of such 
big schemes’. According to the latest information (September 92) from ETSU, 
Mr. Michael Heseltine - Secretary of State for Trade and Industry (now 
responsible for Energy matters) had confirmed his rejection of the MBC 
proposals. Moreover, ETSU understood that ‘the Company were considering 
their next move’ and that ‘a further approach to Government was possible’.
No public declaration on future plans has since been made by the MBC.
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5.3 Other Barrages 
5.3(a) General
Articles dealing with the subject of tidal power have continued to appear in the 
technical press, much of the subject matter being a re-iteration of earlier work. 
The tidal scene was again reviewed by Wilson (149) while further experience 
with the La Ranee project, after fifteen years of operation, was assessed by 
Banai and Bichon (150). The success achieved by the Annapolis single 
machine barrage was considered by Whitaker (151) to point the way forward 
for the development of other schemes on the Bay of Fundy, although Dabom 
(152) cautioned against any moves in this direction in his review of the 
possible environmental effects on the region. China (153), who had for many 
years utilised existing dams and dykes to develop small electrical generation 
schemes, indicated their continuing interest in the development of their huge 
tidal resources, equivalent, according to Charlier (154), to some 90 TWh 
annually. Bernstein re-affirmed his country’s interest in tidal technology 
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Meanwhile, in this country, the on-paper potentials of tidal schemes other than 
those of the Severn and the Mersey were being considered or re-assessed.
The possibilities for tidal generation from barrages constructed on the Solway 
Firth and Morecambe Bay were actively assessed (278) (279) and this section 
examines some of the others in greater detail.
5.3(b) A Comparison of Davev’s Tidal Sites with those of Recent 
Identification.
As has occuned several times in this dissertation, it is appropriate to 
commence this review with specific reference to Davey’s seminal text on the 
subject. In Chapter VI of his thesis (239) Davey undertook a Tidal Power 
Survey of the British Isles. In making this survey, he was of the opinion that
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locations having mean tidal range of less than ten feet (three metres), as 
assessed from the Admiralty Tide Tables, would be unsuitable for exploitation. 
Further, he considered that it was necessary to fix a lower limit for the 
possible generated output - in his case he took an equivalent continuous power 
output of one thousand horsepower (750kW) as that value. The third factor in 
his assessment was the necessary configuration of the coastline to achieve the 
economic enclosure of the maximum water area with a minimum of barrage 
construction, thereby limiting the search to suitable estuaries, inlets and small 
bays.
Neglecting, for reasons not stated (but obviously associated with shipping 
interests), the estuaries of the Thames, Tyne and Tees, Davey identified a 
total of sixty nine sites, forty nine in England and twenty in Scotland which he 
adjudged to be suitable for further consideration and possible exploitation. He 
acknowledged in the text that his list of sites was not exhaustive and, 
moreover, recorded that his technical assessment were necessarily tentative in 
view of shifting sand banks and indefinite low water levels. He emphasised 
also that whether or not a barrage ‘station’ was practical would depend upon 
‘detailed geological studies of the chosen site’.
In the 1980’s, studies had taken place to assess or to re-assess the tidal 
generating potential of the Dee and Conwy estuaries, the Solway Firth, 
Morecambe Bay, The Humber and the Thames (243) (244) (245) while the 
smaller locations of Langstone Harbour (246), Padstow and Hamford Water 
have also received their share of attention. (247).
More recently still, a survey of possible tidal generation sites ‘from small 
estuaries’ has been completed, the results being reported by the D of E. (242). 
During the study, a total of one hundred and eighteen estuaries and 
embayments, located in the west and south west coasts of England was
1 2 2
examined; the coasts of eastern England and of Scotland were not considered 
in view of the fact that ‘they had much smaller tidal ranges’. In much the same 
manner as outlined by Davey, Admiralty charts and tide tables were perused 
for the required information by Binnie and Partners; some sites, obviously 
unsuitable for water turbines in view of their minimum submergence 
requirements, were included in view of the future possibility that ‘air turbines 
could be used instead’.
A comparison of the conclusions reached by Davey with those of the more 
recent studies reveals, perhaps not surprisingly, a strong degree of similarity in 
many of the locations chosen for tidal power development. Also unsurprisingly, 
since the basic calculations are relatively elementary and the sources of 
information the same, the potential energy assessed by the different 
investigators for each site are not greatly different, particularly if the details of 
the precise location of each bairage site are allowed for.
The degree of correlation becomes even more evident if the selected barrage 
locations are appraised on the basis of possible capital cost of each scheme 
and the unit cost of the electricity produced by it. Although the parametric 
method of costing utilised for this assessment, developed by Baker (248), was 
obviously not available to Davey, a majority of his sites are nevertheless 
included in the list of Binnie’s most economic locations (Table 4.1, 4.2, 4.3 of 
Ref 242). An indication, perhaps, of Davey’s ability as a pragmatic and 
discerning engineer. Certainly the results engender a considerable degree of 
confidence in accepting for any future use his energy estimates for locations 
which have not otherwise received corroborative assessment from other 
investigations; e.g. those on eastern England and the coasts and lochs of 
Scotland.
/
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In further support of Davey’s views, it is relevant to note that a location for a 
barrage on the estuary of the River Loughor, Llanelli, identified by Binnie & 
Partners as a ‘potentially interesting tidal site in earlier studies (242), 
although not included in Davey’s list of possible locations, was subsequently 
subjected to an extremely detailed re-assessment. (249). The latter Report 
concluded, perhaps inevitably, that ‘the constmction of a tidal power barrage at 
the Loughor narrows .... is technically feasible’. It went on to state, however, 
that the construction ‘could not be justified at the estimated basic unit cost of 
6.7p/kWh unless other benefits can be ascribed to the development’.
A pre-feasibility study to examine the technical, economic and environmental 
aspects of a combined energy barrage and road crossing of the River Duddon, 
Askam-in-Furness, was announced by the D of E on 22 January 1992. (250). 
The proposal for the study emanated from a consortium comprising McAlpine 
and Sons and Balfour Beatty with additional support from a number of local and 
regional authorities and also by NORWEB pic and Shawater Ltd. The D of E 
supported the study ‘as part of its on-going research programme on renewable 
energy’, contributing approximately £100k towards the anticipated costs. Colin 
Moynihan, the Parliamentary Under Secretary of State, Dept, of Energy (1990- 
92), when announcing the Duddon project commented ‘Tidal Energy is a very
promising renewable energy. This s tu d y  is part of my Department’s
renewable energy research and development programme and follows on from 
work which identified the most promising tidal schemes around the UK’. (242). 
The study was expected to take twelve months and, as part of the 
environmental assessment, consultations would take place ‘with relevant 
interest groups’. It is worthwhile pointing out that the potential of the Duddon 
estuary had first been identified by Davey (251), his estimate of the Duddon’s
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capability bearing close comparison with the assessment of 255GWh annually, 
made by the D of E (242 - Site 20a).
Also on 22 January 92, the D of E released the results of the preliminary 
feasibility study into the possibility for a power barrage across the Wyre 
estuary (252). This study, undertaken by a group headed by Trafalgar House 
Technology (THT) and supported by Lancashire County Council in association 
with NORWEB, the NRA and a contribution from the D of E of around £130k, 
confirmed (253) that the estuary was ‘well suited for a tidal energy scheme 
and, subject to further studies, a barrage is unlikely to have serious adverse 
effects on present developments or current users’. Moreover, the report went 
on, ‘a road crossing could be incorporated into the barrage’ (at an additional 
cost of £7m) and concluded that the maximum benefit to the region ‘would be 
obtained from a combination of road bridge and barrage’. The ability of the 
barrage to control flood water from storm surges was emphasised; it was also 
noted that the ‘use of pumped drainage would be required to keep ground water 
in areas surrounding the barrage to existing levels’. The £90m scheme was 
anticipated to have a capability of 131GWh/annum, the electricity being 
produced at a barrage cost of 6.5p/kWh (1991 prices - 8% discount rate), and 
would reduce annual CO2 emission by ‘up to 136,000 tonnes’.
In his 1923 text, Davey (254) had also made an assessment of the W yre’s 
annual tidal generation capability; he estimated that a barrage at the point 
more or less as identified by the above THT report and which he called 
‘Fleetwood-North’, would have a capability of 126GWh annually.
As a final comment to this Chapter, it is interesting to compare the high note of 
optimism in Moynihan’s comments when discussing his department’s 
involvement with the Duddon investigation with the more reserved attitude 
taken by the 1991 Select Committee on Renewables (255) (256). While that
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Committee viewed, with varying degrees of enthusiasm, the future for wind, 
solar power and wave power, they saw Tidal power as unlikely to prosper, 
given its very high initial capital costs, unless state financial support was made 
available to the projects. Moreover, the Committee argued, ‘a single huge 
project such as the Severn barrage made it difficult to justify smaller, more 
adaptable schemes’. They considered that ‘tidal power was likely to be 
reliable and eventually cheap - smaller barrages than the Severn might 
exemplify these virtues’. The death knell, perhaps, for the Severn but not for 
the Mersey? Or merely hope, in the longer term, for much smaller multi­
purpose projects such as the Duddon and the Wyre?
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Chapter 6 - Analysis
6.1 General
As stated earlier, the literature pertaining to the utilisation of the tides for 
man’s purposes is huge; moreover, it continues to grow year by year. This 
dissertation has identified and discussed the contents of many treatises 
dealing specifically with the use of tidal power for electricity generation; 
inevitably many more have been omitted from the survey.
It is now some seventy years since the first objective assessment of the 
potential of the tide’s power and the feasibility of utilising this power for 
electrical purposes was put forward; even longer if the Decoeur studies of 1910 
are included.
Although it must be doubtful that the technology necessary to construct an 
electricity generating baiTage existed in those early days, the fact remains that 
such ideas did exist, it being necessary ‘only’ to convert them into practical 
reality.
Since that time, the required civil, mechanical and electrical engineering 
expertise to bring a tidal generation construction to a successful technical 
conclusion has been attained. As confirmation of this attainment, a barrage of 
significant size and complexity has been constructed on the estuary of the 
River Ranee where, according to EdF, (the French electricity authority and 
owner of the barrage), the plant has delivered electrical energy, both 
economically and without long term damage to the environment, to their 
distribution network for the past twenty five years.
And yet, despite the considerable tidal ranges to which the British Isles, 
particularly its west coast, is subjected, together with the millions of words, 
both written and spoken, reviewing the progress (or otherwise) made to 
harness this undoubted and continuing source of green energy, not a single
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barrage, large or small, has been constructed in the UK. It could be argued, in 
fact, that the country appears, in practice, to be no nearer a ‘real’ barrage than 
it was in the 1920’s.
It is the purpose of the remaining paragraphs of this thesis to identify possible 
reasons for this state of affairs.
Consideration of the contents of the many articles which have been perused 
leads to the conclusion that, perhaps unwittingly, there have been certain 
discrete and identifiable stages in the ‘progress’ of tidal power in this country. 
The initial period of assessment was perceived to be mainly one of civil and 
electrical engineering importance. Later on, appraisal of the economics of tidal 
produced electrical energy became of major consideration while, latterly, 
solutions to the intractable environmental and ecological problems have 
become the overriding influence. Throughout the period, however, political 
factors, in combination with vested interests, have maintained a most 
significant control over the future for tidal generation. It is with this latter 
aspect that this discussion must commence.
6.2 Political attitude to Tidal Power
The British political mind, whether local or national and of whatever persuasion 
has never been one to take risks. History confirms that anyone rash enough to 
introduce a politically unsound policy is quickly out of office. Technological 
issues in particular have always proved problem areas to the politician, very 
few of whom have at any time received any technical training. Electricity 
matters have been plagued with political interference and indecision; as early 
as the Electricity Lighting Act of 1882, entrepreneurs believed that 
parliamentary interference had ‘stifled the electricity industry at birth’ (257). 
For any political debate to take place on a technical topic, the subject must first 
of all be assessed and simplified to make it understandable to the lay mind.
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This process is undertaken by technical staff working in the ‘second and third 
divisions’ of the Civil Service and their conclusions are in turn used by 
W ilson’s ‘first division’ (258) to provide the necessary briefs for their 
Minister. Inevitably, debates based on such processes are largely 
misunderstood, with the outcome depending more upon the politics of the 
argument that its technicalities. These procedures also lend themselves to 
‘lobbying’ by other, vested, interests, thereby leading to possible distortion of 
the basic technical content in order to achieve the desired result.
Avoidance of political risk also produces a reticence to support a cause which 
may be open to doubt and delay becomes the best attitude to take. There are, 
daily, examples of such procrastination not only in Parliament but also in local 
government and in the public services - ‘why should we stick our necks out’ is 
the feeble phrase used for doing nothing.
Moreover, political expediency and delay are not only the prerogatives of the 
state mind; there are many similar examples to be found within the scientific 
and engineering communities. The thickness of moon dust likely to be 
encountered by Neil Armstrong was a good example of scientific dissension, 
the science of cosmology itself an even better one. There are many items of 
scientific disagreement to be found on the topic of Tidal barrages, as already 
evidenced. Such disagreement, particularly if identified during public 
Conferences or Symposia discussions, is ‘grist to the mill’ to politicians who 
discern in this lack of unanimity perfectly adequate reasons to reserve their 
own opinions and continue the process of delay. Perhaps the comment 
attributed to Trollope applies also to the political mind - ‘to practical 
Englishmen, most of these international Congresses seem to arrive at 
nothing’.
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It is worthy of reiterating, in this assessment of political attitudes to tidal 
power, that the technical advisers to both the pre-1920 and the 1933 studies 
included Sir Eric Geddes and Sir John Snell; Snell being the Chief Adviser to 
Geddes on electrical matters. Geddes had drive, expertise and an identified 
ability to ‘cut through red tape’. His technocratic views on public ownership 
were well known to his parliamentary colleagues, as were his views on 
Ministers themselves - ‘Ninety per cent of Ministers accept the theory but are 
reluctant to put it into practice’, he wrote to Prime Minister Lloyd George 
(259).
Little wonder, taking all things political into consideration, that the 1920 and 
1933 Barrage reports were left to accumulate dust.
On the other hand. Lord Weir was able to ensure the Royal Assent for his Bill 
to construct the 132kV Grid (iron) system by his understanding and 
manipulation of the Parliamentary process. While previous engineering reports 
to Parliament on the necessity for interconnecting generating stations in order 
to save coal had fallen on barren minds, Weir reduced the Reports’ own 
arguments ‘to substantial and attractive gains readily understandable to 
Ministers’. ‘Scrupulosity was perhaps reserved for the general direction of the 
truth rather than its precise quantification’ (262). While Weir could stand 
accused of being economical with the (technical) truth, the point can also be 
made that the earlier, mainly complex and engineering oriented, reports were 
less than persuasive in their ability to communicate in a language best 
understood by their non-expert political readers. This vital aspect of 
communication was not lost on Caimcross who was able to secure, by means 
of a severely worded but simply stated Report - a la Weir -, Parliamentary 
approval for the go-ahead of the Channel Tunnel, a feat which had been found 
impossible by many expert led Committees before his own (261).
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The analyses of the Severn Barrage reports, particularly those written since 
1945, strongly suggest that the ‘W eir’ principle of report writing for 
Parliamentary purposes had not been applied. But perhaps Weir himself may 
not have found it possible to produce an easily read, unambiguous. Report in 
favour of the construction of a Severn or Mersey barrage which would have 
been acceptable to today’s Parliamentarians.
6.3 Institutional Barriers ( ‘Vested Interests’)
Experience strongly supports the view that the attitude taken by ‘vested 
interests’ to any change in the status quo is one of disapproval unless some 
tangible evidence of ‘profit’ - however defined - can be detected. In the early 
days of empire, the United Kingdom, with its vast investments in the slave 
trade and dramatically increasing textile business with the colonies, 
constructed port and shipping facilities on a number of river estuaries to cater 
for these activities. In particular, the Rivers Mersey and Severn became two of 
the vital arteries for international business and both Liverpool and Bristol 
became major cities as a result. Although patterns of trade have altered, both 
ports retain significant business interests on their respective estuaries which 
are of great importance to the financial wellbeing of the surrounding regions.
It is inevitable from the foregoing that any suggestion to effect the (partial) 
closure of their waterways by means of a barrage must result in a vociferous 
defence of the right to free passage, without hindrance or cost, for the shipping 
associated with the business of the ports both above and below any barrage. 
Proposals to incorporate locks of the size and ability to cater for identified 
vessel maxima with minimum but inevitable delay have not silenced these 
arguments. The inescapable reduction of high water levels upstream of a 
barrage, the possible/probable movement of sediment and resultant siltation of 
navigable channels and basins remain problems which the port and shipping
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authorities consider they could well do without. There are few if any real 
benefits to compensate for the disturbance to the well known and used regime 
of river passage; in fact, additional costs could be incurred as a result of lock 
delays.
For these reasons, the Severn authorities associated with the early barrage 
schemes remained opposed to these projects. More recently, their defence of 
such rights has perhaps softened somewhat, at least on paper. The current 
view of the Port of Bristol merely states that ‘if the Severn Barrage is built 
neither the Port nor shipping visiting the Port should suffer consequential 
detriment’. ‘This applies equally to the physical provisions made for shipping 
to pass through the barrage and to the costs faced by the Port and shipping 
attributable to the Barrage’. Associated British Ports held the view that the 
introduction by the barrage of a second locking system will be to the detriment 
of the interests of the ports - while the ‘loss of peak high water would not be 
compensated by an increase in the length of stand’. The shipping interests on 
the Mersey have become equally vociferous.
The mining interests of the South Wales coalfields were no less firmly opposed 
to the early proposals put forward for a Severn barrage. Whether any logically 
reasoned argument was ever put forward in support of their opposition is not 
clear from the literature; the estimated displacement of around one million tons 
of coal per annum, as a result of barrage operation, must have been of only 
minor concern compared with the two hundred million tons produced annually 
by the industry at that period. Possibly it required no more than a suggestion 
of job loss, or of opposition, to ensure that the strength of the mining 
community, well represented in Parliament, restrained any further 
consideration of a barrage.
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More recently identified barrage schemes have not resulted in open opposition 
from the mining community; certainly no resistance can be detected, for 
example, to the Bondi or the STPG proposals of the 1980’s. Yet coal as a 
major fuel for electricity generating purposes was stoutly defended by the 
NUM and the Coalfields Community Campaign during the Hinkley Inquiry of 
1989/90 (263). Perhaps their fierce opposition to nuclear generation but not to 
a barrage was based on the supposition that renewables schemes were 
unlikely to make any major impact on electricity generation and on coal 
production in particular?
Local authorities’ concern in respect of the 1920’s barrage proposals were 
limited to the ‘possibility of severe flooding’ of regions for which they had 
responsibility. The submissions made to the STPG were, as has already been 
observed, much more detailed, with interests set much wider. While 
supporting the concept of a barrage, they object to the release of land for 
development funding purposes, endorsing a requirement that no financial 
burden would fall upon them as a result of barrage construction and operation. 
Most importantly, they sought a detailed involvement ‘at the earliest possible 
stage, in any further consultation about legal, financial and administrative 
aspects of the barrage’.
Opportunities to develop, using private capital, hydro-electric schemes in the 
north of Scotland were rejected, in the 1930’s, by Parliament worried on the 
one hand about the impact of such projects ‘on Scottish miners’ jobs’ and, on 
the other, by ‘groups anxious to preserve the wilderness of the Highland’ 
(264).
Virtually without exception, the authorities, the ‘vested interests’, have 
expressed their concern for the environment and ecology of the Severn estuary 
(similar comments have been made in relation to the Mersey), seeking
1 3 3
assurances for their continued well being in the event of construction and 
operation of a barrage being agreed.
6.4 The Economics of Tidal Power
The literature survey has confirmed that a decision whether or not to proceed 
with the construction of a barrage across the River Severn (and more recently 
the Mersey) depends critically upon the cost comparison of a barrage produced 
kilowatt-hour ( ‘unit’) with one produced by a coal-fired station, or since 1980, 
by a nuclear one. Thus, the 1933 Severn Report concluded that ‘the cost of 
(barrage) power’ (sic) at 0.176 of a penny per unit ‘would be only two thirds of 
the cost generated at an equivalent coal-fired station’ (a fundamentally flawed 
judgement as has been pointed out previously). Although that Report’s 
conclusions make no mention of the cost of money, the body of the document 
includes the rather involved statement ‘in order to put the relative costs on a 
strictly comparable basis they should be calculated on the assumption that 
coal-fired stations were able to raise their capital at an average rate of four per 
cent, the rate we have assumed for the barrage scheme’. The 1945 Severn 
Report confirmed that ‘the interest charged on capital and sinking fund 
investments was three per cent per annum’. The cost per unit was, in the 1945 
case, complicated by the restriction on output for the first fifteen years and 
referred to earlier; figures of 0.209 of a penny and 0.199 of a penny per 
kilowatt-hour respectively were considered relevant. (Headland subsequently 
supported these data). The 1945 Committee considered that the ‘prices were 
lower than those from existing coal fired stations’, but expected them to be 
higher than the prices likely to apply from new, more efficient, stations. They 
declared that the ‘financial value of the ban age scheme will depend upon the 
price of coal per ton’. The 1981 Bondi Report declared that ‘in many scenarios 
the ... barrage is likely to be an economic investment although not as good ... as
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nuclear plant’. The unit cost of electricity generated ‘might be around 
3.1p/kWh at five per cent discount rate’ (real or internal rate of return above 
inflation and the figure previously set by Government for public sector economic 
performance). The Report went on ‘since nuclear fuel is very much cheaper 
than coal or oil, the size of the nuclear component of the generating station is 
decisive for the evaluation of the .... barrage’. Statements of this type are 
merely reporting the obvious, i.e. that in the modem world of electricity supply, 
the position of a tidal generating plant is any running merit order table would be 
determined, like any other plant, by its relationship to the economic 
performance of other generating stations available to the electricity supply 
network and its controllers. An aspect which obviously could prove to be a 
great deterrent to the possibility of any privately financed tidal project, since 
the investor must face the risk of the plant not generating revenue if more 
economically priced generation is available to the despatchers.
The capital costs of hydro-related generation schemes have historically been 
significantly higher than those of conventional fossil fired station. For 
example,the capital cost/kW installed of the 1928 designed Galloway hydro­
electric scheme was around £35 (265), approximately double that quoted for 
the 1930s ‘big, new public supply station’ (266) and not dissimilar to the figure 
appropriate to the large coal-fired generating stations of the 1970’s. No less 
importantly, the capital costs associated with nuclear generating stations 
approximate several hundred pounds/kW installed. The civil engineering costs 
involved in the construction of hydro and nuclear stations far outweigh those 
pertaining to conventional plant. In the case of the Galloway scheme referred 
to above, some two thirds of the total costs related to dam construction and 
associated works, a figure not greatly at variance with that of the 1945 Severn 
barrage project.
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The fuel costs applicable to fossil-fired and nuclear stations are greatly 
different; however, they are both affected by world demand and local labour 
conditions. On the other hand, there are no fuel charges directly applicable to 
tidal generating stations; in fact, considerable savings of fossil fuels would be 
achieved by their use.
Moreover, while the economic lives of both coal/oil fired and nuclear generating 
stations are assessed at thirty years or so (Hunterston 'A' Magnox nuclear 
station was taken out of service after twenty five years), hydro-powered plant 
may well have a life of eighty or one hundred years and possibly in excess of 
such figures. While replanting must occur during such a long time scale, the 
basic civil works will, with adequate maintenance, remain unimpaired by time. 
Taking the foregoing into consideration, it is basically unsound to assess the 
’present worth' of future generation income from the different schemes by the 
accounting analysis known as 'discounted cash flow' (DCF). The DCF process 
bears particularly heavily on the long tenu worth of electricity produced by any 
generation method, even when quite moderate discount rates are used. For 
example, a discount rate of five per cent will result in the worth of the energy 
(to be) produced in thirty years' time being less than a quarter of its present 
value while the fifty year ‘worth’ will be reduced to less than nine per cent of 
its present value. If the discount rate is increased to eight per cent, (quite 
insufficient to satisfy today’s currency markets) these figures become ten per 
cent and two per cent respectively while, at a discount rate of twelve per cent, 
the energy produced in twenty five years' time would be practically worthless 
in evaluating the present day merits of a scheme. The impact of such 
accounting procedures on the economic merit of a tidal barrage generating 
project is obvious. Nevertheless the use of the DCF technique continues to be 
applied to electricity supply assessments; the advance of the combined cycle
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gas turbine, with its low initial capital cost, short construction period and even 
its comparatively short operating life fits perfectly into a DCF structured 
privatised electricity industry. The destruction of the coal mining industry's 
future prospects can thereby, at least partially, be traced to the effect of 
financial policies based on this discounting technique.
The foregoing confirms the fact that the economic judgement of whether or not 
to go ahead with a project does not depend primarily on the level of capital to 
be employed, or even the source, (public or private) of that capital. What 
matters to the financiers is the perceived real rate of return on capital as 
determined by the application of a technique which, in truth, may or may not be 
appropriate to the project itself. For example, by the application of single 
minded financial manipulation, conventional economic policy has enabled a civil 
engineering project similar in magnitude to that of the Severn barrage to be 
financed by private capital. The Channel Tunnel, with an anticipated final cost 
of around £9,000m and a project time scale not dissimilar to that assessed for 
the Severn barrage has gone ahead, although its true rate of return must 
remain open to question for years to come.
Recent official reports on the possible development of a Severn or Mersey 
barrage have shown an increasing concern for the environment and ecology of 
the estuaries. As stated elsewhere (267) 'modern day environmental quality 
ratings are much higher than they were twenty or thirty years ago'. 
Unfortunately, presently accepted accountancy techniques include no factors for 
allowing comparison of the economic benefits of projects of differing 
environmental impact, although suggestions to deal with this shortcoming have 
been made (267).
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6.5 Environmental Aspects
'The "existence" value of an environment not necessarily for physical use but 
merely to be viewed has been found to be a significant reason for its 
preservation' (268). 'Preservation of the remoteness of the Scottish Highlands' 
was put forward as one of the reasons for denying the use of the water power 
of that region for generation purposes (264). In November 1931, a 'Scenery 
Committee', under the chairmanship of Lord Hamilton, had been commissioned 
to discuss the implications and to oversee the effects of the imminent 
construction of the Galloway hydro scheme (268). This Committee was 
subsequently to 'register its concern' at the 'bare and unsightly collection of 
apparatus' which constituted the electricity substations at Glenlee and 
Tongland. Yet the Central Electricity Board (CEB), whose responsibilities 
included the arrangements of these structures, had previously discussed their 
proposed designs and constructions with the Association for the Preservation 
of Rural Scotland (ARPS) and had obtained their complete acceptance. It is 
perhaps of interest to note that the Tongland 132kV substation, probably as a 
direct result of the ARPS discussions, became the first Transmission 
substation in the United Kingdom to be designed and commissioned in the 
compact, metalclad format (269).
It is also worthy of this period to note that a claim, purporting to come from the 
promoters of the Galloway scheme that, 'far from impairing the beauty of the 
area', ... 'the works would improve its amenity', was considered 'untrue' in a 
report prepared by the newspaper The Scotsman which believed 'the 
construction' (on this occasion of the dams) to be 'extremely ugly'. (268). 
Further, the MP Sir Thomas Inskip, arguing this point, asserted that 'no 
desecration of places of beauty could occur if a Scenery Committee was 
appointed', a view which was unacceptable to Lord Hamilton. He was anxious
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to point out that 'whether or not the public advantage of the proposed works 
outweighed the public loss that may be caused by the spoiling of a beautiful 
place is never considered under our present system'. (270). Another example 
of 'beauty being in the eyes of the beholder', again associated with the 
electricity supply industry and the CEB, concerned the criticism of the 'pylons 
and overhead connections' of the Grid system in 1931 by groups of 
environmentalists-'landowners and city nature dwellers'. Herbert Morrison, 
the Minister of Transport whose ultimate responsibility it was, was able to win 
them over. 'They (the towers/pylons) have, he said', a sense of majesty of 
their own and the cables stretching between them over the countryside gives 
one a sense of power, in the service of the people, marching over many miles of 
country' (271). Nevertheless, it is recorded in the later 1930's that 'the 
increasingly stringent environmental requirements affected the planning of 
suitable sites for power stations' and 'delayed the completion of the plant 
programmes'. (272).
The willingness of the population to tolerate or accept any visual or other form 
of degradation of their own environment varies not only from place to place but 
also in relation to their initial perception of their environment. A coal mining 
community brought up to identify with pit-head workings and the spoil of coal- 
getting might be more tolerant of a particular visual intrusion which would be 
completely unacceptable to a country village. Local resistance to 
environmental change remains basically a sociological problem although there 
is, without doubt, a greater reluctance to accept changes when their main 
benefits are enjoyed elsewhere. It remains a fact, however, that environmental 
changes and intrusions to the normal course of life are usually acceptable to the 
population unless personal involvement can be identified. The so-called 
NIMBY (not-in-my-back-yard) syndrome is the result of such attitudes.
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Experience confirms that public opinion, 'that chaos of prejudices' (286), can 
usually be marshalled to accept or reject a proposal by the publicised views of 
the recognised ‘expert’ or celebrity.
And what of the environment which the present generation and its politicians 
are anxious to preserve. (274). The estuaries of the Severn and the Mersey 
have been and continue to be used for the construction of shipping and port 
facilities for the purpose of trade; numerous other rivers were likewise involved 
in these activities. Many of these industrialised rivers and estuaries are no 
longer associated with business but still retain the scars of yester-year; 
evidence remains of redundant boat yards, decaying wharf and dock facilities, 
overgrown feeder canals and filthy effluent outfalls. It is worthwhile repeating 
here part of the contents of Professor McDowell’s letter to the Times (275) ‘In 
common with many other estuaries, the Mersey in its present form is ‘man- 
made’ - not just locally but on a massive scale which has affected their whole 
hydraulic and sedimentary behaviour’.
A not inconsiderable part of the environment from which the public derives its 
visual, social and physical enjoyment and which interests, comparatively 
recently, have set out to protect may well have been man-produced by 
activities undertaken during the not too distant past.
This is not to suggest that protection of the environment as we now know it is 
unnecessary and that full analysis, assessment and regard for any human 
impact upon it need not be undertaken. It is intended merely to draw attention 
to the fact that environmental and ecological issues are highly subjective ones, 
equally complex and, in view of their complexity, usually minority led. 
Nevertheless, some forty eight per cent of the UK population believe that 
‘environmental protection’ is essential, while eleven per cent put 
‘development’ as their priority. European figures support these data (276).
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Other statistics (277), based on highly questionable techniques, suggest that 
no less than two thirds of the UK’s electricity customers would pay an 
additional £7/annum for their supply in order to achieve ten per cent renewable 
energy by the year 2000, while sixty one per cent believe that renewables 
should be given the highest priority to combat global warming.
But, as Shaw observes, it must be ‘recognised that energy production and 
preservation of the environment are often in conflict (not only in respect of 
power generation). The skill is achieving a compromise between the options 
available and the economic penalties’. ‘The challenge of environmental 
investigations is nowhere more multi-disciplinary than in the case of tidal 
power stations’. (277).
Although the possible effects on the environment particularly of energy 
producing or transportation schemes have more recently been publically aired 
within the corridors of power, the Severn barrage reports of 1933 and 1945 
contained little on the subject. The only comment which could perhaps be
construed to point in this direction was that included in the 1945 Report’  .
many considerations other than technical arise which are outside our terms of 
reference’. The literature survey undertaken strongly suggests that the 1974 
article by Shaw (280) made the first specific mention of the ‘environmental 
factors’ of a proposed tidal energy plant on the Severn estuary. As previously 
stated, no environmental study was made of the Ranee river prior to the 
construction of the barrage on its estuary. (281).
Both the Severn and the Mersey estuaries have been and are continuing to be 
the subjects of wide ranging environmental and ecological studies. The Severn 
can justly claim to be the most widely studied of the estuaries of the UK, and 
possibly of the world. Working from the assumption that the ‘physical aspects 
of an estuarine regime are the major determinants of its character’ (282) Shaw
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has made an assessment of the possible effects of a barrage at English Stones 
and also at the Cardiff-Weston site of the Severn estuary on the currents, 
turbidity, salinity and patterns of sedimentation of the estuary. The varying 
aspects of water quality were also reviewed and their effects found to be 
‘important’ but ‘capable of recognition’.
He retained the view that ecological changes caused by a barrage were ‘less 
amenable to solution’, believing that the changed intertidal and subtidal 
substrates, together with the associated turbidity and salinity regimes, would 
significantly affect the whole productivity of the estuary, from primary fauna and 
flora to birds and fish. He also emphasised that, since it was unlikely that the 
environmental effects of one tidal barrage would have little if any commonality 
with those associated with another estuary or barrage site, it was necessary 
‘to consider each tidal barrage on its own merits’ ; ‘the environment of each 
estuary is unique’, he argued. Nevertheless, he concluded that the information 
available in respect of the Severn did not suggest that a barrage ‘would, on 
balance, necessarily have an adverse influence on the ecology of the area it 
would affect, though this depends to a large extent on the regularity with which 
levels in the basin are permitted to vary’. Even with further evidence, Shaw 
was of the opinion that ‘all the evidence will be equally convincing on all topics 
and to all people’.
Since Shaw’s 1986 pronouncements, many other environmental and ecological 
studies have been completed. The results of investigations by Webb, Tinkler, 
Little, Mettam and others are detailed in Ref 277, where the subjects of water 
quality, drainage, biological effects, intertidal, eco-systems, salinity and 
turbidity are fully assessed. Possibly one of the most practical studies was 
undertaken by Firth, when ‘Pollution’ was studied in considerable detail. He 
concluded that there were no precedents for the effect of a tidal barrage on the
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degree of pollution in the aquatic environment. Although many investigations 
had been made of the ecological effects of impounding fresh water behind dams, 
little had been attempted in respect of two way flows of water of varying 
salinity via a barrage structure. Firth was particularly concerned with the 
barrage effect on oxygen levels which had yet to be established in detail, 
pointing out that estuaries are usually channels for the release of sewage, 
usually untreated. ‘Swift scouring, high tidal range and high oxygen levels 
were relied upon to deal with this problem’. The presence of heavy metals in 
solution, adsorbed on the surfaces of sedimentary particles or chemically 
combined with other material’ required further assessment in view of possible 
banage effects. This aspect was also emphasised by Towner in respect of the 
Mersey barrage (283), his Paper pointing out that the ‘Mersey estuary 
presently has poor water quality as a result of the large number of domestic 
and industrial effluent discharges it receives’. He also identified that 
‘significantly elevated concentrations of a number of potentially toxic trace 
metals and organic micro pollutants (exist) in the water column, sediments and 
biota’ ; indicating that a barrage would reduce the degree of interchange of 
water between the estuary and the expanse of Liverpool Bay. The ‘flushing 
time’ of the estuary would be significantly increased, he believed, reducing the 
salinity of the estuary and increasing its toxicity. He concluded that the effect 
of a barrage on the estuary’s environment and ecology would be significant but 
there would also be ‘positive effects’ as well as impacting ones. Consideration 
would need to be given to ‘specific conservation measures as part of a 
management plan, to further reduce impacts’.
Hydraulics Research, a company specialising in barrage and barrage closure 
issues and with detailed understanding of the many hydraulic factors 
influencing the type of structure, its mode of operation, tidal flow.
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sedimentation, water quality and other aspects of tidal station operation have 
been involved with or been responsible for many of the studies reported 
previously (284). They continue to be concerned with the on-going studies at 
both the Severn and the Mersey estuaries; ‘much work remains to be done’. 
When considering the environmental impact of a barrage project, it is 
necessary to remember that the electrical output will, over its working life, 
save not only considerable amounts of fossil fuel (equivalent to perhaps 700- 
800m tonnes of coal over the lives of the Severn and Mersey barrages) but 
would also eliminate the colossal amounts of gaseous and other pollutants 
resulting from the combustion. A tidal station produces no toxic emissions or 
wastes and, importantly in view of earlier comments, is unlikely to have any 
significant visual impact, particularly if the electrical connections to it are 
undergrounded.
Apart from possible environmental impacts which have already been identified, 
the main problem area with a generating barrage concerns the inevitable 
reduction in tidal range behind the barrage, particularly affecting wading bird life 
and with the attendant possibility of increased sedimentation difficulties due to 
reduced current flow. This latter point has been of considerable concern to the 
ports and the shipping interests as earlier remarks in this work have confirmed. 
But, as Laughton (285) has affirmed, ‘the reduction in tidal range and currents 
within the enclosed basin are seen as highly beneficial to the development of 
water-based activities’. In addition, (and as identified by Hooker (273) a road 
crossing added to the barrage construction, as undertaken on the Ranee 
project, involves comparatively little additional cost but can bring considerable 
eonomic benefit to the region.* The favourable use of a barrage for flood
* It is worthy of mention that the construction of a second Severn bridge has 
recently been authorised at a cost of £300m. Moreover, David Hunt, who, in
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control of the upper reaches of an estuary has already been noted. Shaw had a 
point when he remarked that ‘the skill (of obtaining barrage acceptance) is in 
achieving the compromise between the options available and their economic 
penalties’. It is surely a case of ‘paying your money and taking your choice’.
In a previous section, mention was made of the possibility of assessing the 
environmental costs associated with fossil-fired generation in order better to 
assess the benefits of tidal (and other) ‘environmentally friendly’ forms of 
electricity production; i.e. a form of ‘environmental accounting’. The problem of 
environmental evaluation is, however, a difficult one. For example, how does 
one assess the cost of miners’ lives, the effect of their loss on families, of acid 
rain damage to buildings, forests; the destruction of the countryside by pit­
head workings and spoil-tips? How do or would such costs compare with the 
damage due to oil exploration and exploitation, oil spills and the inevitable loss 
of human life? What is the global damage of such activities likely to be, can it 
be costed and how does one attribute the proportion of ‘blame’ to individual 
countries? Obviously very complicated and on-going studies in experimental 
design would be required, the ‘techniques employed would vary in complexity, 
data are not readily available’, while ‘considerable bias may be applied both as 
a result of the method of questioning and by the evaluators of such studies. 
(287). In confirmation of this latter point and as quoted earlier, a public opinion 
poll commissioned by Greenpeace has purported to indicate that some two 
thirds of the UK’s electricity customers would pay ‘an additional £7/annum on 
their electricity bills so that renewables would provide ten per cent of 
electricity needs by the turn of the century’, (sic).
1986 as the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Energy, opened the ICE 
Tidal Power Symposium, has already laid the inaugural stone.
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The European Commission (EC) has given expression to its general policy 
towards renewable energy sources in several Regulations and 
Recommendations - its Communication of February 1990 providing ‘further 
clear encouragement to energy sources which will diversify the Community’s 
energy supplies and contribute to limiting emissions into the atmosphere from 
fossil fuel combustion’. An additional communication, still under discussion, 
intended to limit carbon dioxide emissions and to improve energy efficiency 
was issued in 1991 (288), which proposed strengthening the Community’s 
renewable energy programmes and introducing a combined carbon/energy tax 
which would encourage switching to renewable sources of energy by exempting 
them from it. The UK Government’s own attitude to renewable energy sources 
is to ‘stimulate their exploitation wherever they have prospects of being 
economically attractive and environmentally acceptable’. Its view is set out in 
detail in ‘Renewable Energy in the UK - The Way Forward’ (296). The UK 
policies on the subject are also embodied in the Electricity Act of 1989 and the 
Environmental Protection Act of 1990. The Electricity Act of 1989 empowers 
the ‘Secretary of State to make orders requiring Public Electricity Suppliers to 
obtain electricity from a specified capacity of generation plant supplied by 
renewable electricity sources’. This requirement is known as the ‘Non-Fossil 
Fuel Obligation’ (NFFO), which, until it runs out in 1998 (as presently 
proposed) allows premium electricity prices to be paid for energy generated by 
different technology bands. The price presently paid for Hydro-Electricity 
(Tidal energy is not so identified) is 6p/kWh. The NFFO obviously goes some 
way towards offsetting (subsidising) the non-identified environmental costs of 
fossil-fired generation; its application is necessarily crude and must, in reality, 
relate to the ‘size of the obligation’, i.e. the declared net capacity of each 
technology band and of the total net capacity itself. Nevertheless the NFFO is
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a step, albeit a small and temporary one in support of renewables. The EC 
proposal to introduce a carbon-energy tax is, in itself, an admission of the 
difficulties involved in penalising individual methods of electricity generation for 
their share of any damage, pollution, present and future, caused to the 
environment.
The broad proposals being floated at present in respect of an oil related carbon 
tax include the imposition of three dollars on each barrel of oil imported from 
1993, with an additional one dollar increase per annum until the year 2000.
This burden has been estimated by the oil industry to equate to an increase in 
Community revenues of around £45000m/annum. At a recent World Energy 
Council congress in Madrid, the General Secretary of the Organisation of 
Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) is reported to have said (289)’ .... we 
suspect that the tax is not for environmental purposes but more for the 
collection of increased revenues’. He went on, ‘OPEC ... welcomes measures 
taken to secure a cleaner .... environment but we deplore the politicisation of 
the issue and the imposition of measures based on questionable scientific 
evidence and prejudicial intentions’. ... Is global warming indeed taking place? 
And, if so, is it due - in part, in entirety or indeed at all - to fossil fuel burning?’ 
The Chief Executive of British Petroleum endorsed these comments, stating 
that he was not against taxes as such, ‘but I do object when taxation is 
justified on spurious or dishonest grounds, adding ‘how many of the so-called 
environmental taxes are merely an excuse for raising money ... or for protecting 
one fuel against another’. He urged the use of ‘market-related instruments’ 
and not taxation ‘to improve the environmental record of the energy industry’. 
‘Investment cannot take place’, he claimed, ‘in industries whose profitability is 
destroyed by regulation’ (sic) ‘or by taxation or by consumers whose personal 
wealth suffers the ravages of taxation or of non-existent economic growth’.
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No doubt the hearts of coal-mining and electricity board executives would have 
warmed to such appeals; possibly consumers themselves would have some 
sympathy with the views expressed.
It is against the backdrop of the sentiments expressed in this Chapter that the 
modified environments and ecologies which would be induced by the generating 
barrages proposed particularly for the Severn and the Mersey continue to be 
assessed. The impact of such issues on the pseudo-economics used to 
evaluate the worth of the barrage schemes themselves will be evident.
And finally it has yet again to be re-iterated that the La Ranee project was 
constructed without any prior environmental assessment. ‘The new pattern of 
pool (basin) levels has improved conditions for people living on the shores of 
the pool as regards flooding, yachting etc. and has effectively turned the 
estuary into a lake’ claims Charlier (281). The method of construction of the 
Ranee project, (by cofferdam), necessitated the temporary closure of the 
estuary; environmental specialists admit that the ‘quality’ of the ‘new’ estuary 
is not less than that of its predecessor. In this context and as confirmed by 
Charlier (281) and Shaw, it is nevertheless important to note that the Ranee 
River does not transport significant volumes of sediment; moreover, the river 
current is small compared with that due to tidal movement. As a result, no 
basin siltation is likely. Such ‘easy’ conditions do not of course apply to the 
Severn estuary; hence the necessity, as many contributors have pointed out, to 
give adequate consideration to this problem.
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Chapter 7
Concluding Remarks
This dissertation has distilled the important parts of much of the major 
literature pertaining to the subject of tidal barrages and their application for 
electricity generation. Although its basic terms of reference related specifically 
to the UK, the assessment has strayed occasionally from these shores to 
ensure that the account is as complete as possible. Inevitably, however, 
attention has concentrated particularly on the estuaries of the Severn and the 
M ersey.
It will have been noted, possibly with some surprise, that the dissertation 
contains little detailed review of what might be termed ‘pure engineering’ of a 
barrage. It is, however, a fact that apart from a few publications, identified in 
the thesis, the general literature is not overendowed with engineering detail. 
The reader will therefore search in vain for comparisons of cofferdam 
construction (as employed on the Ranee scheme) with steel/concrete caisson 
flotation and of straflo turbines with the bulb design. These aspects, together 
with related issues of sluice size and design, turbine runner diameter, 
submergence and control are all matters of specific engineering judgement, 
dependant upon ban-age location and open to modification or alteration and to 
personal opinion.
As perusal of the vast literature progressed, it became evident that, from an 
engineering point of view at least and irrespective of the barrage design or of 
the installed equipment, the ability within the country to provide a tidal 
generating barrage across any UK estuary (or elsewhere) was not in doubt. 
Even the first identified Severn proposal agreed the technical feasibility of the 
barrage project although this dissertation casts doubt as to the necessary 
technical expertise and manufacturing capability being available to complete 
the project successfully. Later investigations of the Severn estuary ‘merely’
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confirmed the engineering practicality of constructing a tidal barrage, a 
conclusion which has more recently been endorsed as a result of a similar 
exercise associated with the Mersey estuary.
It is also evident from the detailed analysis of the reports of the various 
committees. Symposia and like bodies which has been undertaken for the 
purpose of this thesis that the economists involved were much less convinced 
of the viability of any barrage generation scheme and, moreover, they have 
remained so. Politicians have seized upon such doubts to delay any 
agreement, incidentally making political capital by heeding the entreaties of 
vested interests. The economic justification for the construction and operation 
of a tidal barrage has been further eroded as a result of the transfer of the 
electricity supply industry from the public to the private sector with its demand 
for increased returns on capital invested.
But it is the more recently confinned strength of argument which has emerged 
from the many interests concerned with the environment and the ecology of the 
estuaries identified with barrage generation projects which has effectively 
halted any possibility of barrage construction for the forseeable future. Many 
investigations into related subjects have been identified as necessary, even 
vital, before any agreement to proceed with a construction on any estuary can 
be made. As time progresses other, no less important investigations will no 
doubt be identified and further, if limited. Government money will be injected to 
keep the projects alive. As Wilson has stated (290) ‘Am I being too cynical 
thinking that after the next three years, there will be another little grant for 
another three years - just enough to keep the engineers quiet but not so much 
as to actually get things done?’.
Clare (291) highlighted the time scale likely to be involved when he confirmed 
the importance of ‘solving the environmental issues’. ‘Nor must the time scale
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that is necessary for such work be underestimated’, he stated; ‘For the Severn 
scheme a period of six years more will be required to complete the 
environmental analysis, the planning and the detailed design. Even for a small 
scheme it is doubted that the period could be sensibly reduced below four 
years’. Unfortunately, that statement was made in 1986; many more years 
must now elapse, as a result of recent environmental decisions, before any 
conclusion as to the future for (Severn) tidal power can be drawn. Moreover, 
Clare’s obvious earlier optimism for the Severn project must have been 
severely tested as a result of the economic issues highlighted by the 
privatisation of the electricity supply industry and by the continuing and indeed 
increasing environmental demands being made on his Group. The sharp 
comments and criticisms voiced by the Select Committee on Renewable 
Energy cannot have gone unnoticed by either Clare or McCormack (the MBC 
M anager).
But any lingering hopes they may have had for the future of their projects must 
have finally been dashed by the Government’s reply to the Report prepared by 
the Select Committee.
‘Tidal Barrages’, the Government avers, ‘are not currently amongst the most 
cost effective of renewable technologies when considered in terms of revenue 
from electricity and it is difficult to see how they could be financed in the near 
future’. (309).
On such a basis, doubts for their future must be uppermost in the minds even of 
the promoters of the much smaller Duddon and Wyre tidal schemes. 
McLaughlin (292) had a valid point when, at the 1986 ICE Symposium, he 
speculated that ‘if France had a site as favourable for tidal power as the 
Severn Estuary, it would probably have been completed ten or fifteen years
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ahead of us. Promoters, contractors, financial institutions, generation boards 
and the Government should reflect on the truth of this and why it should be’.
Or maybe, as the author has suggested (293), ‘although many experts have 
produced literally millions of words reviewing the progress made to harness 
this undoubted source of green renewable energy’, no one of real standing and 
authority truly wants a tidal generating barrage constructed in this country.
But the last words of this dissertation certainly must be those written by 
Norman Davey, (295) the 1920’s proponent of Tidal Power who, some eight 
years earlier had been vilified for his equally ‘contentious’ views on the subject 
of the ‘Internal Combustion Turbine’. ‘In all places and at all times’, he wrote, 
‘in the precincts of Westminster, in the lanes of the City, from the pulpits of our 
academies, the eminent, the learned (and the mass of technical opinion) assure 
me that the gas turbine is necessarily inefficient and that tidal power is 
uneconomic’. The Davey inspired gas turbine is assuredly successful; in the 
due course of time it is possible that his views of tide generated power will be 
equally applauded in this country.
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Chapter 8
Proposal For Further Work - Possibilities for PhD Study.
As has been identified in this thesis, the intermittent and variable nature of 
tidal barrage produced electricity has been emphasised by many contributors to 
the literature. Early barrage projects in this country proposed to minimise this 
shortcoming by utilising some of the barrage generated power to pump water to 
an upper storage reservoir, this to be used for generation during periods of low 
or nil output from the barrage itself, thereby smoothing the electrical output 
from the overall scheme to a lower but more continuous ‘firm’ level. The low 
level of firm power produced by their proposed barrage was remarked upon by 
the 1981 Bondi Committee, which commented that only lOOOMW of the 
installed 7200MW of generating capacity could be considered firm. 
Consideration of the Admiralty Tide Tables confirms, however, that high water 
occurs at different times around the coast of the UK. For example, high tide 
occurs in the Solway Firth some two hours after that at London Bridge, while 
high tide at the Mersey is further delayed. On the other hand, high water at 
the Severn estuary occurs five/six hours before that at London Bridge. Other 
regions have different tidal constants.
It follows from the foregoing that, by judicious selection of barrage sites of 
differing tidal constant, a continuous (firm) source of supply could be obtained 
from tidal generation stations. It would be the purpose of a further 
investigation to identify environmentally suitable barrage locations, to evaluate 
their individual and combined electrical outputs, to determine the methods of 
interconnection to be used, to assess possible capital costs, together with the 
effect on revenue of the cost of money, transmission losses and thereby to 
make an estimate of the firm power likely to become available, together with 
its unit costs, from an integrated UK wide tidal barrage project.
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Appendix B
The Generation of Electricity From The Tides
In its most simple form, a tidal generating barrage consists essentially of a 
dam (or ‘barrage’) constructed across a sea-connected inlet in which one or a 
number of turbines are installed. These can be operated to provide electricity 
as a result of the difference in head between the water above and below the 
barrage.
Like any hydro-electric project, the volume of water passing through the 
turbines per second is a valuable indication of the energy output of the scheme, 
while its economic viability depends greatly upon the capital employed in its 
construction and upon its method of financing.
It follows that, in practice, a tidal project has the greatest likelihood of being an 
economic proposition if (a) the mean tidal range R available is large and (b) the 
area A of the impounded basin is great per unit length of barrage construction. 
These various aspects are examined in further detail below.
(a) The Tide - Assessment of Mean Tidal Range (See Fig 3).
The theory of the tides is complex. Many learned treatises have been written 
on the subject (1) (298). This Appendix is merely intended to discuss the 
subject sufficiently to provide information relevant to the use of the tides for 
barrage generation purposes.
The tidal phenomenon is the periodic movement of the sea (known as the 
‘astronomic tide’), induced mainly as a result of the effect on the earth’s 
surface of the gravitational forces due to the sun and the moon. As may be 
deduced by the application of Newton’s Law of Gravitation, it is primarily the 
moon which is the source of our tides; nevertheless, the force due to the sun is
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considerable, producing approximately fifty per cent of that attributable to the 
moon.
Since, as a result of their respective orbits, the earth, moon and sun do not 
remain in the same relative positions one to another, it follows that the 
gravitational forces operating on the earth’s surface vary periodically. When 
the sun, moon and earth Tine-up’ (or are ‘in-phase’) as at new or full moon, 
the total gravitational pull is at its greatest and the highest or spring tides 
occur. When the sun and moon are at right angles (or in quadrature) relative to 
the earth, as at first and last moon quarters, their combined pull is at a 
minimum and the lowest or neap tides occur.
It will be evident that the height between successive high and low water 
levels, known as the tidal range, will vary throughout the lunar month, during 
which two spring and two neap tides will occur. A similar variation will also 
occur as the seasons advance; the highest spring tides take place in the 
equinoxes of March and September, when the moon is closest to the earth, 
while the lowest neap tides occur in June and December when the moon is 
furthest from the earth.
The tidal range in mid ocean (the ‘equilibrium tide’) is the result of the various 
forces identified; a range of approximately 0.5m has been estimated to apply 
(298). The actual tidal range occurring at a particular locality, however, 
depends upon the coastal configuration, the rate of reduction of the depth of the 
sea in the region and upon the occurrence or otherwise of a phenomenon known 
as ‘resonance’. This latter aspect is caused by the natural frequency of the 
water column in an estuary or bay being similar to, or a close multiple of, the 
frequency of propagation of the incoming tide. The phenomenon, which is 
analogous to that of the voltage increase effect in an AC series connected LC 
circuit, can create a much increased tidal range than would otherwise be
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anticipated. The Bay of Fundy experiences this effect while, in this country, 
the Severn estuary, with a mean tidal range exceeding nine metres, is a classic 
example of tidal range resonance enhancement.
(The mean tidal range, the arithmetic mean of the spring and neap ranges for 
each lunar cycle, is used for the assessment of the tidal energy available).
It will be evident that the Mersey estuary, with its mean tidal range of seven 
metres, also exhibits a significant level of resonance enhancement; other 
estuaries on the W est Coast are also affected to a lesser degree.
(b) Area of Basin - Barrage Length
Both the estuaries of the Severn and the Mersey lend themselves to the 
reasonably efficient enclosure of a large area of water per unit length of 
barrage. Other, smaller estuaries suitable for the purpose have been identified 
elsewhere in this thesis.
It is evident, however, that the ‘specified’ requirements for economic barrage 
produced electricity generation, as identified previously, are likely to be best 
complied with on the estuaries such as the Severn and the Mersey.
(c) Operation of a Tidal Bairage
It is possible to operate the turbines of a tidal barrage in either the ebb mode, 
the flood mode or, depending on the design of turbine, in both modes.
(i) With the ebb method of generation (See Fig 4) the barrage gates or sluices 
are opened to allow the basin to fill during the incoming tide. At high tide, the 
sluices are closed and, after a suitable time interval to provide sufficient head 
for efficient turbine operation, the impounded water is discharged via the 
turbines into the sea. The sluices are then re-opened, the basin refilled and 
the cycle repeated. Two periods of generation are obtained per day as 
indicated in Fig 4.
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(ii) With the flood method of generation (See Fig 5) the barrage remains 
closed until a suitable head between the sea and the water in the basin has 
been achieved to provide efficient operations of the turbines which are operated 
until the effective head between sea and basin level has become too small for 
generation efficiency. The sluices are then opened to complete the emptying of 
the basin and the cycle repeated. Again, two periods of generation per day are 
achieved.
(iii) Two-wav generation (See Fig 6) combines ebb and flood utilisation as 
part of a two way generation cycle; an arrangement which is included in the 
operation of the La Ranee barrage. The scheme requires the use of reversible 
turbines which in turn involves a loss in overall efficiency of the machine/water 
passage design. While two way working may produce more net energy from 
the barrage than a simple ebb generation arrangement, the more expensive 
reversible turbines result in an increase in kWh costs of about ten per cent 
compared with the simple ebb generation scheme (132). The four pulses of 
power output per day will be noted.
(iv) The process known as flood pumping (See Fig 4), used with ebb 
generation, has comparatively recently been suggested for incorporation in the 
Severn and Mersey barrage projects. This concept requires the reverse- 
pumping-operation of turbines at or soon after high tide (when the sluices have 
been closed) in order to ‘top-up’ the water level in the impounded basin and 
thereby increase the resultant head available for ebb generation purposes. The 
use and efficiency of flood pumping is essentially one of overall scheme 
economics and depends upon the attractiveness of the supply tariff and thereby 
the cost of electricity required for the pumping operation. ‘Off-peak’ electricity 
supply would not, as a result of the lunar controlled, variable and intermittent 
nature of tidal generation, necessarily be available for pumping purposes.
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In spite of economic shortcomings, there may be benefits which are not directly 
related to energy production and efficiency. The increase in water levels at 
docking facilities within the basin area as a result of flood pumping may well 
have been one reason for both the Severn and the Mersey barrage schemes to 
include this technique in their proposals. The La Ranee barrage is equipped 
with flood pumping facilities.
(d) The Energv stored in a Tidal Barrage Scheme
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Appendix C
The Relationship of Tidal Power to other Renewables
The exploitation of renewable sources of energy involves the utilisation of 
energy flows which occur in the natural environment and which are continually 
being replaced by natural processes.
The sun provides the natural energy source of hvdro power by its evaporation 
of water, subsequent rainfall and increased river flow. Similarly, by creating 
thermal gradients, the sun is responsible for wind power and for wave power.
It is the obvious source of solar power.
As explained elsewhere in this thesis, tidal power is the result of the 
interaction between the sun and moon’s gravitational forces and the earth’s 
rotation. Geothermal energy exploits the increase in temperature which occurs 
as a result of the progression from the earth’s surface toward its core.
Biofuels such as firewood, straw, domestic and industrial waste and specially 
grown ‘energy crops’ are also, but less directly recognised, solar provided 
sources of energy. They are not, however, ‘renewables’ in the strict sense of 
the term since their fuel is destroyed by burning, either for direct use or by 
suitable conversion, to produce motive power and/or electricity. Land fill gas, 
largely methane, is the result of the fermentation of waste products at refuse 
sites or farm septic tanks, which can be burned directly or used to fuel gas 
engines to provide electricity.
Like tidal power, most renewable sources are of low density and capable only 
of intermittent outputs. Some, like wind power, are also unpredictable in the 
amount of power they can produce at any time; i.e. their ‘firm powers’ are very 
low. As a result it is necessary, for the foreseeable future, that the firm power 
of a conventional electricity supply system, with its interconnected “Grid’
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capacity, is retained to compensate for the varying and intermittent electricity 
supply which may be obtained from ‘renewable’ generation. As stated 
elsewhere in this dissertation, the controllers of the UK Grid system have 
agreed that a renewable generation capacity of lOGW or thereabouts (some 
20% of the present firm capacity connected to the national busbar at any one 
time) can be absorbed without undue concern for the system’s overall stability. 
The potential for renewable energy in this country at the present time is 
summarised below.
Technologv Estimated Energv Power
Potential Potential
TWh/annum GW
Wind power - on shore 45
Wind power - off shore 140
Tidal Power 54 24
Wave Power 50
Additional Hydro 2
Solar 14
Biofuel. Waste Products 44
Energy Crops 40
Geothermal 210
Data taken from ‘Renewable Energv in the UK’. ISBN 0 85296 527 3 
Institution of Electrical Engineers - March 1992
It should be noted that the present level of electricity consumption in the UK 
approximates 250TWh/annum, with a winter peak demand of 50GW.
Charlier indicates that, in world terms, the possible power levels available from 
the sea are enormous, with tidal and wave sources appearing low down on the 
overall list of estimated power outputs.
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Resource Estimated Power Availability
1Q6MW (TW)
Thermal Gradients (OTEC) 40,000
Salinity Gradients 1,400
Marine Bio Conversion 10
Tidal 5
Ocean Waves 3
Off-shore Winds > 20
Data taken from Tidal Energv - R.J. Charlier P7
N o tes:-
The solar energy absorbed by the oceans is immense; estimates suggest that 
as much as 80 billion MWh may be absorbed on a daily basis.
OTEC
The Ocean Thermal Energy Converter (OTEC) is simply a turbine plant 
suspended in the sea and designed to utilise the temperature difference 
between the ocean surface and its depths to boil a fluid such as propane to 
operate a vapour turbine. The OTEC process was considered in detail by the 
French who in 1952 constructed a plant at Abidjan (Republic of Ivory Coast). 
Major mechanical problems were encountered as a result of wave action on the 
huge suspended vessel and its adduction (cold water) pipe. Charlier asserts 
that the plant ‘went out of business due to the above plus the fact that
conventional generation produced cheaper electricity  ’.
Salinity Gradients
Using as a source of energy the salinity gradient between fresh and sea water, 
small batteries have been manufactured which, when immersed in the sea, 
provide low level power for emergency situations. Wicks and others (303) 
have examined the possibilities for large scale generating plants based on the 
principle. Problems have occurred at the permeable membrane separating the 
fresh and ‘salt’ water, due to concentration polarisation and bio-fouling which, 
together with the cost of the membrane itself and the expected damage to
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aquatic life, have cast doubts as to the ultimate success of this type of plant. 
Proponents of such schemes are, according to Charlier, ‘confident of their 
(eventual) implementation’. (304).
Marine Bio-conversion
Some of the enormous solar energy impinging on the surface of the oceans can 
be retrieved, as identified by the American Gas Association and others (305) 
(306), by the harvesting of ‘kelp’ (brown algae) and its subsequent conversion 
into methane and other useful residues. As with many other forms of 
renewable energy, large scale biomass production at sea appears to face major 
problems in respect of required capital and in operating the extensive kelp 
farms (several thousand hectares in area) necessary to make the method a 
feasible economic proposition.
Tidal Currents
A considerable literature exists on the subject of tidal currents. There are 
suggestions that tidal current technology and exploitation may be far less 
expensive than tidal barrage generation. (299). The French in particular have 
given much consideration to this method of sea power extraction (300) (301). 
Musgrove has indicated (299) that the annual average power released by the 
cunents through the North Channel of the Irish Sea is equivalent to 3.6GW; 
6.1GW is the estimated power of the tidal current through the Pentland Firth. 
The ‘most straightforward’ system of power extraction would be the 
underwater equivalent of the windmill, with vertical axis rotor. With a rotor in 
excess of one hundred metres diameter, blades fifty metres long and a tidal 
current of four knots, an output of ten megawatt could be expected. ‘Farms’ of 
several rotors feeding a central servicing facility have been proposed. (302).
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APPENDIX D
Comparison of the Various Severn Schemes 
(Planned Capacity/Construction)
Date of Scheme Planned Capacity 
GW
Construction Period
GW/annumY ears
1920 0.52 Several
1933 ) English 0.914 0.06
1945 ) Stones 0.80 0.1
1981 ) 7.2 0.6
1985 ) C ardiff- 7.2 0.8
1989 ) Weston 8.64 0.96
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Appendix E
A Comparison of Quoted and Anticipated Capital 
Costs and Unit Charges Associated with 
Severn Barrage Proposals.
Applying information assessed from:- ‘What Did It Cost The Day Before 
Y esterday’.
- Dr. Harold Priestley.
INCREASES 
1915-1945 1945-1990
Wages and Salaries Marginal x 16
RPI less Wages and Salaries x 1.68 x 14
Fuel and Lighting x 1.1 x 11
it is possible to make some comparison of the capital costs and kWh charges 
quoted by the different Severn Barrage committees with those which would be 
anticipated on the basis of changes which have taken place to the RPI over the
years. The fo lowing table summarises the comparisons.
Year Capital Costs £m. kWh Charges
1920
Quoted Anticipated Quoted Anticipated
(datum) 28 - 0.5d -
1933 38 37 0.15d 0.69d
1945 47 47 0.20d 0.88d
1980 885* 850-900 3.1p* 3.15p
(*Hooker figure 1982) (*Bondi figure 1980)
Although the quoted capital costs are in generally good agreement with those 
expected as a result of RPI changes, it is apparent that the unit costs quoted 
for 1933 and 1945 are very much lower than anticipated. The precise reason for
1 7 0
this divergence is not evident from the literature, but Hannah (311,) confirms 
that, by 1947, electricity tariffs and prices were now out of line not only with 
competing fuels but also with the cost structure of the industry at post war 
price levels.
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